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0. Introduction
There	be	none	of	Beauty’s	daughters	
With	a	magic	like	thee;	
And	like	music	on	the	waters	
Is	thy	sweet	voice	to	me:	
When,	as	if	its	sound	were	causing	
The	charmèd	ocean’s	pausing,	
The	waves	lie	still	and	gleaming	
And	the	lull’s	winds	seem	dreaming:	
And	the	midnight	moon	is	waving	
Her	bright	chain	o’er	the	deep;	
Whose	breast	is	gently	heaving,	
As	an	infant’s	asleep:	
So	the	spirit	bows	before	thee,	
To	listen	and	adore	thee;	
With	a	full	but	soft	emotion,	
Like	the	swell	of	Summer’s	ocean.1	
Beautiful	 verses	 have	 been	 dedicated	 to	 our	 special	 Goddess,	 those	 by	 Lord	
Byron	and	many	others.	 I	am	talking	about	music,	or	as	Greeks	thought	of	 it,	
the	art	of	 the	Muses	 (Mousikē).	Music	 seems	 to	have	been	 there,	 long	before	
Ancient	 Greece,	 next	 to	 us,	 accompanying	 humans	 throughout	 the	 ages,	
1	Poem	by	Lord	Byron,	an	ode	written	 to	music,	whose	 title	 is	 in	 fact	 “For	Music”	 (Byron	
1919	[1901]:	verse	598).	
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probably	 since	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 humanity.	 It	 inspires	 poets,	 artists	 and	
simple	 listeners;	 it	 takes	 infinite	 forms	and	serves	a	great	variety	of	purposes.	
The	voice	of	music	embraces	the	listener	with	its	arms,	its	magic	makes	us	bow	
before	it,	we	let	ourselves	dream	with	it	and	as	Byron	says,	it	invades	us	with	“a	
full	but	soft	emotion”	(Byron	1919	[1901]).	
It	 is	 commonplace	 to	 describe	music	 in	 emotive	 terms,	 to	 say	 that	we	
hear	melancholy	in	one	song,	or	that	another	raises	our	spirits.	It	is	also	claimed	
that	 music	 is	 essentially	 emotional,	 that	 there	 is	 no	 good	 music	 devoid	 of	
emotion,	that	this	quality	makes	music	so	special	and	that	it	is	there	where	its	
magic	 resides.	Probably	 it	 is	not	gratuitous	 to	 label	music	as	 “the	 language	of	
emotions”	 (Cooke	 1959),	 and	 regardless	 of	whether	 it	 is	 a	 proper	 language	or	
whether	 genuine	 emotions	 are	 involved	 in	 music,	 emotional	 properties	 are	
somehow	 detected	 in	 music	 and	 humans	 are	 often	 affected	 as	 a	 result	 of	
musical	experiences.	
The	relation	of	music	to	the	emotions	is	interesting	to	many	disciplines	
and	 from	different	 standpoints.	Philosophers,	musicologists,	 evolutionary	 and	
experimental	 psychologists,	 anthropologists,	 neuroscientists…	 all	 investigate	
and	 discuss	 the	 connection	 of	music	 with	 the	 emotive	 life.	My	 interest	 here	
focuses	 mainly	 in	 what	 music	 itself	 has	 to	 “tell”	 us	 about	 its	 relation	 to	 the	
affective	 realm,	 or	 broadly	 speaking,	 to	 what	 is	 taken	 as	 expressive	 and	
“emotional.”	 I	 point	 to	 what	 is	 in	 music,	 discover	 the	 aspects,	 elements	 or	
properties	that	make	a	piece	of	music	melancholic	or	cheerful,	or	at	least	that	
lead	it	to	be	heard	as	such.	In	other	words,	define	the	nature	of	music,	find	an	
explanation	for	its	expressiveness	and	also	see	how	those	properties	prompt	us	
to	react	in	particular	affective	ways.		
There	 is	 an	 aspect	 in	music	 that	 I	 would	 also	 like	 to	mention	 in	 this	
preface.	 There	 is	 something	 about	 music,	 that	 moves	 and	 enthralls	 the	
susceptible	listener	with	special	power,	fully	and	deeply,	an	intrinsic	force	that	
Kivy	calls	“the	mystery	of	music”	(2009:	205-213).	I	discuss	whether	music	moves	
the	 listener,	as	a	result	of	valuing	and	appreciating	the	work	and	 its	aesthetic	
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and	formal	features,	or	whether	there	is	something	else.	So	where	does	such	a	
power	 reside?	 Is	 it	 to	 be	 found	 in	 its	 purely	 abstract	 features,	 or	 has	 music	
another	sort	of	content	that	makes	the	aesthetic	experience	so	intense?	
In	work,	I	delve	into	the	relationship	of	music	and	emotions	adopting	a	
philosophical	 standpoint	 and	 grounding	 in	 the	 conceptual	 analysis	 proper	 of	
the	analytic	 aesthetics	 tradition.	 I	have	also	 taken	 into	consideration	 theories	
and	research	from	the	cognitive	sciences	on	emotions	and	music,	thinking	that	
an	interdisciplinary	study	may	illuminate	the	issue,	but	the	main	focus	has	been	
from	aesthetics.	Of	course,	for	the	issue	of	how	musical	properties	are	related	to	
its	 expressive	 power	 I	 have	 considered	 what	 music	 theory,	 and	 my	 personal	
experience	as	a	musician,	have	to	offer.		
For	this	purpose,	I	focus	on	the	problematic	relation	between	music	and	
expressive	 properties,	 and	 particularly	 between	music	 and	 emotions.	 I	 try	 to	
clarify	 what	 is	 meant	 when	 we	 describe	music	 in	 expressive	 terms,	 and	 also	
what	the	nature	of	the	emotional	experience	of	listeners	is	when	appreciating	a	
musical	work.			
First,	 I	 shall	 face	 the	 puzzle	 about	 how	 can	 music	 be	 expressive	 of	
emotion,	 being	 music,	 as	 it	 is,	 a	 non-sentient	 object,	 devoid	 of	 agency	 and	
consciousness.	I	want	to	clarify	what	is	meant	when	we	say	that	music	expresses	
emotions,	 when	 we	 say	 that	 the	 second	 movement	 of	 Beethoven’s	 Eroica2is	
mournful,	that	we	can	hear	it	expressing	sorrow,	affliction	and	so	on.	Could	we	
really	talk	about	music	expressing	emotions	in	a	literal	sense?	If	so,	how	could	
music	do	it?	Were	this	the	case,	whose	emotions?	Where	do	they	come	from?	If	
they	are	emotions,	what	are	they	about?	Or	are	they	not	about	anything?		
Then,	I	look	at	the	emotive	properties	of	music	from	a	broader	perspective.	
Music	 is	 one	 of	 the	 fine	 arts,	 but	 has	 very	 special	 peculiarities.	 I	 am	 talking	
about	music	 alone,	 absolute	 music.	 I	 would	 like	 to	 show	 that	 the	 expressive	
																																								 								
2	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6l_bPmJifV4.	Beethoven’s	Symphony	No.	3,	 in	E-flat	
major,	 op.55,	 also	 known	 as	Eroica.	 The	 examples	 refers	 to	 the	 2nd	Movement,	 Adagio	
Assai	in	C	minor.	
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features	of	music	are	part	of	its	aesthetic	properties.	This	task	requires	several	
terminological	 clarifications	 and	 probably	 also	 a	 short	 historical	 review	 in	
regard	to	aesthetics.	The	aim	is	to	define	what	aesthetic	properties	are,	to	see	
whether	expressive	properties,	and	particularly	emotive	ones,	can	be	regarded	
as	aesthetic	properties	or	whether	they	are	something	else.	
The	next	step	is	to	clarify	the	nature	of	those	properties,	to	see	if	they	have	
an	 ontological	 place	 in	 music,	 or	 on	 the	 contrary,	 are	 mere	 human	
constructions.	 I	 explain	 the	 relation	 of	 the	 primary	 elements	 of	 music	 to	 its	
expressive	properties,	developing	a	classification	of	possible	 types	of	aesthetic	
properties	in	artworks,	and	particularly	in	music.	
Once	that	is	done,	it’s	time	to	go	into	the	detail,	and	enter	into	the	musical	
machinery,	its	dimensions	and	the	aspects	that	constitute	and	grant	music	such	
power.	Moving	across	that	terrain,	we	will	need	also	to	explain	why	and	how	it	
is	 that	we	 recognize	 expressive	 and	 particularly	 emotive	 properties	 in	music.	
With	this	aim,	I	propose	a	resemblance	account	of	music	inspired	by	Peter	Kivy	
and	Stephen	Davies.		
Finally,	 I	 also	 explore	which	 kinds	 of	 emotion,	 quasi-emotions,	moods	 or	
other	affective	reactions	listeners	experience	with	a	piece	of	music,	at	least	if	we	
consider	that	they	experience	anything	at	all.	Listening	to	the	Eroica	makes	us	
sad	 and	 gloomy,	 makes	 us	 cry,	 lets	 our	 mind	 wander	 in	 past	 mournful	
experiences,	drives	us	to	despair,	or	fills	us	with	awe.	For	the	present	I	am	not	
so	much	interested	in	any	kind	of	affective	responses,	but	in	those	that	have	to	
do	with	the	properties	that	music	itself	presents.		
There	are	many	things	that	need	to	be	considered	in	order	to	achieve	those	
goals.	We	should	define	our	concept	of	emotion	and	its	constituents	first.	In	the	
case	of	music,	especially	 in	pure	or	absolute	music,3	this	explanation	becomes	
problematic,	 given	 that	 there	 is	 no	 obvious	 content	 at	 which	 a	 music-work	
points,	i.e.,	there	is	apparently	nothing	to	be	sad,	angry	or	joyful	about.	At	first	
																																								 								
3	I	clarify	the	concept	of	absolute	or	pure	music	in	section	0.1.	
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sight	 there	 is	 no	 one,	 nothing	 in	 the	 Eroica	 for	 whom	 I	 may	 feel	 sad,	 nor	
nothing	 for	which	 I	might	 feel	despair.	How	could	music	be	 the	object	of	my	
emotion	 then?	 How	 could	 it	 be	 its	 cause?	 Why	 do	 we	 react	 to	 music	
emotionally	if	it	does	not	have	obvious	implications	for	our	lives?		
Be	that	as	it	may,	our	experience	makes	it	difficult	to	deny	that	music	moves	
us	in	one	way	or	other.	And	this	is	precisely	what	I	intend	to	clarify	at	the	end	of	
this	 work,	 where	 its	 power	 to	move	 us	 resides,	 and	 what	 we	 precisely	mean	
when	we	talk	about	“being	moved”	by	it?	
Philosophy	of	music	 is	the	discipline	that	studies	the	nature	of	music	and	
our	experience	of	it	(Kania	2014).	Much	of	the	philosophical	questions	regarding	
music	 concern	 aesthetics,	 given	 that	 music	 has	 been	 considered,	 since	 the	
eighteenth	century,	as	one	of	the	fine	arts,	and	it	is	an	extended	practice	among	
people	 (composers,	 performers,	 or	 listeners).	 Issues	 concerning	 ontology	 and	
music	 cognition,	 are	 studied	 together	 with	 the	 relation	 of	 music	 to	 the	
emotions,	in	the	philosophy	of	music.	As	I	have	said,	this	research	work	focuses	
on	the	latter.		
As	with	many	philosophical	issues,	the	early	philosophical	discussions	on	
music	 can	 be	 found	 to	 be	 in	 conceptual	 confusion.	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 such	
confusions,	I	will	try	first	to	clarify	the	notion	of	“music”	as	an	artistic	discipline	
that	deserves	aesthetic	 interest.	Afterwards	we	will	 see	what	 is	understood	by	
the	term	“emotion,”	and	develop	my	notion	of	it.		
Music	is	commonly	defined	as	the	art	of	organized	sound,	differing	with	
other	 sound	 structures,	 that	 even	 if	 organized,	 cannot	 be	 properly	 taken	 as	
music.	An	influential	definition	of	music	was	given	by	Hanslick,	claiming	that	
“music	is	forms	put	into	motion	through	sounds”	(Hanslick	1986	[1891]:	28).	We	
can	 think	of	examples	of	 sounds	 that	 follow	patterns	or	organized	 structures,	
heard	 in	 our	 daily	 life,	 but	 which	 could	 hardly	 be	 considered	 proper	 music.	
Speeches,	the	tolling	of	church	bells,	the	roaring	of	car	engines	or	the	sound	of	
chirping	birds	may	be	 taken	as	 examples	of	 organized	 sound.	We	could	 even	
hear	them	“as	if”	they	were	music	and	“as	if	they	had”	some	formal	properties	of	
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the	musical	 sort	 (melody,	 rhythm…).	But	 I	would	not	 take	 them	as	music,	 at	
least	if	they	were	not	created	qua	art	or	with	a	musical	purpose.4	We	could	add	
that	 we	 also	 hear	musical	 sounds	 as	 pitched,	 occupying	 a	 place	 in	 the	 scale	
(Davies	2003,	Scruton	1997).	However,	it	seems	to	me	that	this	definition	does	
not	 cover,	 for	 instance,	 works	 of	 percussion	 or	 electronic	musical	 loops	 that	
lack	pitch	or	tone	as	an	element.	A	more	promising	definition	of	music	has	been	
offered	by	Levinson,	claiming	that	its	sounds	must	be	organized,	
(...)	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 enriching	 or	 intensifying	 experience	 through	 active	
engagement	(e.g.	listening,	dancing	or	performing)	with	the	sounds	regarded	
primarily,	or	in	significant	measure,	as	sounds.	(Levinson	1990:	273)	
A	test-case	for	the	concept	of	music	is	John	Cage’s	4,33,5	“silent”	where	the	
musical	 “sounds”	 as	 commonly	 understood,	 have	 no	 pitch,	 no	 rhythm,	 no	
harmony,	no	structure.	So,	is	it	nothing?	Most	musicologists	take	“the	content	
of	 the	piece	 to	be	 the	sounds	 that	occur	during	 the	performance,	 rather	 than	
the	 silence	due	 to	 the	performer’s	 inaction”	 (Kania	2014	 :	 3),	 an	 idea	however	
discussable,	 which	 poses	 a	 serious	 question	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 ontology	 of	
music.6	
In	this	dissertation	I	avoid	controversial	examples	(of	the	type	of	Cage’s	
work),	 and	 I	 limit	 to	what	 is	 taken	paradigmatically	 as	music,	 i.e.,	 structured	
sound	works	 created	 as	 art,	 composed	 qua	 music,	 and	 constituted	 by	 purely	
musical	elements,	such	as	harmony,	pitched	tone	and	rhythm.	I	will	also	narrow	
																																								 								
4	Notice	that	much	music	has	been	composed	with	the	intention	of	emulating	such	sound	
patterns.	 Examples	 can	 been	 found	 in	 Honegger’s	 Pacific	 231,	 said	 to	 represent	 steam	
engines,	Vivaldi’s	Spring	the	singing	of	birds,	or	the	passage	on	which	Berlioz’s	Symphonie	
Fantastique,	5th	movement	emulates	the	bells	of	death.		
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xp80cHYVh2Q	(Honegger’s	Pacific231)	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cao6WyF-61s	 (Berlioz,	 Symphonie	 Fantastique,	 5th	
movement)	
5	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zY7UK-6aaNA.	(John	Cage’s	4,33)	
6 	For	 further	 information	 and	 reflection	 on	 the	 subject,	 I	 recommend	 watching	 this	
controversial	 video	 by	 William	 Dodds	 of	 Manchester	 University:	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WTCVnKROlos	
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the	scope	to	absolute	music,	this	will	be	the	main	character	of	this	story,	music	
without	text,	lyrics	or	program,	also	called	pure	music,	instrumental	music,	or	
“music	alone”	(Kivy	1990).	In	other	words,	music	without	the	accompaniment	of	
non-musical	components.	The	main	reason	for	this,	that	is	confining	myself	to	
pure	music,	is	that	it	allows	a	better	understanding	of	what	music	has	to	“tell”	
by	 itself,	 without	 attributing	 or	 transferring	 this	 content	 to	 narrative	
components	of	any	sort.	That	being	so,	 I	 think	we	can	examine	the	questions	
and	 evaluate	 the	 possible	 answers	 about	music	 and	 emotions	more	 carefully,	
and	avoid	extra-musical	contamination.		
Regarding	emotions,	what	I	have	found	is	that	the	term	is	used	to	cover	
too	 broad	 a	 variety	 of	 phenomena	 and	 that	 there	 is	 no	 agreement	 about	 the	
essential	element	of	an	emotional	process.	Often	“emotion”	is	used	to	refer	to	
states	charged	with	feeling	that,	as	far	as	I	can	see,	don’t	fulfill	the	conditions	of	
a	 full-blooded	 emotional	 episode.	Besides,	 theories	 of	 emotions	 can	be	 found	
back	 in	 Plato	 and	 Aristotle,	 and	 since	 then,	 philosophers’	 and	 psychologists’	
explanations	 have	 fluctuated	 throughout	 history,	 sometimes	 stressing	 their	
feeling	 components,	 other	 times	 claiming	 that	 emotions	 are	 essentially	
cognitive	processes.	Even	 though	 I	have	 read	up	on	 theories	of	 emotions	and	
actual	discussions	on	the	topic,	I	don’t	intend	to	expose	them	here	thoroughly,	
but	just	to	the	extent	that	some	ideas	may	help	to	illuminate	our	issue.			
Thus,	the	very	definition	of	“emotion”	depends	on	the	theory	of	emotion	
adopted.	 In	 Chapter	 1	 I	 clarify	 concepts	 related	 to	 that	 term,	 concepts	 that	
occupy	what	 I	 call	 “the	 affective	 realm.”	Throughout	 the	dissertation,	 I	 argue	
that	the	idea	of	“emotion”	in	its	narrow	sense	involves	much	more	than	feeling	
and	its	corresponding	somatic	or	physiological	component.	I	claim	that	there	is	
no	 emotion	 without	 cognition,	 but	 neither	 emotion	 without	 feeling.	 I	 take	
emotions	 as	mental	 states	 generated	 as	 responses	 to	 certain	 events	 that	have	
significance	 to	our	well-being.	They	 involve	 feeling	components,	 affect	bodily	
changes,	 have	 physiological	 impact,	 affect	 our	 behavior	 (have	 motivational	
force)	 and	 are	 triggered	when	 an	 external	 object	 is	 appraised	 or	 judged	 in	 a	
specific	way	relevant	for	our	well-being.		
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I	have	also	pointed	to	the	ideas	of	the	“attentive	listener,”	“ideal	listener”	
or	 the	 “appropriate	 listening	 experience.”	 Attentive	 listeners	 do	 not	 need	
profound	knowledge	 in	music	 theory,	 neither	 to	 be	 experts	 in	 that	 particular	
style.	 But	 there	 are	 still	 some	 minimal	 constraints:	 the	 “hearing”	 must	 be	
directed	 at	 the	work,	 attention	 focused	 as	much	 as	 possible,	 and	 the	 listener	
should	be	minimally	 familiarized	with	 that	 specific	 sort	of	music	 for	a	proper	
understanding,	appreciation	and	aesthetic	enjoyment	of	it.	
I	 consider	 it	 important	 to	delimit	 the	discussion	of	emotions	 to	 such	a	
prototype	 listener,	 whose	 perception,	 attention	 and	 cognitive	 involvement	 is	
focused	 on	 music.	 Conclusions	 based	 on	 passive	 or	 disinterested	 attitudes	
towards	music,	would	not	be	relevant	for	this	research	(although	this	could	be	
interesting	from	a	psychological	standpoint).	Obviously	there	are	many	modes	
of	listening	to	music,	and	I	don’t	intend	to	defend	some	above	others.	But	for	
the	present	purpose,	I	will	avoid	the	type	of	hearing	or	enjoying	of	music	that	
somehow	distances	the	listener	from	what	is	a	proper	musical	perception.	Some	
music	may	 push	 us	 to	 dance,	 or	 help	 us	 to	 create	 a	 tranquil	 and	 enveloping	
atmosphere,	and	that’s	good	and	licit.	But	as	soon	as	we	forget	about	listening	
to	music,	our	attitude	is	not	useful	for	this	discussion	anymore.		
I	any	case,	I	claim	that	an	aesthetic	listening	experience	(at	the	time	of	
listening)	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 devoid	 of	 affection,	 and	 that	 identifying	 the	
expressive	properties	in	the	work	and	getting	carried	away	for	its	beauty,	may	
even	help	in	a	better	understanding	of	the	music-work.	
Outline	
The	structure	of	my	work	is	the	following	one,	In	Chapter	1,	I	present	the	puzzle	
of	music	expressiveness.	I	critically	analyze	different	accounts	to	pave	the	way	
for	 my	 proposal.	 In	 Chapter	 2,	 I	 expose	 a	 cognitivist	 account	 of	 music	
expressiveness.	I	argue	that	emotions	in	music	are	not	felt,	but	are	perceptual	
properties	 of	 it,	 and	 that	 music	 has	 the	 power	 to	 exhibit	 the	 appearance	 of	
emotions.	 Chapter	 3	 focuses	 on	 aesthetic	 properties	 or	 art-works,	 and,	
departing	from	Sibley’s	account	on	“aesthetic	concepts,”	I	propose	a	taxonomy	
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of	second-level	aesthetic	properties	of	art	in	general.	I	also	show	the	place	that	
expressive	properties	occupy	among	them.	Chapter	4,	brings	us	back	to	music	
and	to	show	how	the	classification	of	aesthetic	properties	applies	to	music.	I	use	
various	 examples	 to	 illustrate	 the	 classification	 and	 its	 scope.	 In	Chapter	 5,	 I	
address	 the	 issue	 of	how	 is	 that	 music	 is	 able	 to	 include	 those	 expressive	
properties	 in	 it,	 particularly	 emotive	 properties.	The	 core	 issue	 of	 this	
chapter	then,	is	 to	 explain	 how	 do	 emotions	 “get	 into”	 absolute	 music.”	 In	
Chapter	6,	 I	 present	 the	Radford	Paradox	of	 fiction	 as	 an	 introduction	of	 the	
issue	of	emotions	in	the	listener.	I	present	two	ways	in	which	music	can	induce	
emotive	 or	 more	 generally	 affective	 responses	 in	 the	 listener.	 As	 usual,	 the	
seventh	and	last	Chapter	is	devoted	to	the	conclusions	and	the	plans	for	future	
research.	
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Chapter	1	
1. The	puzzle	of	expressiveness	
in	music	
The	 emotional	 expressiveness	 of	 music	 has	 been,	 since	 Hanslick’s	 formalist	
account,	a	much	discussed	issue	in	the	aesthetics	of	music.	Against	his	skeptical	
ideas,	there	is	a	growing	consensus	that	music	is	expressive	of	human	emotions,	
and	that	music	is	often	heard	as	expressive	of	emotions	by	listeners.	We	say	that	
the	second	movement	of	Beethoven’s	Eroica7	is	mournful,	that	Chopin’s	Etude	
Op.	 10	 No.12	 expresses	 anger,	 or	 that	 Tchaikovsky’s	 Sixth	 Symphony	 sounds	
depressing.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 such	 agreement	 about	 what	 is	 meant	 by	
“expression	of	emotions”,	nor	in	explanations	of	how	music	can	be	expressive	of	
emotions.	How	can	we	make	sense	of	there	being	emotions	in	music,	given	that	
it	 is	a	non-sentient	object,	devoid	of	agency	and	consciousness?	Can	we	really	
talk	 about	 being	 emotions	 in	music	 in	 a	 literal	 sense?	 If	 this	 were	 the	 case,	
which	sort	of	emotions,	or	whose	emotions?		
1.1. Emotions	 in	 ordinary	 life	 and	
emotions	in	music	
Describing	 music	 in	 emotive	 terms	 puts	 us	 into	 a	 quandary.	 Emotions,	 in	 a	
broad	 sense,	 are	 mental	 states	 attributed	 to	 sentient	 agents	 and	 commonly	
involve	 feelings,	 physiological	 reactions,	 cognitive	 processes	 and	 behavioral	
changes.	 The	 significance	 of	 these	 elements	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 account	 of	
																																								 								
7	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6l_bPmJifV4.	Beethoven’s	Symphony	No.	3,	 in	E-flat	
major,	 op.	 55,	 also	 known	as	Eroica.	 The	 examples	 refer	 to	 the	 2nd	Movement,	Adagio	
Assai	in	C	minor.	It	is	a	classic	example	in	musical	aesthetics	literature.		
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emotions	we	adopt.	But	in	any	case,	it	seems	pretty	obvious	that	emotions	are	
not	part	of	music	in	the	same	way	they	are	part	of	human	beings.	Music	is	not	
melancholic	or	jolly	in	the	way	a	person	might	be.	Music	does	not	feel,	think	or	
react	to	any	stimuli.		
However,	 we	 describe	 music	 in	 expressive	 terms	 and	 in	 fact	 there	 is	 a	
significant	consensus	in	the	attributions	of	emotion	we	make	to	different	music	
passages,	 at	 least	 about	 some	 characteristic	 emotional	 features.	 There	will	 be	
little	 doubt,	 I	 guess,	 with	 describing	 Albinoni’s	 Adagio	 as	 “sad,”	 or	 the	main	
theme	 of	 Bach’s	 Toccata	 and	 Fugue	 in	 D	 minor	 as	 expressive	 of	 “fury”	 or	
“anger.”	 But	 applying	 predicates	 like	 “proud,”	 “desperate”	 or	 “tender”	 to	
instrumental	music	pieces	may	bring	more	disagreement	and	make	us	wonder	
whether	such	terms	point	at	real	properties	of	the	work,	or	denote	our	personal	
experience	of	it,	or	are	somehow	influenced	by	external	factors	(say,	the	context	
of	 the	 composition,	 canon,	 et	 cetera).	 Are	 all	 emotive	 descriptions	 of	 music	
events	merely	figurative,	or	is	it	possible	to	make	sense	of	them	(at	least	some	of	
them)	 in	 any	 other	 way?	 Can	 emotive	 properties	 be	 regarded	 as	 part	 of	 the	
purely	musical	content?	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 will	 clarify	 what	 is	 understood	 by	 “emotion.”	 In	 later	
chapters	 I	will	show	that	“expression	of	emotion”	when	attributed	to	music	 is	
understood	 in	 different	 ways,	 and	 only	 one	 of	 these	 different	 senses	 of	
“expression”	has	a	place	in	the	context	of	purely	musical	pieces	and	explains	the	
expressiveness	of	music.	Finally,	I	will	discuss	which	account	explains	best	how	
music	is	expressive	of	emotions.	
1.2. What	are	emotions?	
The	 term	 “emotion”	 is	 used	 as	 an	 umbrella	 term	 that	 covers	 what	 I	 will	 call	
“fully-fledged	 emotions”	 such	 as	 sadness,	 fear,	 anger	 or	 joy	 (emotions	 in	 its	
narrow	 sense),	 and	 moods	 such	 as	 depression,	 anxiety,	 melancholy	 or	
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nervousness,	 and	 feelings.8	The	 aim	 of	 this	 section	 is	 not	 to	 survey	 in	 depth	
different	accounts	of	emotions,	but	to	clarify	a	few	concepts	and	sketch	a	hybrid	
theory	of	emotions	that	I	think	answers	best	to	the	diversity	of	the	emotional	
phenomena,	and	sheds	light	on	the	relation	between	emotions	and	music.9	
Contemporary	 philosophy	 and	 psychology	 hold	 quite	 generally	 that	
emotions	 are	 intentional,	 evaluative	 and	 related	 to	 events	 in	 the	 world.	
However,	there	is	divergence	about	what	emotions	are.	Thoughts,	perception,	
memory,	action	tendencies,	behavioral	patterns,	feelings,	body	changes...	are	
all	elements	of	affective	processes.	But	it	is	contentious	whether	any	of	them	
is	more	fundamental	than	the	rest.		
At	one	extreme	of	 the	spectrum	of	 theories	of	emotion	stand	cognitive	
theories,	 emphasizing	 the	 role	of	 thoughts	 and	propositional	 attitudes	 and	
downplaying	that	of	bodily	processes	(Lyons	1980).	Cognitive	theories	assign	
emotions	 an	 evaluative	 judgment	 (a	 thought	 content)	 and	 it	 is	 such	 a	
judgment	 about	 the	 object	 that	 is	 the	 import10	of	 emotion	 (the	 judgment	
about	good	fortune	as	the	import	of	joy,	for	example).	This	view,	that	traces	
back	 to	 classical	 times,11	is	 probably	 the	 dominant	 account	 of	 emotions	 in	
contemporary	philosophy.		
At	the	other	extreme,	we	find	feeling	theories	of	emotions,	which	make	
bodily	 reactions	 and	 the	 feeling	 of	 such	 changes,	 essential	 to	 emotions	
(James	 1884,	 on	 the	 somatic	 feeling	 account;	Damasio	 1997,	 Prinz	 2004,	 as	
revisited	versions	of	feeling	theory	of	emotion).	
																																								 								
8	Prinz	(2004)	refers	to	emotions,	moods,	motivations,	sentiments	and	valence	bodily	states	
as	 the	main	 affective	 constructs.	 Ben-Zé'ev	 distinguishes	 emotions,	 sentiments,	moods,	
affective	 traits,	 and	 affective	 disorders.	 For	 present	 purposes,	 I	 think	 it	 is	 sufficient	 if	 I	
focus	 on	 emotions	 and	 moods.	 In	 any	 case	 for	 further	 reading,	 see	 Aaron	 Ben-Zé'ev	
(2000).	
9	For	 deeper	 immersion	 in	 theories	 of	 emotion	 see	 Lazarus	 (1999),	 Prinz	 (2004),	 Deigh	
2009.	
10	With	import	is	meant	the	core	content	of	emotion.	
11	The	Stoics	and	Aristotle	wrote	about	those	issues.	
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Of	 course,	 there	 are	many	 accounts	 in	between.	Perceptual	 theories	 of	
emotions	 are	 one	 example	 (De	 Sousa	 1987,	 Nussbaum	 2002),	 and	 answer	
some	 of	 the	 objections	 made	 to	 standard	 cognitive	 accounts.12	Appraisal	
theories,	such	as	the	one	proposed	by	Lazarus	(1991),	Lazarus	&	Smith	(2000	
[1990])	or	Arnold	(1960)	might	offer	the	key	to	understanding	why	emotions	
differ	between	individuals.	In	general	terms,	they	claim	that	evaluations,	or	
better,	appraisals	of	the	situation	are	essential	to	the	definition	of	particular	
emotions,	 and	 propose	 that	 different	 patterns	 of	 appraisals	 (according	 to	
different	dimensions)	give	rise	to	particular	emotions.13		
Feelings	 are	 defined	 as	 “the	 subjective	 experience	 of	 emotions	 and	
moods”	by	Juslin	&	Sloboda	(2010:	10).14	We	say	that	“we	feel	sad,”	or	that	“we	
feel	 depressed,”	 to	 denote	 our	 particular	 experience	 with	 regard	 to	 an	
emotional	 process.	 Feelings	 are	 experienced	 due	 to	 physiological	 changes	
that	 can	 be	 identified	 (e.g.	 heartbeat	 racing,	 hard	 breathing,	 gut	
contraction	…	),	body	changes	that	the	subject	perceives	internally	(Damasio	
2006	[1994]:	143).	It	could	be	said	that	feelings	involve	not	only	a	subjective	
aspect,	but	also	a	physical-objective	response.	In	any	case,	feelings	are	basic	
components	 of	 both	 emotions	 and	 moods,	 but	 not	 all	 feelings	 are	
components	in	emotions	(Damasio	2006	[1994]:	150-151).	For	example,	feeling	
physically	 tired,	 calm	 or	 excited	 does	 not	 require	 an	 emotional	 import;	 in	
																																								 								
12	A	 typical	 objection	 to	 cognitive	 theories	 of	 emotions	 is	 illustrated	with	 the	 example	of	
“fear	of	falling”.	Fear	may	be	felt	in	front	of	a	precipice	even	if	one	is	sure	she	won’t	fall.	
Perceptual	 theories	 answer	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 belief	 about	 falling	 but	 the	 perception	 of	
danger	in	falling	that	causes	fear.	This	would	also	explain	why	we	experience	emotions	in	
fiction.	
13	According	to	Lazarus	&	Smith	(2000	[(1990)]	appraisals	can	be	understood	as	“evaluations	
of	what	 one’s	 relationship	 to	 the	 environment	 implies	 for	 personal	 well-being.”	Magda	
Arnold	(1960)	distinguishes	three	dimensions	to	each	emotion;	Lazarus	(...)	offers	a	more	
elaborated	 six-dimensional	 account.	 For	 example,	 anger	 is	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
following	aspects:	goal	relevance	(it	is	relevant),	goal	congruence	(it	is	in-congruent),	type	
of	 ego-involvement	 (self-esteem	 for	 example),	 blame	 or	 credit	 (someone	 is	 to	 blame),	
coping	 potential	 (attack	 is	 viable)	 and	 future	 expectancy	 (things	 will	 be	 expected	 to	
change	by	attack).	That’s	why	more	or	less	satisfactorily	different	combinations	of	values	
can	define,	according	to	Lazarus,	different	emotions.	
14	The	 first	 entries	 of	 New	 Oxford	 American	 Dictionary	 (2005)	 defines	 “feeling”	 as	 “an	
emotional	state	or	reaction,”	“emotional	responses	or	tendencies	to	respond.”	
		 14	
contrast,	when	an	emotion	 like	 fear	 is	experienced,	 something	else	beyond	
the	physical	reaction	is	involved,	there	is	something	to	be	fearful	of	and	the	
shortness	of	breath	is	induced	by	the	perception	and	probably	evaluation	of	
such	an	object.	
So,	we	said	that	emotional	states	(in	a	broad	sense)	are	characteristically	
accompanied	by	physiological	changes	or	body	reactions.	Fear	comes	usually	
together	 with	 a	 quickened	 pulse,	 a	 shortness	 of	 breath,	 trembling	 lips	 or	
goose-bumps;	rage	causes	flushing	of	the	face,	clenching	of	the	teeth	and	so	
on.	 Sometimes	 symptoms	 are	more	 easily	 recognizable	 than	 others,	which	
makes	 the	 category	 of	 emotions	 so	diverse.15	I	will	 argue	 in	Chapter	 2	 that	
this	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	not	just	any	emotion	can	be	depicted	by	music.		
The	boundary	between	moods	and	emotions	 is	not	clear.	 It	 is	not	even	
clear	whether	they	are	of	a	distinct	class	or	not.16	They	are	in	fact	often	used	
interchangeably	 to	 refer	 to	 thematically	 parallel	 moods	 and	 emotions	
(gloomy/melancholy-sadness,	anxiousness-fear,	 ...).	This	extends	also	to	the	
predicates	we	ascribe	to	musical	passages.	We	may	describe	Chopin’s	C	sharp	
minor	Nocturne	as	having	a	melancholic	(mood)	touch,	or	we	could	refer	to	
it	as	a	sad	(emotion)	music	piece,	and	probably	both	descriptions	match	our	
perception	of	 it.	So,	 it	 seems	moods	and	emotions	have	much	 in	common.	
Both	have	a	 feeling	component	that	 involves	physiological	changes	and	are	
characteristically	 linked	 to	 outward	 physio-gnomic	 and	 bodily	 expression.	
They	may	 also	 be	 induced	 by	 the	 same	 particular	 object;	 for	 example,	 the	
death	of	a	friend	as	the	cause	of	sadness,	as	well	as	what	triggers	a	depressive	
mood	in	the	long	term.		
Let’s	 look	 now	 at	 some	 differences.	 Moods	 are	 generally	 defined	 as	 low	
intensity	 subjective	 feeling	 states	 that	 are	 relatively	 long-lasting.	 In	 contrast,	
																																								 								
15	Different	types	of	emotions	and	their	relation	with	music	expressiveness	are	reviewed	in	
section	2.6.	
16	Prinz	 (2004:	 182-190)	 adopts	 this	 view,	 and	 offers	 a	 very	 interesting	 discussion	 on	 the	
issue.	
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emotions	 normally	 have	 a	 shorter	 life	 but	 are	 felt	 with	 more	 intensity.	 An	
outburst	 of	 anger	 will	 probably	 be	 the	 result	 of	 a	 particular	 emotional	
experience,	a	short-lasting	but	intense	emotive	reaction;	whereas	a	depressing	
mood	can	be	milder	but	endure	much	longer	and	with	everlasting	pain	(notice	
that	 a	mood	 state	may	be	 originated	by	 a	 previously	 felt	 emotion).	 Similarly,	
moods	 respond	 or	 apply	 to	 global	 conditions	 whereas	 emotions	 involve	
focusing	attention	on	a	subset	of	the	environmental	input,	on	a	specific	event,	a	
stimulus,	 a	 story,	 something	 that	 implies	 a	 significant	 change	 for	 our	
well-being.		
In	standard	cases	emotions	point	to	specific	situations,	are	about	something	
or	 have	 an	 “aboutness.”	 You	 are	 angry,	 proud	 or	 fearful	 about	 something.	 In	
contrast,	moods	may	not	have	a	clear	object	pointed	at;	we	are	often	trapped	by	
them	in	such	a	way	that	the	cause	that	initially	triggered	this	affective	state	may	
be	blurred.	For	 instance,	 you	may	 find	yourself	 feeling	gloomy	or	 anxious	 for	
several	days	or	months	without	being	able	to	say	what	you	are	gloomy	about.	
However,	 I	 don’t	 think	 this	 means	 that	 moods	 lack	 intentionality.	 Indeed,	 I	
don’t	think	emotions	and	moods	differ	in	that	some	are	intentional	states	and	
the	 others	 unintentional,	 but	 in	 that	 the	 cause	 of	 an	 emotion,	 in	 contrast	 to	
moods,	 is	 usually	 a	 particular	 event.	 Thus,	moods	 are	 also	 intentional	 states,	
even	 if	 the	 objects	 they	 correspond	 to	 are	 not	 particulars.	 I	 draw	 on	 a	
distinction	made	by	Jesse	Prinz	in	support	of	this	view.	
According	 to	 Prinz	 (2004),	 intentionality	 does	 not	 lie	 in	 the	 particular	
object	that	“caused”	the	emotion,	in	what	triggered	that	emotion	(say,	sadness	
at	the	death	of	a	family	member),	but	in	the	formal-relational	object	that	such	
emotion	represents	(“loss	of	something	valued”	in	the	case	of	sadness).	In	other	
words,	 intentionality	 lies	 in	the	property	 in	virtue	of	which	an	event	elicits	an	
emotion.17	If	 we	 follow	 that,	 moods	 such	 as	 anxious	 or	 melancholic	 states,	
																																								 								
17	Prinz	 (2004:	62-63),	 invoking	Kenny’s	 (1963)	 idea,	distinguishes	between	 the	event	 that	
causes	an	emotion	(the	particular	object),	and	what	the	emotion	represents	(the	formal	
object).	 The	 latter	 is	 the	 relational	 property,	 the	 property	 in	 virtue	 of	 which	 an	 event	
elicits	 an	 emotion,	 a	 property	 that	 represents	 an	 organism-environmental	 relation.	 For	
example,	 sadness	 represents	 a	 loss,	 and	 the	death	of	 a	 child	 is	 the	 cause	of	 sadness,	 in	
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represent	also	those	sorts	of	property,	an	uncertain	threat	in	the	case	of	anxiety	
or	 a	 low-spirited	 feeling	 of	 loss	 in	 the	 latter.	 I	 think	 here	 resides	 the	 most	
important	 difference	 between	 emotions	 and	moods.	Melancholy	 (mood)	 and	
sadness	 (fully-fledged	 emotion)	may	 share	 the	 same	 formal	 property	 (loss	 of	
something	valued),	but	in	melancholy	as	a	mood,	it	may	be	difficult	to	find	the	
particular	object	 that	 triggered	such	affective	 state.	Thus,	both,	emotions	and	
moods	involve	intentionality,	the	difference	is	that	the	cause	of	an	emotion,	in	
contrast	to	that	of	moods,	is	usually	a	particular	event.		
Finally,	 fully-fledged	 emotional	 processes	 involve	 cognition	 to	 some	
degree	 and	 require	 evaluative	 appraisals	 of	 external	 events.	 In	 contrast,	
moods	might	influence	cognitive	capacities	(Carroll	2003),	but	may	not	be	a	
result	of	cognition	or	require	a	specific	appraisal	to	set	them	off.			
Summarizing,	 I	 take	 emotions	 as	 feeling-charged	 mental	 states	 directed	
towards	 particular	 objects.	 Focused	 on	what	 is	 important	 to	 the	 subject	 as	 a	
result	of	an	appraisal	for	her	well-being,	they	represent	characteristic	relational	
properties.18	Moods	are	also	feeling-charged	mental	states,	but	refer	to	things	or	
situations	quite	generally,	and	are	less	attached	to	and	focused	on	something	in	
particular.		
Therefore,	I	assume	an	“hybrid”	theory	of	emotions.	I	support	the	idea	that	
feelings	 and	 bodily	 reactions	 normally	 involved	 with	 them	 are	 basic	 in	
emotional	processes.	But,	at	the	same	time,	I	think	reducing	what	an	emotion	is	
to	our	experience	of	changes	in	the	body	oversimplifies	the	phenomena.	For	an	
emotional	 episode	 to	 occur,	 a	 situation,	 real	 or	 fictional,	 external	 or	 internal,	
																																								 																																								 																																								 															
virtue	of	being	a	loss.	Being	a	loss,	in	fact,	does	not	depend	on	being	represented	as	a	loss.	
I	may	not	represent	the	death	as	a	loss	given	that	I	don’t	care	about	that	child,	and	wont’	
respond	 emotionally.	 But	 it	 is	 still	 a	 loss.	 So,	 sadness	 is	 not	 intentional	 because	 it	 is	
directed	 at	 the	 death	 of	 a	 child,	 rather	 because	 it	 represents	 loss	 (a	 formal-relational	
element).	
18	Lazarus	 (1991)	 offers	 a	 “dimensional	 appraisal	 theory”	 of	 emotions,	 which	 could	 be	
regarded	as	a	particular	type	of	cognitive	theory	of	emotions.	In	his	account	emotions	are	
intentionally	 related	 to	what	 he	 calls	 “core	 relational	 themes”,	 and	 each	 emotion	 is	 an	
evaluation	 of	 how	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 subject	 and	 the	 environment	 affects	 to	 her	
self-being.		
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that	 somehow	 affects	 the	 subject,	 needs	 to	 be	 perceived	 and	 appraised.	 The	
degree	of	cognitive	involvement	in	such	a	process	will	depend	on	the	particular	
emotion	 and	 its	 complexity.	 But	 in	 any	 case,	 I	 cannot	 see	 how	 they	 can	 be	
reduced	to	a	single	aspect,	given	the	diversity	of	emotional	episodes.		
The	key	 to	understanding	 the	plurality	of	 the	category	of	emotions	 is	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 elements	 such	 as	 feelings,	 thoughts,	 evaluations,	 judgments,	
behavioral	 changes,	 and	 so	on	are	 involved	 in	different	emotions.	And,	 as	we	
shall	 see,	 this	 is	 also	 what	 will	 prove	 key	 in	 the	 account	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	emotions	and	music.		
1.3. Emotions	and	music	
Having	seen	what	emotions	and	the	components	implied	in	affective	processes	
are,	 asserting	 that	 emotions	 are	 literally	 part	 of	 music	 sounds	 preposterous.	
Neither	 music-works	 nor	 instances	 or	 performances	 of	 music-works,	 are	
psychological	states,	that	is,	human	mental	states.	However,	we	describe	music	
as	sad,	joyful	or	fearful.	It	has	been	argued	that	music	is	the	genuine	language	of	
the	emotions;	a	language	that	conveys	emotions	in	a	better	way	than	any	other	
artistic	form.	I	won’t	however	defend	that	view,	as	I	don’t	take	music	to	have	the	
necessary	 properties	 for	 being	 a	 language.19	My	 goal	 is	 to	 explore	 what	 it	 is	
about	music	that	makes	people	of	all	ages	and	places	identify	emotional	aspects	
in	it.		
For	 non-specialists,	 describing	 a	 musical	 event	 in	 terms	 of	
technical-musical	 terminology	 is	quite	complicated.	But	a	pleasurable	musical	
experience	 does	 not	 necessarily	 require	 expertise	 in	 music	 criticism	 (or	
practice).	We	may	enjoy	and	even	understand	what	is	“happening”	in	a	music-	
work	without	detecting	the	specific	musical	properties	that	it	contains.	I	would	
say,	at	least,	that	it	is	perfectly	right	to	describe	music	using	predicates	from	our	
everyday	contexts.	We	say	we	detect	tension	and	relaxation	 in	music,	balance	
																																								 								
19	For	an	interesting	discussion	about	why	music	in	not	a	language,	see	Kivy	2004.	
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and	disorder,	coherence	and	 incoherence,	delicacy	and	heaviness,	melancholy	
and	joy.	It	may	be	argued	that	we	are	inclined	to	“animate”	natural	and	physical	
objects,	 that	we	detect	 tranquility	 or	delicacy	 in	 a	music	piece	 just	 as	we	 see	
faces	and	human	body	shapes	in	clouds	or	trees,	or	just	how	we	read	an	angry	
face	 in	 a	 simple	 emoticon.	 It	 seems	 to	 me,	 however,	 that	 there	 is	 more	
substantial	 “ground”	 for	 the	 expressive	 attributions	we	make	 to	music-works,	
than	 there	 is	 for	 the	humanizing	of	 elements	 of	 the	natural	 environment.	To	
find	this	“ground”	is	one	of	the	aims	of	this	work.		
There	 are	 several	 answers	 to	 the	 question	 about	 the	 relation	 between	
emotions	 and	music.	One	 is	 to	 argue	 that	 when	we	 say	 something	 like	 “this	
music	is	sad,”	we	don’t	need	to	understand	it	as	a	literal	possession	of	sadness,	
but	 rather	 as	 a	metaphorical	 one.20	Another	 one	 is	 to	 simply	 deny	 any	 direct	
relationship	between	music	and	emotions,	in	other	words	to	hold	that	there	is	
no	place	 for	emotions	 in	music.	That’s	more	or	 less	 the	answer	given	by	pure	
formalists.	
But	 there	 are	 several	ways	 to	make	 room	 for	 literalness	 in	 the	 statement	
“this	music	 is	 sad.”	We	may	 argue	 that	 such	 emotions	 are	 the	 expression	 of	
emotions	by	a	subject,	the	author-composer,	or	also	that	they	are	the	expression	
of	an	imagined	character	that	inhabits	the	music.		
																																								 								
20	Versions	of	this	view	of	emotions	in	artwork	are	those	presented	by	Susanne	Langer	(1957)	
and	Nelson	Goodman	(1968).	It	is	not	my	idea	to	analyze	them	in	length,	but	it	is	helpful	
to	summarize	their	main	idea.	Even	if	they	differ	in	several	aspects,	they	share	the	view	
that	 art	 in	 general	 and	 music,	 in	 particular,	 are	 iconic	 symbols.	 Langer	 holds	 that	
artworks	are	“presentational”	symbols	of	mental	states	identifiable	with	emotions.	What	
is	called	“semiotic	aesthetics”	had	its	heyday	in	the	1940s	and	1950s,	but	it’s	been	mostly	
rejected	 by	 contemporary	 analytic	 philosophy.	 Goodman’s	 theory	 of	 exemplificational	
symbols	 holds	 that	 an	 artwork	 is	 expressive	 when	 it	 metaphorically	 possesses	 the	
emotional	 property	 it	 exemplifies.	 Davies	 (1994:	 138)	 summarizes	 it	 as	 follows:	 “X	
expresses	Y	if	and	only	if	X	possesses	Y	metaphorically	and	it	exemplifies	Y.	Although	X	
does	 not	 denote	 Y,	 denotation	 is	 present	 within	 this	 relation—it	 runs	 from	 Y	 (the	
predicate)	to	X”.	In	the	case	of	music,	we	could	say,	following	Goodman,	that	a	piece	of	
music	is	sad	not	because	music	is	literally	sad,	but	because	it	exemplifies	sadness.	Sadness	
is	then	a	metaphoric	property	of	the	work.	One	critique	of	this	account	of	expression	is	
that	exemplification	involves	the	use	of	a	property	in	the	artwork;	but	if	the	work	already	
possesses	such	a	property	we	are	not	dealing	with	metaphoric	exemplification	but	with	
literal	possession.	For	more	information	and	critiques	on	these	accounts	see	Davies	(1994:	
137-166).	
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There	 is	 an	 alternative	 to	 those	 positions,	 that	 is	 regarding	 emotions	 in	
music	as	dispositional	properties.	A	dispositional	property	does	not	consist	in	a	
present	 state	 of	 the	 object,	 but	 in	 its	 propensity	 to	 change	 under	 a	 given	
circumstance.	Applied	to	emotions	and	music,	such	accounts	argue	that	music	
is	 expressive	 of	 an	 emotion	 in	 virtue	 of	 being	 able	 to	 arouse	 or	 evoke	 this	
emotion	 in	 the	 listener,	 a	 view	 defended	 by	 arousalists	 (also	 known	 as	
emotivists).	
In	 the	 following	 sections	 I	 will	 consider	 those	 accounts	 of	 music	
expressiveness,	 and	 explore	 why	 all	 of	 them	 are	 flawed	 and	 don’t	 offer	 a	
satisfactory	 account	 of	 the	 relation	 of	 the	 emotions	 to	 music.	 Against	 pure	
formalist	 views,	 I	 will	 explore	 in	 Chapter	 2	 an	 account	 that	 I	 think	
accommodates	satisfactorily	the	emotions	in	music.	But	in	opposition	to	those	
accounts	that	seek	to	justify	the	expression	of	emotions	in	music	by	appealing	
to	agents	outside	what	the	music-work	is,	I	will	argue	that	there	is	another	way	
in	which	 emotive	 properties	 can	 be	 legitimately	 attributed	 to	music-works.	 I	
think	 that	 music,	 as	 structured	 sound	 that	 occurs	 in	 time	 and	 involves	
movement	 (changing	patterns	of	 sounds),	has	 a	 great	potential	 to	 embody,	 if	
not	 felt	 emotions,	 then	 the	 appearance	of	 the	 emotions	being	 expressed.	The	
emotional	features	heard	in	music	might	not	be	the	manifestation	of	a	mental	
state,	 they	 might	 not	 be	 felt	 emotions	 by	 anyone	 real	 or	 imaginary,	 but	
emotional	 features	 that	 have	 been	 drawn	 by	 specific	 sound	 arrangements,	
typically,	in	accordance	with	the	composer’s	intention.		
1.4. Whose	 emotions?	 The	 composer,	
the	persona	and	the	audience	
A	piece	of	music	 is	 taken	as	expressive	of	emotions	 if	 it	contains	and	conveys	
emotive	 properties	 to	 the	 listeners.	 But	 considering	 that	 expression	 (as	 the	
outward	 manifestation	 of	 thoughts,	 emotions,	 beliefs...)	 is	 something	 mostly	
attributed	 to	 sentient	 agents,	 it	 seems,	 prima	 facie,	 that	 emotions	 and	music	
can	only	go	 together	 if	we	attribute	 the	expression	of	emotions	 in	music	 to	a	
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subject’s	emotional	state,	a	subject	that	in	one	way	or	another	is	linked	to	the	
music.21		
Expressiveness,	 however,	 is	 attributable	 to	 non-sentient	 agents	 and	
artworks.	Expressiveness	does	not	seem	to	require	a	corresponding	felt	emotion.	
If	this	is	the	case,	we	need	to	discover	how	something	can	be	expressive	without	
any	emotion	being	felt.	
In	 the	 next	 three	 sections	 I	 will	 present	 the	 accounts	 that	 typically	 have	
argued	for	the	idea	that	music	“expresses	emotions”;	i.e.	that	felt	emotions	are	
involved	in	music.		
1.4.1. 	Expression	theory	
One	way	to	connect	expressiveness	and	expression	is	appealing	to	the	composer	
or	 the	 performer	 and	her	 emotions	 being	 expressed	 through	 the	work	 or	 the	
performance.	Expressionists	assert	that	music	“symptomizes”	in	an	identifiable	
way	the	emotions	of	the	composer	or	the	performer.	Classic	expression	theories	
claim	 (Tolstoy	 1995	 [1898],	 Dewey	 1934,	 Collingwood	 1938)	 that	 emotions	 in	
music	are	feelings	expressed	by	the	composer	in	the	act	of	composition,	and	the	
emotions	we	hear	in	the	work	are	the	manifestation	of	those	emotions,	just	as	
sadness	is	manifested	in	someone’s	tears.		
Expression	 theories	 evolved	 during	 the	 period	 of	 nineteenth-century	
Romanticism,	and	gave	to	the	concept	of	expression	a	central	place	in	aesthetics.	
Sulzer	 suggests	 that	 the	 composer	 imagines	 some	 drama	 or	 situation	 before	
setting	to	work.	Once	the	composer	has	decided	the	emotional	character	of	the	
work	 in	 process,	 she	 should	 put	 herself	 in	 the	 state	 of	mind	 that	 she	wishes	
others	to	experience	(Le	Huray	and	Day	1981:	124).	Beethoven	is	said	to	have	put	
his	 mind	 into	 specific	 states	 while	 sketching	 many	 of	 his	 compositions	
“stimulated	by	those	moods	which	poets	turn	into	words,	I	turn	my	ideas	into	
tones	which	 resound,	 roar	 and	 rage	 until	 at	 last	 they	 stand	before	me	 in	 the	
																																								 								
21	I	develop	the	concept	of	expression	and	its	problems	with	music	in	Chapter	2.	
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form	of	notes”	 (Morgenstern	 1956:	87).	The	 image	of	Beethoven,	 full	of	wrath	
and	rage,	sketching	notes	on	the	manuscript	in	front	of	his	piano	comes	to	my	
mind.		
So,	 the	goal	of	 the	 romantic	artist	was	 to	express	her	 sincere	emotions	
through	 the	 artwork,	 in	 this	 case	 via	music,	 rather	 than	 eliciting	 or	 inducing	
them	in	others.	Music	would	be	able	then	to	embody	drama,	heroism	or	victory,	
a	 vehicle	 to	 express	 the	 composer’s	 emotional	 state,	 or	 even	 to	 communicate	
something	through	it.	According	to	expressive	theories,	the	expressive	power	of	
music	does	not	merely	lie	in	that	it	evinces	or	exhibits	emotions	in	virtue	of	its	
expressive	capacities,	but	in	that	it	manifests	the	emotions	of	the	composer	by	
means	of	a	cognitive	process	in	which	the	artist	makes	use	of	musical	elements	
and	the	combination	of	them	in	order	to	achieve	her	goal.	The	creative	activity	
must	have	been	an	act	of	expression	since	expressive	properties	are	crucial	 to	
artworks.	This	approach	is	found	in	the	theories	of	Tolstoy	(1995	[1898]),	Dewey	
(1934),	Collingwood,	 (1938),	or	Osborne	 (1977).	Tolstoy,	 in	What	 is	 Art?	 (1995	
[1898])	defends	the	idea	that	the	main	function	of	art	is	the	communication	of	
emotion,	 and	 that	 it	 is	 the	 artist	who	expresses	 a	particular	 emotion	 through	
her	work,	which	 in	 turn	 induces	 it	 in	 the	 audience.	Collingwood	 (1938)	 takes	
expression	to	be	the	core	of	art,	and	the	exploration	of	the	artist’s	emotions	the	
proper	way	to	understand	the	work.	
Summarizing,	expression	theory	answers	the	question	of	how	emotions	
are	 a	 part	 of	 music	 by	 saying	 that	 musical	 expression	 becomes	 the	 outward	
manifestation	 of	 the	 artist	 into	 the	 artistic	medium,	 the	manifestation	 of	 the	
emotions	 felt	 by	 the	 composer	 in	 the	 act	 of	 composition.	 The	music-work	 is	
expressive	of	the	author’s	emotional	state.22	
However	this	view	of	music	and	expression	presents	several	problems.	The	
most	evident	problem	is	that	sometimes	the	composer	fails	to	manifest	in	the	
work	what	she	feels	in	the	creative	process,	at	least	in	a	way	that	is	recognizable	
to	the	listener.	Composers	do	not	always	succeed	in	pouring	their	feelings	into	
																																								 								
22	For	a	deep	account	of	expression	theories	and	discussions	involved,	see	Robinson	1983.	
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their	 composition.	 This	might	 happen	 for	 example	 because	 the	 artist	 did	not	
select,	or	combine,	appropriately	the	musical	elements.	In	other	words,	she	did	
not	 write	 the	 right	 kind	 of	 piece.	 So,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 we	 hear	 emotional	
properties	that	were	not	felt	or	intended	to	be	expressed	by	the	composer,	or	at	
least	that	we	don’t	hear	what	she	wanted	to	express	in	her	work.	That	being	the	
case,	we	could	say	that	a	music-work	is	expressive	independently	of	the	emotion	
that	the	author	is	experiencing	at	the	time	of	composition.		
Another	problem	is	that	very	often	the	composer	does	not	experience	the	
emotion	 her	 music	 is	 expressive	 of.	 Creative	 processes	 vary	 from	 author	 to	
author,	and	also	depend	on	the	particular	moment	in	which	the	creation	takes	
place.	Different	techniques	are	involved	while	writing	music.	Probably	Bach	and	
Beethoven	did	not	share	the	same	one:	more	automated	in	the	case	of	Bach,	and	
more	instinctive	in	Beethoven.		
In	any	case,	it	is	not	clear	at	all	that	all	composers	involve	themselves	in	an	
affective	state	accordant	with	the	emotional	character	of	the	work,	or	that	the	
latter	are	the	result	of	their	emotive	states.	Often	composers	work	on	demand,	
and	cannot	wait	to	find	the	emotional	tone	they	intend	to	confer	on	their	work.	
It	 seems	 quite	 improbable	 that	 Bach	 for	 example,	 who	 wrote	 such	 a	 vast	
amount	of	work	under	commission	 for	 the	protestant	church	 (more	 than	300	
cantatas),	 experienced	 all	 the	 emotions	 expressed	 in	 his	 compositions	 while	
composing	them.	Composers	usually	do	not	work	under	the	emotion	that	they	
allegedly	manifest	in	their	work.	Beethoven	wrote	the	joyous	final	movement	of	
the	 Piano	 Concerto	 No.	 1	 being	 ill	 with	 gastroenteritis.	 (Davies,	 1994:	 172)	
Examples	 can	 be	 found	 in	 many	 works	 that	 are	 not	 devoid	 of	 expressive	
qualities	and	yet	have	been	the	result	of	tedious,	methodical	and	regular	work.	
For	 instance,	 in	 Themes	 and	 Conclusions	 (1972)	 Stravinsky	 explains	 how	 he	
wrote	his	Symphony	in	C	during	his	unhappiest	period	in	his	life,	between	1939	
and	1940.	 Ill	with	tuberculosis,	he	was	enclosed	 in	a	sanatorium	with	his	wife	
and	 family.	 There,	 a	 daughter	 and	 his	wife	 died,	 and	 shortly	 after	 so	 did	 his	
mother.	He	had	to	bury	three	beloved	family	members	in	half	a	year;	however,	
he	confessed	he	was	able	 to	 survive	 thanks	 to	 the	work	he	was	composing	at	
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that	time.	Looking	back	in	1963	he	wrote	referring	to	that	composition:	“(...)	But	
I	did	not	seek	to	overcome	my	grief	by	portraying	or	giving	expression	to	it	in	
music,	 and	 you	will	 listen	 in	 vain,	 I	 think,	 for	 traces	 of	 this	 sort	 of	 personal	
emotion.”	(Stravinsky	1972:	48)		
The	 idea	of	artistic	 inspiration	and	the	picture	of	 the	artist	discharging	
her	emotions	into	the	score	are	very	close	to	expression	theories.	But	it	cannot	
be	 generalized	 to	 all	 cases.	Very	 often,	 behind	 compositions	 lies	 a	 process	 of	
methodical	concentration	and	careful	work	that	could	not	be	carried	out	while	
emotions	disrupt	the	task.	Waiting	for	the	ideal	inspirational	mood	would	be	a	
luxury	 for	many	 composers	 and	 impossible	 to	 afford	 given	 that	many	 works	
require	 weeks,	 months	 or	 even	 years	 of	 thorough	 work;	 for	 many	 others,	 it	
would	be	a	distraction	and	a	disruption	of	the	creative	work.		
So	even	if	the	music-work	sounds	expressive	of	particular	emotions,	we	
cannot	infer	from	it	that	those	emotive	features	manifested	in	the	piece	are	the	
author’s	 emotions	 in	 the	 time	 of	 the	 composition.	 Therefore,	 what	 listeners	
understand	 about	 music	 or	 hear	 expressed	 in	 music,	 needs	 to	 be	 found	
somewhere	other	 that	 in	 the	composer’s	mind	and,	 I	will	 argue,	 in	 the	music	
itself.		
The	 arguments	 above	 show	 that	 music	 can	 be	 expressive	 of	 an	 emotion	
independently	 of	 the	 composer’s	 emotional	 state	 at	 the	 time	 of	 composition.	
Thinking	that	the	artist	infuses	the	work	with	her	emotions	is	wrong	or,	at	best,	
misleading.	I	won’t	deny	that	sometimes	composers	succeed	in	expressing	their	
emotions	in	the	works	they	write,	but	that	cannot	be	taken	as	the	paradigmatic	
case	 or	 the	 way	 we	 recover	 music’s	 expressive	 power.	 We	 cannot	 infer	 any	
emotion	 in	 the	 artist	 from	 the	 emotional	 character	 of	 a	 work.	 Moreover,	
Collingwood’s	 account	 (1938)	 as	 a	 theory	 of	 art	 has	 much	 more	 obvious	
limitations,	in	that	not	all	art	is	expressive,	or	even	if	it	is,	expressiveness	is	not	
what	makes	it	aesthetically	relevant	and	artistically	valuable.	An	example	of	this	
can	be	found	in	Bach’s	Well-Temperated	Clavier,	a	work	of	the	utmost	aesthetic	
beauty	to	which	expressiveness	is	not	normally	attributed.	With	Tormey	(1971),	
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I	 conclude	 that	an	artwork	may	have	expressive	qualities	without	 there	being	
necessarily	a	prior	act	of	expression	by	the	author.23	
1.4.2. 	Persona	theory	
Expression	 and	 expressiveness	 in	 music	 can	 be	 put	 together	 in	 the	 case	 of	
absolute	music	without	appealing	to	the	composer’s	mental	state	at	the	time	of	
the	 composition,	 if	 we	 consider	 that	 the	 emotions	 heard	 in	 music	 are	 the	
expression	of	the	inner	state	of	a	persona	inhabiting	the	music	or	that	the	heard	
emotions	are	regarded	as	the	manifestation	of	someone’s	emotional	state.	This	
idea	 has	 been	 defended	 by	 several	 authors,	 including	 Levinson	 (1996,	 2005),	
Robinson	(2005)	and	Walton	(1988,	1990).	This	proposal	could	be	interpreted	as	
a	heuristics,	or	as	a	theory	that	applies	only	to	a	particular	kind	of	music.		
The	expressive	character	of	an	artwork,	in	general,	and	of	a	music-work,	in	
particular,	 can	 be	 explained	 because	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 the	manifestation	 of	 the	
emotional	 state	 of	 someone.	We	 could	 say	 for	 example	 that	 the	melancholic	
character	of	a	piece	of	music	is	such	in	virtue	of	its	dark	harmonic	progressions	
in	minor	and	diminished	chords,	its	slow	tempo	and	the	downcast	melodic	lines,	
but	what	makes	 us	 call	 it	melancholic	 is	 that	 its	 character	 “seems	 to	 be”	 the	
expression	 of	 someone’s	 melancholy.	 This	 position	 is	 defended	 by	 Robinson	
(2004:	180).	The	character	inferred	from	the	work,	could	be	an	artist,	a	narrator	
or	 a	 character-persona	 of	 the	work	 itself.	 Collingwood’s	 expressionist	 idea	 of	
music	 is	 not	 completely	 rejected	 in	 this	 account	 but	 slightly	 modified:	
expression	in	music	remains,	as	the	manifestation	of	the	emotional	state	of	an	
agent	in	the	artistic	medium,	not	the	composer	himself,	but	an	implied	artist	or	
persona.		
A	stronger	position	is	defended	by	Levinson	(1996,	2005).	According	to	him	
we	 experience	 music	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 emotions,	 as	 the	 emotional	
externalization	of	someone’s	sadness,	“imagining”	that	music	is	the	expression	
of	an	emotion	by	some	indefinite	fictional	agent,	the	persona,	a	character	that	
																																								 								
23	I	introduce	Tormey’s	critic	in	Chapter	2.	
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the	cultivated	 listener	might	discover	 in	 the	music.	Levinson	emphasizes	 that	
this	 way	 of	 hearing	music	 is	 always	 required	 for	 the	 appreciation	 of	 music’s	
expressiveness	by	an	appropriately	experienced	listener.	Such	a	strong	view	of	
expression	is	shown	in	the	following	quotation:	
A	passage	of	music	P	is	expressive	of	an	emotion	E	if	and	only	if	P,	in	context,	
is	 readily	 heard,	 by	 a	 listener	 experienced	 in	 the	 genre	 in	 question,	 as	 an	
expression	of	E.	 (…)	To	hear	music	as	 such	and	such	 is,	perhaps,	 to	 imagine	
that	the	music	is	such	and	such,	and	more	specifically,	to	imagine	of	the	music,	
as	you	are	hearing	it,	that	it	is	such	and	such	(Levinson	1996:	193-195).	
In	 other	 words,	 the	 listener	 of	 a	 piece	 of	 music	 hears	 the	 persona	 as	
externalizing	 something.	 A	 symphony	 with	 many	 expressive	 properties,	 for	
instance,	 can	 be	 imagined	 as	 embodying	 an	 agent,	 a	musical	 persona	who	 is	
making	expressive	utterances	of	joy,	anger	and	so	on.	There	is	no	need	to	appeal	
to	 the	 “composer’s	 voice”	 (Cone	 1974)	 or	 imagine	 that	 Beethoven’s	 9th	
Symphony	 is	 the	musical	 representation	of	Beethoven’s	 joy.	All	we	need	 is	 to	
imagine	the	persona	as	a	fictional	character	expressing	emotions.	As	Levinson	
(1996)	puts	it,	music	can	be	expressive	of	the	inner	state	of	a	persona	by	means	
of	its	dynamic	gestures,	in	a	sui	generis	musical	manner.		
In	 short,	musical	 expressiveness	 is	 explained	by	 the	 listener’s	 imaginative	
response	to	the	work,	by	its	power	to	evoke	in	imagination	a	vivid	impression	of	
real	 emotions	 being	 felt.	 The	 listeners	 imagine	 the	 persona	 expressing	 her	
emotions	in	music	as	the	externalization	of	her	inner	psychology	(Levinson	1982,	
1996,	 2005).	 A	 musical	 passage	 is	 heard	 as	 sad	 because	 the	 hypothetical	
character	is	imagined	to	be	sad.	So,	music	is	expressive	if	the	listener	hears	in	it	
the	expression	of	an	imaginative	character’s	emotion.	
The	persona	 theory’s	account	of	expressiveness	 is	 inspired	 in	 the	 fictional	
worlds	offered	by	novels,	films,	plays	or	operas:	it	points	at	imagined	personae,	
characters	 inhabiting	 the	 musical	 “world.”	 Unlike	 expression	 theory,	 the	
persona	 theory	 avoids	 referring	 to	 a	 subject’s	 occurrent	 emotion	 to	 explain	
whose	emotion	is	the	one	expressed	by	the	music.	
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The	 plausibility	 of	 the	 persona	 theory	 lies	 in	 that	 it	 ties	 expression	 of	 a	
persona’s	 emotional	 state	 with	 the	 expressive	 character	 of	 the	work,	 like	 the	
way	in	which	a	person’s	face,	voice	or	gait	evinces	her	emotional	state.	This	is	at	
least	 Robinson’s	 (2004)	 idea.	 Following	 that,	 the	 external	 manifestation	 of	
people’s	emotional	 states	 (say	gestures,	body	movements,	 tone	of	voice...)	are	
paralleled	with	music’s	outward	features.	And	real	mental	states	are	paralleled	
with	implied	mental	states	of	an	alleged	persona.	However,	I	think	this	analogy	
does	not	hold	for	several	reasons.		
First,	we	cannot	find	in	absolute	music	any	justification	to	identify	such	an	
implied	 persona	 towards	 which	 emotions	 in	music	 can	 be	 directed	 to,	 or	 to	
decide	 whether	 a	 particular	 imagined	 content	 is	 correct	 or	 not.	 In	 fiction	
(novels,	 films,	plays,	 et	 cetera)	much	 information	about	 the	 fictional	world	 is	
conveyed.	 The	 plot,	 the	 characters	 and	 the	 description	 of	 scenes	 are	 the	
backbone	that	will	channel	 the	audience’s	 imagination.	But	 in	absolute	music	
this	does	not	work.	In	absence	of	lyrics	or	some	other	sort	of	narrative	content,	
a	 fictional	character	 is	nowhere	to	be	 found.	There	 is	 little	 reason	to	 take	the	
imagination	of	the	listener	so	“seriously”;	at	least	it	is	not	trustworthy	enough	to	
be	regarded	as	an	objective	basis	for	music	expressiveness.	Making	up	personae	
to	justify	the	place	of	emotions	in	music	says	very	little	about	the	work.	
Second,	appealing	to	a	persona’s	emotions	does	not	answer	why	a	specific	
musical	passage	has	this	power	to	evoke	(in	the	case	that	it	does)	such	emotions	
in	us.	While	listening	to	a	song,	to	its	particular	musical-expressive	features,	I	
may	imagine	someone	or	even	myself	being	affected	by	the	character	I	detect	in	
the	 music;	 this	 image	 may	 evoke	 in	 us	 past	 memories,	 moments	 of	 our	
childhood.	 However,	 and	 be	 that	 as	 it	 may,	 those	 images	 and	 responses	 are	
triggered	by	 this	piece	music.	 So,	whatever	 characters	 inhabiting	 this	musical	
world	come	to	our	mind,	the	trigger	for	this	should	be	found	in	the	music.		
Third,	 this	narrow	view	of	expression	(understood	as	the	manifestation	of	
someone’s	 feelings),	 doesn’t	 seem	 to	 be	 the	 notion	 of	 expression	 that	
corresponds	 to	 music.	 In	 the	 same	 way	 that	 not	 all	 human	 outward	
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externalization	of	emotions	(gestures,	body	movements,	tone	of	voice...)	involve	
felt	emotions,	we	could	 think	 that	neither	a	 fearful	music	passage,	or	a	 joyful	
one,	involve	the	feelings	of	fear	or	joy	by	someone.	
For	these	reasons,	I	contend	that	appealing	to	the	listener’s	imagination	to	
answer	 how	 music	 (especially	 absolute	 music)	 can	 express	 emotions	 is	 not	
appropriate.	Whatever	the	listener	imagines,	it	reveals	more	about	the	listener	
than	about	the	music,	and	this	is	not	what	we	are	attempting	to	discover.	The	
answer,	 if	 any,	 should	 be	 found	 in	 the	 perceptual	 musical	 features	 and	 not	
anywhere	else.	
1.4.3. Arousal	theory	
Let’s	 consider	 a	 third	 possibility.	 Some	 argue	 that	 music	 is	 expressive	 of	 an	
emotion,	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 tendency	 to	 arouse	 the	 corresponding	 emotion	 in	 a	
qualified	 listener,	 a	 view	 defended	 by	 arousalists	 (or	 emotivists).	 They	 take	
expression	in	music	to	consist	in	the	power	to	move	the	listener	to	an	affective	
state;	but	not	any	listener,	an	understanding	listener:	one	that	attends	closely	to	
the	work.	The	simplest	version	of	arousal	theory	could	be	formulated	as	follows	
(with	M	as	music,	E	an	emotion,	L	a	listener):	
(1)	M	is	E	=	M	arouses	E	in	L24	
Sad	music	is	prone	to	make	people	feel	sad,	joyful	music	is	prone	to	make	
listeners	 happy.	 So	 the	 emotions	 expressed	 in	 a	 music-work	 are	 those	
experienced	 by	 the	 listener.	 A	 piece	 of	 music	 is	 melancholic	 because	 under	
normal	circumstances	it	makes	normal	listeners	feel	melancholic.	
																																								 								
24	This	formulation,	and	the	following	ones,	have	been	borrowed	from	Davies	(1994:	185,	187,	
189),	but	I	allow	myself	to	introduce	a	little	change.	In	the	quoted	passage	Davies	states	
“M	is	E	=	M	evokes	E	in	L”.	I	substituted	“evokes”	by	“aroused.”	The	first	entry	of	the	verb	
“evoke”	in	the	dictionary	(New	Oxford	American	Dictionary	(2005)	says	“bring	or	recall	(a	
feeling,	 a	 memory	 or	 an	 image)	 to	 the	 conscious	 mind”.	 Also,	 entry	 1.1.	 “to	 elicit	 a	
response”.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 evoking	 a	 feeling	 or	 an	 emotion	 then,	 does	 not	 clearly	
imply	a	feeling	response,	or	an	emotional	state	caused	by	whatever.	
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Arousal	 theories	 emphasize	 the	 moving	 power	 of	 music,	 and	 the	
importance	of	the	affective	involvement	of	the	audience.	But	following	this	view,	
we	 could	 logically	 deduce	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of,	 for	 example,	 a	melancholic	
response,	the	piece	of	music	could	not	be	regarded	as	melancholic	or	as	having	
melancholy	among	its	expressive	properties,	which	makes	it	a	quite	a	difficult	
statement	to	be	generalized.	So	arousal	theory	in	its	simplest	version	has	some	
problems,	which	revisionists	of	the	theory	will	try	to	answer	in	different	ways.		
At	 first	 sight	we	might	 think	 that	arousal	 theories,	 rather	 than	explaining	
emotions	 in	music,	 focus	on	how	music	provokes	 emotions	 in	 the	 listener.	 It	
could	be	objected	that	to	describe	the	listener’s	emotive	reaction	to	music	is	not	
to	describe	what	music	is	expressive	of.	Arousalists	have	answered	that,	even	if	
the	experience	of	the	emotions	expressed	belongs	to	the	listener,	it	is	correct	to	
attribute	expressiveness	to	music	as	a	dispositional	property	to	arouse	emotions	
in	the	listener.		
The	argument	of	analogy	with	colors	and	expressive	properties	of	music	is	
defended	 for	 example	 by	 Speck	 (1988).	 Under	 standard	 conditions,	 normal	
observers	attribute	 the	color	green	 to	 fresh	grass,	and	 the	experience	of	color	
can	be	said	to	be	shared	by	most	people.	That’s	why	we	consider	it	appropriate	
to	 attribute	 greenness	 to	 grass	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 observer’s	 experience.	 The	
same	 argument	 is	 applied	 to	 emotions	 and	 music.	 Responses	 to	 music	 have	
normally	an	interpersonal	validity	in	a	similar	way	to	when	we	perceive	colors	
or	 smells	 (Davies	 1994:	 185).	 They	usually	 converge,	 and	 according	 to	 arousal	
theories	this	is	reason	enough	to	assume	that	the	emotional	experience	tells	us	
more	about	music	than	about	the	listener.		
It	 could	 be	 objected,	 however,	 that	 just	 as	 color	 perception	 depends	 on	
principles	related	to	the	absorption	and	reflection	of	light,	and	on	its	effect	on	
the	optic	nerve,	music	 should	 also	 follow	principles	 that	make	 it	 powerful	 to	
affect	listeners	emotionally	in	specific	ways.	If	music	must	possess	properties	or	
principles	 that	 cause	 such	 responses,	 they	 should	 be	 describable	 and	
identifiable	within	music,	there	is	no	need	to	appeal	to	the	listener’s	response	to	
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explain	why	music	is	expressive.	If	that’s	right,	an	improved	version	of	arousal	
theory	could	be	summarized	as	follows:		
(2)	M	 is	 E	 =	M	 arouses	 E	 in	 L	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 possessing	 properties	 a,	 b,	 c	
(properties	 that	 might	 be	 specified	 in	 musically	 technical	 terms	 without	
reference	to	E)25	
Even	 if	 this	 approach	 answers	 some	 objections,	 it	 still	 has	 to	 face	 the	
problem	of	many	 counterexamples.	Music	often	 triggers	particular	memories,	
associations	and	correspondent	emotional	responses.	Other	times	the	listener	is	
distracted	 or	 lacks	 an	 appropriate	 response	 to	 music	 expressiveness	 for	
whatever	 reason.	Often	we	 react	 to	music-works	 in	 a	way	 that	 can	hardly	 be	
attributed	 to	 the	 particular	 music-work.	 We	 may	 get	 irritated,	 for	 instance,	
listening	to	joyful	music,	amazed	by	dreadful	music,	saddened	by	a	joyful	song,	
etc..	Cases	 like	 these	are	 frequent,	 and	count	at	 first	 sight	 against	 arousalists’	
main	 thesis.	 However	 most	 arousalists	 hold	 that	 not	 just	 any	 emotional	
response	to	music	reveals	the	emotional	character	of	the	musical	piece.		
Two	main	 lines	 of	 reply	 to	 such	 objections	 are	 offered	 by	 arousalists:	 (i)	
arguing	 that	 despite	 appearances	 in	 most	 of	 the	 cases	 shown	 by	
counterexamples,	 the	 listener’s	 response	 in	 not	 elicited	 by	 music	 but	 by	
something	outside	it;	(ii)	identifying	factors	that	pervert	listeners’	tendency	to	
respond	in	a	way	that	reveals	music's	expressive	character.	So,	for	many	arousal	
theorists,	listening	attentively,	listening	appropriately,	free	from	interference	or	
inhibiting	or	deviating	factors,	are	the	conditions	required	by	the	arousal	theory	
as	an	account	of	music	expressiveness.	This	could	count	as	a	revisited	formula	
for	the	arousal	thesis:		
(3)	M	is	E	=	M	tends	to	arouse	E	in	L,	given	that	L	attends	to	the	music	in	the	
absence	of	factors	that	inhibit	or	interfere	with	L’s	emotional	response	to	M.26	
																																								 								
25	See	previous	footnote.	
26	See	previous	footnote.	
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In	any	case,	a	thorough	list	of	those	factors	should	be	written	for	the	arousal	
version	 to	 be	 fully	 developed.	 Something	 quite	 difficult	 to	 achieve,	 as	 I	 will	
argue	soon.	
A	better	way	of	dealing	with	such	counterexamples	would	be	to	claim	that	
those	 exceptions	 exist,	 but	 that	 they	 don’t	 refute	 arousal	 theory.	 The	 answer	
adopted	 by	 some	 authors	 (see	 Mew	 1985)	 is	 to	 explain	 that	 not	 all	 aroused	
emotions	are	 to	be	 taken	as	 responses	 to	 the	emotive	properties	of	 the	work:	
among	aroused	responses,	we	should	distinguish	between	those	aroused	by	the	
work's	expressive	power	and	those	aroused	by	other	aspects	of	the	piece..		
Given	 that	 emotion	 has	 cognitive,	 physiological	 and	 phenomenological	
components,	we	 find	 that	 the	 response	 to	 absolute	music	 lacks	 the	 cognitive	
component	that	characterizes	emotions.	For	example,	feeling	pity	is	a	response	
of	the	appropriate	kind	in	the	case	of	sad	music,	but	not	sadness.	The	response	
to	music	cannot	be	an	object	cognitively-directed	at,	or	 founded	on	emotion,	
and	that’s	precisely	why	such	aroused	feelings	do	not	motivate	us	to	action	in	
the	way	other	emotional	experiences	do	Sad	music	 is	sad	when	 it	arouses	the	
physiological	and	phenomenal	aspects	of	pity	(a	feeling).	
Even	 though	 arousal	 theory,	 in	 its	 revised	 versions,	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	
attractive	answer	to	the	problem	of	expressiveness	in	music,	it	generates	several	
new	problems.	We	have	 seen	already	 the	problems	 that	 the	 simple	 arousalist	
thesis	(“M	is	E	=	M	arouses	E	in	L”)	presents.	It	follows	from	this	that,	if	there	is	
no	emotional	response,	then	there	is	no	expressiveness	in	the	music	piece,	which	
as	I	have	argued	,	is	pretty	implausible.	
Such	 close	 dependence	 of	music	 expressiveness	 on	 the	 listener’s	 reaction	
entails	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 audience,	 the	 expressiveness	 of	
music	 cannot	 be	 explained.	 But,	 even	 if	 we	 admitted	 that	 the	 expressive	
properties	 of	 music	 have	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 dispositional	 properties	
(remember	the	analogy	with	the	perception	of	colors),	such	a	capacity	and	the	
rules	or	conditions	of	the	emotive	power	would	still	reside	in	the	music-work,	I	
contend.		
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Regarding	the	analogy	of	colors	and	music's	expressive	properties,	it	could	
be	argued	that	the	experience	of	music	 is	much	more	culture-bound	than	the	
perception	 of	 color	 (Davies	 1994:	 186)	 and	 that	 the	 response	 to	 specific	
expressive	properties	in	music	is	not	universal.	If	the	experience	varies	from	one	
musical	 context	 to	 another,	 even	 if	 we	 admit	 there	 is	 a	 high	 degree	 of	
convergence	 in	 a	 given	 musical	 culture,	 it	 seems	 difficult	 to	 see	 how	 music	
expressiveness	can	be	explained	by	appeal	to	listeners’	response.		
The	second	definition27	is	not	satisfactory	either.	On	the	one	hand,	we	do	
not	need	to	appeal	to	the	response	at	all	to	point	out	the	properties	in	music	in	
virtue	of	which	(according	to	definition	2)	 listeners	 respond	emotionally.	 It	 is	
not	because	it	elicits	specific	emotions	that	a	piece	of	music	is	expressive,	but	
because	it	possesses	the	alleged	musical	features.	For	example,	properties	such	
as	light	and	major	key	harmonies,	 loud	dynamics,	galloping	melodies	and	fast	
tempo	in	a	music	piece	are	what	makes	it	sound	cheerful,	and	maybe	also	prone	
to	arouse	a	cheerful	feeling	in	the	listener.	But	not	the	other	way	around.		
The	 third	definition28	attempts	 to	clarify	 that	not	any	emotive	 response	 is	
valid	to	attribute	an	expressive	feature	to	a	music-work.	I	completely	share	the	
idea	that	among	our	emotional	reactions	to	music,	not	all	of	them	are	linked	to	
its	expressive	character.	However,	it	is	not	easy	to	define	such	factors	and	what	
is	understood	as	the	appropriate	 listening	for	such	arousal	 to	be	 justified.	We	
mentioned	 before	 some	 counterexamples	 and	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 expressive	
character	of	music	and	the	listener’s	response	mismatch:	the	listener	is	irritated	
with	 the	melancholic	 banality	 of	 a	 song;	 the	 listener	 associates	 a	 joyful	 song	
with	 a	 fearful	 past	 experience;	 the	 listener	 is	 not	 emotionally	 affected	 to	 the	
expressive	character	of	music;	or	prefers	avoiding	emotional	involvement	in	the	
																																								 								
27	M	is	E	=	M	arouses	E	 in	L	 in	virtue	of	 its	possessing	properties	a,	 b,	 c	 (properties	that	
might	be	specified	in	musically	technical	terms	without	reference	to	E.	
28	M	is	E	=	M	tends	to	arouse	E	in	L,	given	that	L	attends	to	the	music	in	the	absence	of	
factors	that	inhibit	or	interfere	with	L’s	emotional	response	to	M.	
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listening	 experience	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 more	 intellectual	 listening	 experience;	 et	
cetera.		
From	such	a	perspective,	it	is	difficult	to	find	the	criteria	to	differentiate	an	
appropriate	response	from	an	inappropriate	one.	We	may	appeal	to	an	attentive,	
interested	 listener,	 not	 infected	 by	 personal	 or	 external	 factors,	 to	 define	 the	
appropriate	affective	 response	 to	a	particular	piece	of	music.	But	even	 in	 that	
case,	 just	 by	 appealing	 to	 listeners’	 feelings	 (as	 arousalists	 propose)	 it	 is	
practically	impossible	to	discern	when	a	response	is	affected	by	factors	external	
to	that	expressed	by	the	music-work,	and	when	it	is	not.	Such	a	conclusive	list	
of	 constraints	 is	 difficult	 to	 write.	 And	 even	 if	 we	 did,	 we	 would	 still	 find	
counterexamples	that	show	how	sometimes	the	emotive	reactions	to	music	do	
not	correspond	to	those	expected	from	its	expressive	character.		
For	example,	 it	could	happen	that	even	attending	to	music	with	attention	
and	 discernment,	 avoiding	 “contaminating”	 our	 emotional	 reaction	 to	 the	
music	with	personal	factors,	the	listener’s	emotional	reaction	to	the	music	is	not	
necessarily	 the	 one	 corresponding	 to	 the	 work’s	 emotional	 character.	 The	
Beatles’	Yellow	Submarine,	a	song	that	(independently	of	its	lyrics)	is	regarded	
as	expressive	of	 joy	and	vitality,	may	neither	arouse	 in	us	 joy	nor	vitality,	but	
emotional	indifference	or	even	disgust	to	the	simple	march	like	rhythm	of	the	
song.	Similar	examples	could	be	found	in	instrumental	music.	So,	the	relation	of	
the	 expressive	 character	 of	 music	 and	 our	 “parallel”	 reaction	 to	 it	 is	 not	
something	we	could	generalize,	and	 less	 so	 if	we	aim	to	explain,	by	means	of	
such	responses,	what	music	expressiveness	consists	in.	
I	 won’t	 deny	 that	 there	 is	 some	 convergence	 in	 the	 responses	 of	 the	
listeners	 to	 the	expressive	character	of	music.	But	not	everybody	 is	moved	by	
expressive	music,	not	even	every	attentive	and	experienced	listener.	And	when	
they	do,	it	is	unlikely	that	they	are	all	moved	in	exactly	the	same	way.	So	instead	
of	 looking	 for	 the	 ideal	 type	 of	 response	 to	 explain	 the	 work’s	 expressive	
character	(and	account	for	music	expressiveness	as	a	dispositional	property),	we	
should	find	a	way	in	which	music-work's	expressiveness	is	explained	in	itself.	
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Before	 rejecting	 arousal	 theory	 as	 a	 convincing	 account	 of	 music	
expressiveness,	let’s	try	one	more	definition.	Let’s	consider	the	following:	
(4)	M	 is	 E	 =	M	 arouses	 E	 in	 L	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 possessing	 properties	 a,	 b,	 c	
(describable	musical	properties)	and	just	when	M	tends	to	arouse	E	in	L,	given	
that	L	attends	to	the	music	in	the	absence	of	factors	that	inhibit	or	interfere	
with	L’s	emotional	response	to	M.	
It	 follows	 from	 this	 definition	 that	 possessing	 properties	 a,	 b,	 c	 is	 not	
sufficient	 to	 arouse	 in	 the	 listener	 the	 appropriate	 response	 and	 that	
appropriate	 listening	 is	 required	 for	music	 expressiveness.	But	we	 should	 still	
have	 to	 answer	 to	 other	 counterexamples.	Despite	 the	 absence	of	 interfering,	
inhibiting	or	contaminating	factors	to	that	response,	listeners	could	be	able	to	
identify	 the	 expressive	 character	 of	 music	 (and	 most	 probably	 the	 musical	
properties	responsible	for	it),	and	nevertheless	not	be	susceptible	to	feeling	the	
corresponding	emotions	or	to	feel	any	emotions	at	all.	Moreover,	we	still	would	
have	 to	 face	 the	problem	of	 cases	 in	which	 it	 is	 precisely	 a	work’s	 expressive	
feature	(and	not	some	other	aspect	of	the	work)	which	arouses	an	emotion	that	
does	not	correspond	to	the	expressed	emotion.	
So,	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 expressive	 power	 of	 music,	 I	 contend	 that	 an	
arousalist	theory	does	not	offer	any	satisfactory	account.	Appealing	to	its	power	
to	 arouse	 correspondent	 emotions	 or	 feelings	 in	 the	 listener	 (when	 the	
appropriate	conditions	are	met)	 results	 in	a	circular	argument:	 if	 the	emotive	
response	 of	 a	 listener	 is	 the	 criteria	 to	 explain	 music	 expressiveness,	 our	
emotive	responses	to	music	cannot	be	explained	by	appeal	to	music's	expressive	
capacity.	 As	 Kania	 (2014)	 puts	 it,	 if	 the	 listener’s	 response	 depends	 upon	 the	
emotion	 music	 is	 expressive	 of,	 the	 expressiveness	 of	 music	 cannot	 depend	
upon	the	response.	
In	 conclusion,	 arousal	 theories	 attach	 great	 importance	 to	 the	 music’s	
power	to	move	us,	and	I	agree	that	the	listener’s	affective	response	is	sometimes	
closely	 related	 to	 the	 emotional	 character	 of	 the	 music-work.	 As	 we	 said,	
listeners	 often	 respond	 with	 feelings	 that	 mirror	 those	 emotive	 qualities	 in	
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music,	 and	 sometimes	 sad	 music	 tends	 to	 make	 people	 feel	 sad,	 and	 joyful	
music	 to	 feel	 happy.	 However,	 such	 connections	 are	 not	 regular	 enough	 to	
conclude	 that	 expression	 in	 music	 can	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 listener’s	
emotional	response.	
As	I	argued,	it	is	neither	sufficient,	and	as	I	will	explain	in	the	next	section,	
nor	 necessary.	 So,	 I	 conclude	 that	 when	 we	 describe	 a	 passage	 of	 music	 in	
emotional	terms	it	is	not	right	to	appeal	to	its	dispositional	properties	to	move	
us	 in	 a	 particular	way.	 I	 think	 that	we	 should	 ascribe	 these	 properties	 to	 the	
musical	passage	itself	and	that	our	reactions	are	not	what	make	a	musical	piece	
expressive.		
I	 propose	 to	 inverse	 the	 focus	 to	 the	musical	 event:	 sad	music	 is	 not	 sad	
because	 it	may	 arouse	 sad	 emotions	 in	 the	 listener,	 but	 sad	 feelings	may	 be	
aroused	because	music	“is	sad”,	or	better,	expressive	of	sadness.	So,	music	is	not	
expressive	 because	 it	 causes	 emotional	 reactions	 in	 us,	 but	 for	 some	 other	
reason.	
1.5. Music	 cannot	 express	 emotions:	
pure	formalism	
Besides	 approaches	 to	 emotions	 and	music	 that	 seek	 to	 justify	how	emotions	
enter	into	music,	another	possible	way	to	clarify	such	a	problematic	relation	is	
simply	 by	 denying	 that	 there	 is	 any	 direct	 relationship	 between	 music	 and	
emotions	 at	 all.	 Pure	 formalist	 accounts	 will	 hold	 that	 there	 is	 no	 place	 for	
emotion	 inside	music,	 that	music	 is	unable	 to	express	emotions.	This	passage	
from	 Stravinsky’s	 Autobiography	 shows	 quite	 naturally	 the	 main	 idea	 of	
formalism:		
“For	 I	 consider	 that	 music	 is,	 by	 its	 very	 nature,	 essentially	 powerless	 to	
express	anything	at	all,	whether	a	feeling,	an	attitude	of	mind,	a	psychological	
mood,	a	phenomenon	of	nature,	etc.	Expression	has	never	been	an	 inherent	
property	of	music.	That	 is	by	no	means	 the	purpose	of	 its	existence.	 If,	as	 is	
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nearly	 always	 the	 case,	music	 appears	 to	 express	 something,	 this	 is	 only	 an	
illusion	and	not	a	 reality.	 It	 is	 simply	an	additional	attribute	which,	by	 tacit	
and	 inveterate	 agreement,	 we	 have	 lent	 it,	 thrust	 upon	 it,	 as	 a	 label,	 a	
convention—in	short,	an	aspect	which,	unconsciously	or	by	force	of	habit,	we	
have	come	to	confuse	with	its	essential	being.”	(Stravinsky	1936:	53-54)	
Formalism	 is	 an	 account	 of	music	more	difficult	 to	 define	 than	 it	 seems	 at	
first	glance,	because	it	encompasses	different	versions	that	resemble	each	other	
in	 some	 aspects	 but	 differ	 in	 others.	 The	 very	 use	 of	 the	 word	 “form”	 is	
problematic,	as	we	will	see	later.	It	is	an	“ill-chosen	word”	as	Kivy	puts	it	(2002:	
67).	If	we	look	for	its	historical	roots	we	find	in	Kant	one	of	its	ancestors,	even	if	
the	interpretation	of	his	ideas	on	aesthetics	is	a	source	of	much	controversy	and	
not	 everybody	 agrees	 in	 turning	 to	 Kant	 for	 the	 philosophical	 foundation	 of	
music	formalism.	A	clearer	formalist	position	was	later	developed	by	Hanslick	
(1986	[1891]),	and	at	present,	in	softer	versions,	by	Peter	Kivy	(1990,	2001a,	2001b,	
2007,	2009),	Malcolm	Budd	(1995),	Stephen	Davies	(1994)	or	more	recently	by	
Nick	Zangwill	(2015).	
In	 its	 broad	 sense,	 music,	 absolute	 music	 more	 precisely,	 is	 taken	 by	
formalists	as	“a	structure	of	sound	events	without	semantic	or	representational	
content”	(Kivy	2002:	89),	where	emotions	do	not	have	a	clear	place.	It	focuses	
on	how	sound's	perceptual	properties	are	organized	in	a	structure	that	develops	
in	time.	So	the	essence	and	the	interest	of	music	should	be	found	in	its	formal	
structure,	 and	 not	 in	 emotive	 properties	 and	 less	 in	 any	 other	 sort	 of	
propositional	 or	 representational	 content.	 Trying	 to	 get	 further	 and	 attribute	
any	extra-musical	content	to	music,	 is	surpassing	 its	boundaries.	Music	 is	not	
about	anything	beyond	music,	but	just	about	itself.	
It	 is	 Hanslick’s	On	 the	 Musically	 Beautiful	 (1986	 [1891])	 (Vom	Musicalish	
Schönen	in	the	original	German	version)	where	we	find	the	prototype	of	musical	
formalism.	 This	 little	 book,	 full	 of	 inspirational	 ideas	 on	 music,	 offers	 an	
account	against	 feeling	theories,	an	account	of	music	 in	which	emotions	have	
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no	 place.29	We	 could	 summarize	 his	 main	 ideas	 on	 music	 and	 emotions	 as	
follows.	
Two	 statements	 show	 what	 Hanslick	 calls	 the	 negative	 and	 the	 positive	
thesis:	(i)	The	defining	purpose	of	music	is	not	to	represent,	express	or	arouse	
feelings;	 (ii)	 “The	 content	 of	music	 is	 tonally	moving	 forms”	 (“Der	 Inhalt	 der	
Musik	 sind	 tönend	 bewegte	 Formen”),	not	 the	 representation	or	 expression	of	
feeling.	This	implies	that	what	is	musically	beautiful	is	inherent	to	music,	and	
has	 to	be	 found	 in	 its	 “tonal	 relationships”30	and	artistic	 combinations,	not	 in	
extra-musical	 contents	 or	 any	 sort	 of	 meaning.	 Music	 “has	 a	 sense	 and	
logic—but	 musical	 sense	 and	 logic”	 (Hanslick	 1986	 [1891]:	 30),	 an	
ordered-formal	structure	similar	to	the	syntax	of	 languages;	according	to	Kivy	
(2012).		
The	 methodological	 error	 committed,	 according	 to	 Hanslick,	 in	 musical	
aesthetics	 up	 to	 his	 time,	 is	 to	 look	 for	 an	 account	 of	 the	 feelings	 that	 take	
possession	of	us	when	we	hear	music,	rather	than	investigating	what	is	beautiful	
in	music.	 He	 advocates	 a	 scientific	 approach	 to	music	 that	 avoids	 subjective	
feelings	 as	 the	 content	 of	music.	With	 this,	Hanslick	 does	 not	 deny	 that	 the	
contemplation	of	beautiful	music	can	arouse	pleasant	feelings;	nor	that,	as	some	
composers	 declare,	 putting	 their	 mind	 in	 a	 particular	 emotional	 state	 while	
composing	might	help	 in	the	creative	process.	The	point	 is	 that	music	has	no	
other	 purpose	 but	 pure	 aesthetic	 enjoyment,	 something	 we	 attain	 with	 the	
contemplation	of	its	form,	which	is	nothing	more	than	the	combination	of	the	
musical	material:	the	rhythm	(the	animating	principle),	the	system	of	tones	(the	
basic	 material),	 the	 harmonic	 structure	 and	 timbre,	 which	 makes	 music	 a	
kaleidoscope	of	multiple	colors	and	combinations.		
																																								 								
29	I	used	the	English	translation	of	Payzant,	a	wholly	new	translation	from	the	original	book	
in	German,	and	not	a	revision	of	the	first	English	translation	done	by	Gustav	Cohen,	first	
appeared	in	1891.	
30	Note	that	“tone”	for	Hanslick	is	a	specific	kind	of	sound,	of	determinate	and	measurable	
pitch,	perceived	as	having	a	specific	position	or	degree	on	the	scale.	
		 37	
So	following	Hanslick,	to	induce	feelings	in	us	is	not	the	task	of	music,	and	
it	is	not	by	means	of	those	aroused	feelings	that	we	will	be	aware	of	its	beauty.	A	
sort	 of	 disinterested	 listening31,	 far	 away	 from	 practical	 purposes	 is	 what	 the	
listener	must	reach,	free	of	the	authority	of	subjective	feeling.	The	latter	is	no	
more	than	a	secondary	effect,	not	part	of	its	inner	nature,	but	dependent	upon	
the	particular	circumstances	and	context.		
In	this	account,	 instrumental	music	shows	the	purely	musical	nature.	Out	
of	 words	 and	 lyrics	 we	 find	 the	 magnificence	 and	 the	 power	 of	 combining	
musical	 formal	 elements.	 But	 such	music	 cannot	 represent	 the	 ideas	 of	 love,	
fear	or	anger.	Nothing	is	expressed	but	“musical	ideas.”		
Which	 is	 the	 attribute	 that	 music	 can	 present	 about	 feelings?	 In	 other	
words,	given	 that	 feelings	are	not	 the	content	of	music,	what	do	 feelings	and	
music	 have	 in	 common?	 The	 answer	 given	 by	 Hanslick	 to	 this	 question	 is	
“motion”.	 Motion	 is	 “the	 ingredient	 which	 music	 has	 in	 common	 with	
emotional	states	and	which	it	 is	able	to	shape	creatively	in	a	thousand	shades	
and	contrasts”	(Hanslick	1986	[1891]:	11).	But	what	the	attentive	listener	hears	is	
not	 emotive	 properties,	 but	 how	 the	 tones	 ascend,	 descend,	 sprinkle,	 are	
repeated	 in	 other	 passages	 and	 shape	 before	 the	 ear	 a	 melodic	 symmetry	
between	different	bars,	how	the	bass	marks	the	rhythm	and	how	the	melody	is	
harmonized	during	the	composition.32	The	content	of	music	is	the	conjunction	
of	all	its	musical	elements.		
It	 is	 true,	he	admits,	 that	we	use	predicates	 like	“witty”,	 “banal”,	 “insipid”,	
“graceful”	or	“dull”	to	describe	music;	we	also	characterize	the	expressiveness	of	
a	musical	motif	 or	 passage	 with	 emotive	 properties	 like	 “arrogant”,	 “tender”,	
																																								 								
31	The	idea	of	disinterestedness	has	its	roots	in	Kantian	aesthetics.	According	to	him,	pure	
judgments	 of	 taste	 require	 us	 to	 take	 distance,	 to	 look	 at	 art	 works	 impartially,	 in	 a	
disinterested	 way,	 as	 “free	 delight”.	 We	 judge	 things	 as	 beautiful	 independently	 of	
whether	 they	 serve	 our	 personal	 interest	 or	 not.	 That’s	why	Kant	 defines	 taste	 as	 “the	
faculty	of	judging	an	object	or	a	mode	of	representation	by	means	of	a	delight	or	aversion	
apart	from	any	interest.	The	object	of	such	delight	is	called	beautiful”	(Kant,	2008	[1790]:	
42	(§7))	
32	Extracts	from	examples	given	by	Hanslick	(1986	[1891]).		
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“spirited”;	other	 features	of	 the	realm	of	appearance	 like	“fragrant”,	 “chilly”	or	
“hazy”	 are	 also	 attributed	 to	 music	 (Hanslick	 1986	 [1891]:	 32).	 Due	 to	 the	
difficulty	 of	 describing	 music	 in	 non-technical	 language,	 since	 it	 has	 no	
prototype	 in	nature	and	no	conceptual	content,	we	resort	to	“poetical	 fictions	
(Hanslick	 1986	[1891]:	30).	But	according	to	Hanslick	 in	all	 those	cases	we	are	
simply	 using	 emotive	 terms	 in	 a	 figurative	 way,	 extracting	 them	 from	 the	
vocabulary	 of	 our	 emotive	 life	 to	 describe	 purely	musical	 ideas.	 Behind	 such	
terms,	 there	 is	 no	 expressive	 property	 intrinsic	 to	 music,	 but	 all	 we	 find	 is	
“tonally	 moving	 form”,	 the	 sensuous	 manifestation	 of	 musical	 tonal	
relationships,	 organized	 in	 a	 unique	 fashion	 in	 each	 work.	 The	 proficient	
composer	 avails	 of	 her	 knowledge	 and	 mastery	 to	 choose	 and	 combine	
effectively	musical	elements.	But	what	we	hear	is	nothing	else	but	the	result	of	
this	work,	pure	musical	form.		
1.6. 	Conclusions	
In	this	chapter	I	have	arrived	to	the	following	conclusions:	
1)	 Music	 has	 no	 representational	 nor	 propositional	 meaning	 (it	 has	 no	
depictive	 content).	 Absolute	music	 is	 not	 about	 anything	 but	 itself.	 Quoting	
Kivy’s	beautiful	metaphor,	“absolute	music	is	a	solitary	dancer”	(Kivy	2009:	210).	
2)	Music	does	not	possess	emotions	like	humans	do.	Emotions	in	music	are	
not	felt	emotions.	
3)	Musical	expressiveness	cannot	be	explained	by	appealing	to	any	subject’s	
actual	emotion.	The	expressiveness	heard	in	music	cannot	either	be	attributed	
to	the	composer	or	to	the	performer.	Nor	to	imaginary	personae.	
4)	Music	may	arouse	emotions	or	emotion-like	feelings	in	the	listener,	but	
music	expressiveness	cannot	be	explained	appealing	to	such	emotions.	
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5)	 Pure	 formalist	 arguments	 leave	 no	 place	 for	 emotions	 in	music,	 so	we	
should	revise	such	account	in	order	to	explain	why	is	that	we	attribute	emotive	
properties	to	music.		
As	 Levinson	 pointed	 out,	 two	 different	 questions	 often	 get	 involved	 in	
discussions	of	expression	in	art:	“what	is	expression?”	and	“how	do	works	of	art	
achieve	 expression?”	 or	 “what	 are	 the	 grounds	 for	 artistic	 expression.”	 As	we	
saw,	 the	 second	 one	 becomes	 especially	 problematic	 when	 we	 deal	 with	
absolute	 music	 (Robinson,	 2005:	 272).	 A	 convincing	 account	 of	 musical	
expressiveness,	 then,	 should	 explain	 at	 least	 the	 following	 issues.	 First,	 the	
meaning	 of	 “expression”	 when	 we	 attribute	 expressive	 properties	 to	 music.	
Second,	an	explanation	of	how	music	works	acquire	their	expressive	properties.	
And	 third,	 the	 significance	 of	 such	 “expression”	 in	 music	 for	 its	 artistic	
appreciation	and	value,	and	see	if	it	is	essential	to	them. 
In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	deal	with	the	first	issue	and	clarify	what	is	meant	
by	“expression”	when	it	is	attributed	to	absolute	music.		
	
	
Chapter	2	
2. A	 cognitivist	 approach	 to	
music	expressiveness	
Up	to	now	I	have	reached	some	negative	conclusions.	I	argued	so	far	that	music	
does	not	represent	emotions;	representation	entails	the	intentional	depiction	of	
something	else,	i.e.	it	entails	a	meaningful	content.	Music	does	not	say	anything,	
it	 is	 not	 about	 anything,	 nor	 points	 to	 something	 outside	 itself.	 In	 absolute	
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music	there	 is	no	“depictive”	or	any	other	extra-musical	content.	So,	we	don’t	
perceive	 the	 expressive-making	 features	 of	 music	 as	 representing	 anything	
beyond	music	and	we	neither	understand	what	a	musical	theme	“means”	in	the	
sense	that	we	understand	what	a	linguistic	utterance	means.	
In	this	chapter	I	will	present	a	positive	thesis.	I	will	argue	for	a	cognitivist	
point	 of	 view	 with	 regard	 to	 music’s	 emotive	 properties,	 and	 take	 emotive	
properties	of	music	as	perceived	features	of	it.	Briefly	put,	I	will	argue	that	we	
hear	emotive	properties	 in	music,	and	that	 it	 is	there,	 in	the	music,	where	we	
find	its	expressiveness.		
2.1. Formalism	revisited	
Music	formalism	focuses	in	what	is	truly	musical,	the	sound	event,	the	formal	
structure	 and	 its	 purely	musical	 elements.	 The	 formalist	 ontological	 account	
puts	 music	 in	 a	 prominent	 place	 among	 art	 genres,	 explaining	 its	 nature	
without	appeal	to	extra-musical	contents	like	external	objects,	characters,	lyrics	
or	narrative	sources.	Musically	moving	tones	are	the	focus	of	attention	from	a	
formalist	 perspective	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 its	 musical	 structures	 becomes	 the	
appropriate	 description	 of	 the	 musical	 object,	 which	 I	 think	 is	 the	 right	
approach	to	take.	
However,	holding	a	 strong	 formalist	perspective	 regarding	music	 imposes	
several	limitations.	
As	 I	 explained	 before,	 a	 strong	 formalist	 position	 (e.g.	 Hanslick	 1986	
[1891])	 entails	 that	music	 either	 cannot	 embody	 emotions,	 or	 that	 if	 it	 does,	
those	emotive	properties	would	not	have	any	relevant	role	 for	appreciation	of	
music.	 Following	 Hanslick,	 absolute	 music’s	 aesthetic	 value	 resides	 in	 its	
“specifically	 musical	 kind	 of	 beauty,	 (…)	 self-contained	 and	 in	 no	 need	 of	
[emotive]	 content	 from	 outside	 itself	 (…)”	 (Hanslick	 1986	 [1891]:	 28).33	Pure	
																																								 								
33	For	further	information	about	Hanslick’s	formalism,	see	Kivy	2002:	63-64.	
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formalism	 holds	 that	 the	 content	 of	 music	 is	 nothing	 more	 than	 “tonally	
moving	forms”	(Hanslick	1986	[1891]:	28)	or	pure	sound	structure.	That	being	so,	
a	 formalist	 account	 of	 music	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 compatible	 with	 music	
expressiveness.	
One	of	the	arguments	behind	Hanslick’s	negative	thesis	is	that	given	that	
(i)	music	cannot	represent	thoughts,	and	(ii)	definite	feelings	involve	thoughts,	
then	(iii)	music	cannot	express	definite	emotions.	This	idea	has	been	attacked	
by	denying	that	thoughts	are	an	essential	part	of	emotions	and	defending	that	
not	 all	 emotions	 are	 object	 directed	 (Budd	 1985:	 24-25);	 or	 by	 arguing	 that	
sometimes	music	 also	 calls	 to	mind	 certain	 thoughts	 (Levinson	 1990).	 These	
positions	 aim	 at	 preserving	 a	 place	 for	 emotions	 in	music	 at	 any	 cost,	 so	 to	
speak.	But	I	think	it	is	a	wrong	line	to	take.	As	I	see	it,	Hanslick’s	error	does	not	
lie	in	denying	that	music	can	express	definite	emotions	(I	think	he	is	right	here),	
but	in	restricting	the	notion	of	“expression	of	emotion”	in	music	to	that	which	
involves	thought	and	feeling.	Once	we	admit	that	this	notion	of	emotion	is	not	
applicable	to	music	and	we	broaden	it,	music	emotive	descriptions	make	sense.	
This	exclusion	of	the	affective	side	of	music	is	extended	also	to	listeners’	
attitudes	 and	 responses.	The	 ideal	 listener	 according	 to	 formalist	 accounts	 of	
music	is	one	that	does	not	approach	a	listening	experience	under	the	influence	
of	 feelings	 or	 focuses	 her	 attention	 on	 what	 is	 heard	 as	 expressive.	 Hanslick	
(1986	 [1891]:	 50)	claims	 that	when	 listening	 to	music	under	 the	 influence	of	a	
distressing	or	agitated	mood,	for	example,	the	character	of	what	is	heard	loses	
its	significance	and	we	no	longer	hear	music.	On	the	other	hand,	he	argues	that	
if	physiological	reactions	or	feelings	are	aroused	while	listening	to	music,	they	
are	no	more	than	a	secondary	effect	of	music,	and	that	we	cannot	understand	
its	nature	by	that	means.	Kivy	(2006,	2007,	2009)	follows	his	predecessor	in	this	
matter.	 His	 “canonical	 way”	 of	 listening	 to	 music	 is	 free	 from	 personal	
associations	 and	 mind	 wanderings.	 Behind	 this	 formalist	 idea	 lies	 the	
assumption	 that	 those	attitudes	contaminate	a	purely	musical	experience	and	
appreciation	of	a	work.	Appealing	to	how	people	are	moved	by	music,	to	how	
music	affects	the	listener	or	the	performer,	reveals	more	about	the	subject	than	
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about	the	musical	work,	given	that	music	on	its	own	does	not	have	the	power	to	
elicit	any	kind	of	emotive	response.		
However,	I	think	there	is	still	hope	for	a	place	for	emotions	in	music	in	
the	formalist	picture	for	the	following	reasons:		
1. Experiencing	 and	 enjoying	 the	 emotive	 character	 of	 the	work	 in	 a	 listening	
experience	 does	 not	 imply	 deviating	 attention	 from	 the	 musically	 formal	
elements,	 as	 far	as	 the	 former	are	derived	 from	the	 latter.	This	 requires	us	 to	
discern	the	expressive	features	inherent	to	the	music	work	from	the	subjective	
emotive	connotations	listeners	or	performers	sometimes	give	to	the	work.	The	
difficulty	 lies	 in	 finding	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 formal	 and	 emotive	
properties	of	music	are	related.		
2. Performers	 and	 specially	 listeners	 are	 affected	 by	music	 in	 various	 ways.	 I	
won’t	defend	that	any	sort	of	emotional	response	is	relevant	to	understanding	a	
music-work.	But	 I	 think	 some	affective	 responses	 are	directly	 connected	with	
the	expressive	character	of	the	work	and	are	elicited	by	it.	The	nature	of	such	
responses	and	how	they	might	occur	I	will	explore	later.		
Given	that	 formalism,	 in	 its	broad	sense,	 takes	music	as	 “a	structure	of	
sound	events	without	semantic	of	representational	content”	(Kivy	2002:	89),	we	
could	 accommodate	 emotional	 properties	 in	music	 if	we	understand	 them	as	
heard	 properties	 derived	 from	 its	 formal	 structure,	 as	 Kivy’s	 “enhanced	
formalism” 34 	somehow	 does.	 It	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 enhancement	 of	
Hanslick’s	 formalism	 “allowing	 to	 include	 emotive	 properties	 as	 perceptual	
properties	of	 the	music,	 in	other	words,	aesthetic	properties	 in	Sibley’s	 sense”	
(Kivy	 2009:	 98).	 So,	 I	 take	 from	 formalism	 the	 primary	 role	 of	 form	 and	
structure	and	the	idea	that	music	is	constructed	upon	the	connections	of	sound	
patterns;	 but	 I	 am	 not	 to	 deny	 that	 expressiveness	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 music	
appreciation,	enjoyment	or	understanding.	It	must	be	music’s	abstract	form	and	
																																								 								
34	Kivy’s	 formalist	account	was	 labelled	as	 “enhanced	formalism”	by	Phillip	Alperson,	and	
adopted	by	Kivy	himself	in	Kivy	2009.	
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the	perceptual	elements	 that	 integrate	 it,	devoid	of	any	meaning	and	content	
beyond	what	is	purely	musical,	which	provides	the	elements	required	to	exhibit	
emotional	qualities.		
2.2. The	 uses	 of	 “expression”,	 and	
expressiveness	in	the	arts	
We	say	that	a	face	expresses	terror;	that	someone’s	gait	and	walking	expresses	
sadness;	 that	 freedom	of	 speech	 allows	 us	 to	 express	 our	 ideas;	 that	 the	 film	
expresses	 the	 suffering	of	 a	 time;	 that	 a	 student	 expresses	herself	 incorrectly;	
that	the	ballet’s	performance	was	expressive;	that	a	face	of	a	Saint	Bernard	dog	
expresses	sadness;	or,	that	the	weeping	pillow’s	shape	reflects	a	sad	expression.		
The	 name	 “expression”	 and	 the	 verb	 “to	 express”	 are	 used	 in	 various	
contexts	 and	adopt	different	meanings	or	 senses	depending	on	each	of	 them.	
Ideas,	emotions,	opinions	can	be	expressed.	But	what	is	exactly	meant	when	it	
is	 said	 to	 “express”	 something,	 or	 that	 an	 object	 has	 an	 expression	 of	
something?		
I	take	as	expression	(in	a	general	sense)	the	manifestation	or	the	action	of	
making	 known	 something	 by	 means	 of	 certain	 elements.	 Ideas,	 opinions,	
thoughts	or	emotions	are	examples	of	what	can	be	expressed.	Words,	gestures,	
body	movements,	facial	expressions,	a	picture,	a	dance	performance,	the	shape	
of	a	natural	object,	or	a	music	passage,	are	examples	of	the	elements	throughout	
which	 the	 object	 of	 expression	 is	 manifested.	 “Expression”	 is	 not	 limited	 to	
conscious	 agents.	 Natural	 elements,	 lifeless	 objects	 or	 artworks	 can	 also	 be	
expressive.	When	a	person	 expresses	 something,	 or	when	her	 voice,	 gestures,	
walking	or	gait	are	expressive,	what	is	meant	is	that	certain	elements	manifest	
certain	other	elements	of	the	subject,	suggesting	somehow	what	sort	of	things	
those	other	elements	might	be.		
Characteristically	“to	express	an	emotion”	means	to	manifest	a	feeling	state,	
as	 Kania	 (2014)	 points	 out,	 it	 is	 “the	 outward	manifestation	 of	 an	 emotional	
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state”.	Following	that,	tears	express	sadness	only	if	the	subject	is	sad,	or	if	the	
subject	 pretends	 to	 be	 sad.	 The	 dictionary	 has	 another	 sense35	for	 the	 noun	
“expression”:	“a	look	on	someone’s	face	that	conveys	a	particular	emotion:	a	sad	
expression.”	 This	 is	 fine	 as	 long	 as	 we	 extend	 the	 use	 of	 “expression”	 and	
concede	that	in	a	broader	sense	it	can	be	used	also	in	cases	in	which	there	is	no	
felt	 emotion	 behind	 the	 expressive	 object.	 The	 sad	 face	 can	 be	 expressive	 of	
sadness	even	if	the	subject	does	not	feel	sad.	I	will	analyse	such	a	broader	sense	
shortly.		
Expressiveness	can	be	 taken	as	 the	 function	of	 the	expressive	elements	of	
what	 is	 expressed.	Whether	 that	 which	 is	 expressed	 (an	 idea,	 a	 thought,	 an	
emotion)	is	literally	there	or	not	is	another	matter.	It	is	something	that	not	just	
humans	possess,	but	potentially	something	that	artworks	also	have.		
Let’s	think	about	fiction,	say,	the	anguished	face	of	Marion	in	Psycho	as	the	
knife	 approaches	 the	 curtain.	 We	 can	 detect	 anguish	 and	 terror	 in	 her	
movement,	notice	terror	in	her	face;	we	would	say	Marion’s	face	is	expressive	of	
anger.	We	would	even	attribute	felt	anger	or	panic	to	Marion,	to	the	fictional	
character	 she	 represents,	 however	 we	 are	 aware	 that	 there	 is	 nobody	
experiencing	such	a	feeling	out	there.	In	this	case	the	use	of	“expression”	does	
not	need	to	be	taken	as	the	expression	of	a	felt	emotion.	Certain	elements	of	the	
subject	(Marion’s	face)	suggest	that	something	is	being	expressed.	However,	in	
fiction	it	is	not	the	feeling	of	an	occurrent	emotion	that	is	being	expressed,	but	
what	 we	 perceive	 is	 the	 appearance,	 in	 ordinary	 cases,	 of	 the	 outward	
manifestation	 of	 that	 specific	 emotional	 state,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 appearance	 of	
terror.	And	in	fact,	it	is	well	known	that	Hitchcock	used	quite	perverse	methods	
with	the	actresses	and	actors	of	his	films	in	order	to	provoke	the	most	realistic	
expressive	 reactions	 he	 could.	 Tippy	 Hedren	 was	 one	 of	 his	 victims.	 The	
freezing-cold	water	 shower	of	 the	Psycho	 scene,	or	 the	martinis	he	made	her	
drink	to	lose	her	shyness	and	reserve,	seem	almost	naïve	if	we	compare	it	with	
																																								 								
35	New	Oxford	American	Dictionary	(2005).	
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the	tactics	he	used	in	shooting	The	Birds36.	The	terror	gestures	were	expressions	
of	real	terror	in	this	particular	case.	(Spoto	2008	[1983])	
From	 these	 sorts	 of	 examples	we	 see	 that	 the	word	 “expression”	 acquires	
different	uses	in	different	contexts.	We	can	say	that	the	paradigm	of	expression	
occurs	 when	 a	 person	 externalizes	 a	 felt	 emotion	 or	 a	 thought	 by	 means	 of	
outward	features.	When	there	is	suffering	and	sadness	but	the	subject	does	not	
externalize	it,	we	don’t	talk	about	expression.	On	the	contrary,	tears	may	betray	
the	 sadness	 that	 a	 person	 feels	when	 a	 family	member	 is	 suffering,	 but	 tears	
alone	don’t	 express	 sadness	 in	 a	 full	 sense.	Obviously,	we	 can	also	 express	 in	
words	that	which	we	don’t	really	feel,	believe	or	think.	The	actress	is	not	really	
feeling	what	the	character	of	Marion	in	Psycho	is	supposed	to	be	feeling	for	the	
audience.	However,	some	elements	externalize	or	exhibit	the	outward	features	
of	how	such	emotions	(or	thoughts)	are	expressed	in	ordinary	cases,	and	that’s	
why	it	is	not	strange	to	say	that	Marion’s	face	expresses	terror.	But	what	is	given	
is	 the	 appearance	 of	 emotion	 being	 felt,	 her	 eyes	 and	 mouth	 wide	 open,	 a	
scream,	 the	 dramatic	 raising	 of	 arms	 and	 her	 body’s	 contraction.	 What	 the	
audience	 perceives	 is	 the	 outward	 display	 of	 an	 emotional	 episode,	 an	
expressive	 appearance,	 not	 a	 real	 affective	 state.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	 word	
“expression”	then	acquires	a	different	use	in	fiction:	a	use	in	which	emotions	are	
not	 felt	 but	 evinced;	 the	 same	 use	 when	 we	 say	 we	 are	 "actors"	 in	 real	 life,	
feigning	what	we	don't	feel,	think	or	believe.	
If	we	translate	this	into	music,	we	find	no	actors,	no	characters	that	pretend	
to	feel	any	sort	of	emotion,	or	ideas	and	thoughts.	In	the	case	of	the	emotional	
features	we	 attribute	 to	music,	what	 is	 being	 expressed	may	be	 linked	 to	 the	
outward	 manifestation	 of	 an	 emotion;	 but	 unless	 we	 adopt	 an	 arousalist	 or	
persona	 account	 (positions	 I	 rejected	 in	 Chapter	 1)	 it	must	 be	 admitted	 that	
nothing	 is	 being	 actually	 expressed.	 Music	 expressiveness	 becomes	 a	
																																								 								
36	Before	shooting	the	final	attack	of	the	birds	she	was	said	that	they	would	use	mechanical	
birds,	but	in	the	last	moment	they	changed	their	mind.	The	result	would	have	been	too	
artificial.	 So	poor	Tippy	Hedren	was	 literally	 tortured	 in	a	kind	of	 cage	by	 real	 seagulls	
and	crows	during	the	whole	shooting	of	the	final	scene.	(Spoto	2008	[1983]:	397-398)	
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philosophical	 problem,	 since	 neither	music-works,	 nor	 performances	 of	 them	
are	psychological,	sentient	agents.		
That	 being	 so,	 there	 are	 three	 ways	 to	 tackle	 the	 problem	 of	 music	
expressiveness.	One	is	to	deny	that	music	is	expressive	of	emotions	(in	its	broad	
sense).	 The	 second	 one	 is	 to	 justify	 the	 parallelism	 of	 music	 and	 fiction,	
pointing	at	a	subject	that	is	implicitly	expressing	emotions.37	And	the	third	one,	
the	approach	I	take,	which	is	to	extend	the	use	of	“expression”	to	cases	in	which	
expressive	features	are	detected,	but	no	emotion	is	felt,	nor	simulated,	but	just	
where	the	emotion	or	emotions	are	exhibited.	This	is	the	case	of	absolute	music,	
I	contend.	
2.3. Music	exhibits	emotions	
The	 distinction	 made	 by	 Tormey	 (1971)	 in	 his	 critique	 of	 Collingwood’s	
expression	theory	helps	clarify	my	argument.	It	provides	an	insight	into	the	idea	
that	a	work	of	art	can	have	expressive	qualities	without	a	prior	act	of	expression	
of	 emotions.38	He	distinguishes	 between	 the	notions	 of	 “expression	 of	X”	 and	
“X-expression”.	
The	first	phrase,	the	“expression	of	X”,	suggests	that	there	is	something	
being	expressed,	that	someone	is	manifesting	her	own	state	of	mind	by	virtue	of	
showing	specific	emotional	signs.	If	something	or	someone	expresses	sadness	it	
stands	 in	 the	 appropriate	 relation	 to	 occurrent	 sadness.	 This	 is	 what	 I	 took	
before	as	a	paradigmatic	use	of	the	word	“expression”.			
The	 second	 usage	 of	 the	 noun	 expression	 or	 “X-expression”	 does	 not	
imply	a	subject	“expressing”	her	state	of	mind	by	means	of	external	gestures	or	
features.	A	 “gloomy	expression”,	 a	 “serious	 expression”	detected	 in	 a	 subject’s	
																																								 								
37	See	Chapter	1.	
38	His	critique	of	expression	theories	has	been	discussed	in	Sparshott	(1982)	and	Robinson	
(2004).	
		 47	
facial	features	does	not	necessarily	entail	that	the	subject	is	sad	or	serious.	That	
sad	or	gloomy	expression	may	merely	be	the	result	of	the	face’s	physiognomy,	
which	is	expressive	of	gloom	or	seriousness,	without	implying	the	manifestation	
of	 any	 particular	 emotional	 state.	 The	 properties	 perceived	 in	 her	 face	 and	
countenance	 are	 what	 give	 the	 appearance	 of	 those	 emotions	 being	
underneath.39 
Kivy’s	example	(1980)	of	the	Saint	Bernard	dog’s	“sad	expression”	illustrates	
nicely	this	second	option.	It	is	not	the	case	that	the	dog	is	sad,	and	that	the	face	
evinces	 its	mental	 state;	 but	 that	 the	 dog’s	 expressive	 features,	 or	 what	 Kivy	
calls	the	“contour,”	makes	our	perception	of	sadness	possible.	We	cannot	infer	
from	its	melancholic	features,	its	wrinkled	brow,	sad	eyes,	drooping	mouth	and	
ears,	 the	 emotional	 state	 of	 the	 dog,	 but	 we	 can	 see	 its	 sad	 expression.	 The	
example	used	by	Kivy	could	be	extended	to	other	facial	features	like	that	of	the	
Basset	Hound	(Davies	1994),	but	also	to	non-animate	objects	like	cars,	clouds,	
trees	 etc.	 The	 important	 point	 of	 these	 examples	 is	 that	 being	 expressive	 of	
specific	emotional	features	does	not	imply	felt	emotions.		
I	think	that	when	we	say	a	piece	of	music	expresses	an	emotion	the	use	of	
the	term	is	that	of	“X-expression”.	Similarly,	in	fiction	or	in	representational	arts	
(painting,	sculpture...)	 there	 is	no	prior	emotional	process,	no	one	 is	 feeling	a	
real	 emotion	 that	 some	 external	 features	 betray.	We	 attribute	 expression	 (in	
this	second	sense)	to	entities	that	could	never	express—in	the	transitive	use	of	
the	 term.	 The	 Saint	 Bernard’s	 face	 is	 sad	 in	 virtue	 of	 some	 external	 facial	
properties.	 Similarly,	 a	 Debussy	 prelude	 is	 expressive	 of	 sadness	 in	 virtue	 of	
some	outward	musical	features.	This	implies	that	what	listeners	may	detect	in	
music	are	the	expressive	properties	of	music	and	not	somebody’s	mental	state	
or	representation	of	it.	Expressive	music	“gives	expression	to	an	emotion”	where	
																																								 								
39	Scruton	 appears	 at	 first	 to	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	 music	 has	 an	 identifiable	 expressive	
character	and	focuses	on	the	idea	that	it	is	“expressive”	simpliciter	(1974:	pp.	78-83),	that	
music	 is	 expressive	 without	 expressing	 any	 particular	 emotion	 (the	 verb	 is	 used	
intransitively	 in	 music).	 In	 later	 works	 he	 seems	 to	 correct	 his	 point	 and	 admits	 that	
expressions	like	sadness	can	be	identified	in	music,	but	without	implying	that	anybody	is	
feeling	sad,	and	this	is	what	he	takes	now	as	the	intransitive	sense	(1997:	p.	157-158).		
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a	subject's	beliefs	or	the	intentional	object	of	her	feeling	are	absent.	Were	we	on	
the	 right	 track,	 the	 next	 step	 should	 be	 to	 explain	 how	 it	 happens	 and	 to	
identify	the	musical	elements	that	give	music	such	an	expressive	power.	
In	conclusion,	it	seems	to	me	that	the	nature	of	expression	in	music	is	not	
properly	 answered	by	 an	 expression	 theory	 that	 appeals	 to	 the	 composer’s	 or	
the	performer’s	 emotional	 state,	neither	by	 appealing	 to	 imagined	 characters,	
nor	to	the	listener’s	emotive	response.	As	O.K.	Bouwsma	has	said,	“the	sadness	
is	to	music	rather	 like	the	redness	to	the	apple,	than	it	 is	 like	the	burp	to	the	
cider”	 (Bouwsma,	 1950:	 94).	 I	 take	 it	 that	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 that	 is	 that	 we	
perceive	 the	music’s	 expressiveness	 as	part	of	 its	nature,	 as	 ascribing	 such	an	
emotion	to	the	music,	and	not	as	the	property	to	dispose	listeners	to	emotional	
responses.		
Thus,	 music	 expressiveness	 cannot	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 occurrent	
emotions	being	manifested,	but	as	a	(musical)	system	that	is	impregnated	with	
suggestions	 of	 emotion.	 I	 suggest	 that	 when	 we	 hear	 emotions	 in	 music,	 as	
emerging	from	the	work,	it	is	more	appropriate	to	talk	about	music	“exhibiting	
emotions”	(X-expression)	than	music	“expressing	emotions”	(expression	of	X).	I	
think	also	that	a	clear	distinction	between	the	composer,	the	performer	or	the	
listener’s	 emotions,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 emotions	 in	 the	music,	 on	 the	
other,	 is	crucial	 if	we	want	to	offer	a	good	account	of	the	expressive	power	of	
music,	without	mixing	things	up.40		
2.4. Literal	or	metaphoric?	
We	have	concluded	that	being	expressive	of	emotions	does	not	entail	someone	
manifesting	her	 feelings,	nor	 expressing	 emotions	 in	 the	paradigmatic	way	of	
the	verb	“to	express.”	That’s	why	I	think	that	exhibiting	emotions	satisfies	better	
the	 way	 in	 which	 music	 manifests	 expressive	 features	 by	 means	 of	 musical	
elements.	 Music	 is	 expressive	 of	 an	 emotion	 by	 exhibiting	 this	 emotion,	 by	
																																								 								
40	See	Chapter	1.	
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wearing	the	“appearance	of	emotion,”	as	Davies	(1994)	says.41	Now	it’s	 time	to	
look	more	closely	at	what	is	meant	by	that	and	which	sort	of	listeners’	reaction	
corresponds	to	music	expressiveness.	In	what	follows,	I	will	argue	that	when	we	
say	 “this	music	 is	 sad”,	 what	 is	meant	 is	 exactly	 that	 it	 is	 sad	 and	 that	what	
listeners	perceive	is	precisely	how	it	is	sad.	
Some	 authors	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 expression	 of	 emotions	 and	 emotive	
attributions	to	music	are	not	to	be	taken	literally.	But	this	can	be	understood	in	
different	ways.42			
When	 the	 word	 “expression”	 is	 attributed	 to	 artworks,	 and	 especially	 to	
non-representational	 genres	 like	music,	we	 can	understand	 it	metaphorically.	
One	 argument	 for	 such	 a	 view	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 “intelligibility”,43	used	 by	
formalists	to	deny	that	absolute	music	is	not	able	to	express	definite	emotions.	
Recall	that	given	that	works	of	art	are	not	sentient	beings,	and	that	emotional	
expression	 is	 mostly	 associated	 with	 those,	 the	 fact	 that	 we	 attribute	 such	
properties	 to	 artworks	 is,	 to	 say	 the	 least,	 problematic.	Hanslick	 adduces	 the	
following	in	defense	of	the	idea	that	the	musically	beautiful	has	to	be	found	in	
its	formal	structure:	
It	is	extraordinarily	difficult	to	describe	this	specifically	musical,	autonomous	
beauty.	Since	music	has	no	prototype	in	nature	and	expresses	no	conceptual	
content,	 it	 can	 be	 talked	 about	 only	 in	 dry	 technical	 definitions	 or	 with	
poetical	 fictions.	 (...).	What	 in	every	other	 art	 is	 still	description	 is	 in	music	
already	metaphor.	(Hanslick	1986	[1891]:	30)	
																																								 								
41	The	 main	 thesis	 of	 Stephen	 Davies	 in	 this	 work	 is	 that	 music	 “presents	 emotions’	
characteristics	in	appearances.”	(1994:	261).	For	further	reading,	see	Chapter	5	of	his	work	
Music	and	Meaning	(1994).	
42	In	Chapter	3	I	present	Sibley’s	account	of	aesthetic	terms.	I	discuss	the	point	that	he	
also	picks	out	 some	words	 that	we	use	metaphorically	 in	aesthetic	descriptions,	 for	
example,	“melancholy,”	“tightly-knit”,	or	“quasi-metaphors”,	for	example,	“dynamic,”	
“balanced”	(2004	[1959]:	128).	
43	Hanslick	1986	[1891]	and	Zangwill	2007,	2015	adopt	this	position.		
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More	 recently	 Nick	 Zangwill	 (2007,	 2015)	 has	 argued	 that	 emotions,	 like	
other	musical	descriptions	related	to	space,	motion,	time	etc.,	are	metaphorical.	
Describing	natural	phenomena	in	emotive	terms,	as	we	do,	does	not	mean	that	
nature	is	connected	with	emotions.	Likewise,	with	music.		
I	have	argued	in	the	previous	section	that	a	broader	notion	of	“expression”	
can	accommodate	also	the	expressiveness	in	fiction	and	in	absolute	music;	and	
that	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 for	 something	 (say	 an	 artwork)	 to	 be	 expressive	 of	 an	
emotion	 even	 if	 we	 have	 no	 reason	 to	 suppose	 that	 an	 occurrent	 and	 felt	
emotion	is	being	expressed	by	a	sentient	subject.		
A	somewhat	different	line	was	defended	by	Nelson	Goodman	in	his	seminal	
work	Languages	of	Art	(1968).	Goodman	analyses	expression	as	a	“metaphorical	
exemplification”.	 Ordinarily,	 metaphors	 are	 taken	 as	 figures	 of	 speech,	 as	
linguistic	 devices. 44 	Goodman’s	 metaphorical	 exemplification	 suggests	 that	
being	metaphoric	is	a	feature	of	the	way	in	which	music	possesses	an	emotive	
property.	In	other	words,	the	possession	of	emotional	character	is	metaphorical	
and	music	itself	(not	just	the	descriptions	of	it)	is	metaphoric.45		
There	is	also	another	sense	in	which	attributions	of	expressiveness	to	music	
are	 regarded	 as	 figurative.	 An	 account	 along	 this	 line	 has	 been	 defended	 by	
Roger	 Scruton	 (1997).	 According	 to	 him	 our	 experience	 and	 description	 of	
music	 involves	 an	 elaborate	 system	 of	 metaphors,	 metaphors	 of	 space,	
movement	and	animation.	We	organize	pitches	according	to	thickness,	volume,	
weight,	 color,	 dynamism	 and	 so	 on.	 Following	 that	 view,	 it	 is	 not	 only	 the	
emotive	properties	in	music	which	fall	under	the	figurative	use	but	it	is	a	great	
part	of	the	“tonal	surface”	that	is	predicated	metaphorically.	Our	experience	of	
music	has	not	only	sound	as	its	intentional	object,	but	also	“life	and	movement”,	
that	music	is	situated	by	listeners	in	an	imagined	space	(“the	musical	sphere”)	
																																								 								
	
44	This	account	is	analyzed	in	length	by	Davies	(1994:	123-166).	
45	For	a	deeper	insight	see	Giovanelly	(2016).	
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and	organized	in	terms	of	their	own	experience	(Scruton	1997:	96).	Actually,	we	
say	the	melody	falls	and	rises,	that	the	chords	are	open,	hollow	or	filled,	that	the	
notes	are	higher	or	lower,	that	the	texture	of	an	instrument	is	thick	or	thin,	that	
the	rhythm	is	heavy	or	light,	and	that	the	passage	is	shining,	silken,	dark	or	sad.				
However,	 I	 think	 that	when	we	 say	 that	 the	 initial	 glissando	of	Gershwin	
Rhapsody	 in	 Blue	 “lightly	 ascends,”	 that	Ravel’s	Bolero’s	 “thin	 textures”	 evolve	
into	a	crescendo,	or	that	Mozart	Minuets	are	“cheerful	and	gracious,”	we	mean	
exactly	what	 the	words	describe.	Having	expressive	 terms	“adopted”	by	music	
from	 their	 original	 contexts	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 they	 are	 now	 used	
metaphorically.	Words	 acquire	 different	 uses	 and	meanings	 and	 those	 evolve	
over	time.	Even	if	the	primary	uses	of	the	terms	“expression”	and	“sadness”	are	
rooted	 in	human	behavior,	 it	does	not	mean	 that	when	we	ascribe	expressive	
terms	 to	music	we	 are	 using	metaphors.	The	 same	 is	 true	 for	movement	 and	
spatial	ascription	 to	music.	Musical	movement	 is	not	of	 the	sort	of	a	physical	
object	 that	moves	 from	one	 place	 to	 another	 (its	 primary	 use),	 but	 points	 to	
how	sound	events	change	along	a	temporal	process.	Not	all	non-primary	uses	of	
words	are	metaphoric.		
In	 conclusion,	 I	 think	musical	 descriptions	 in	 terms	 of	 motion,	 space	 or	
emotive	expression	have	long	ago	entered	into	the	musical	vocabulary	and	their	
use	 is	 interpersonal,	 regular	and	cross-cultural.46	So,	 I	 think	 that	ascription	of	
emotive	terms	to	music	is	not	metaphoric.	When	I	say	that	“the	music	expresses	
sadness”	 it	 is	 not	 meant	 that	 the	 music	 feels	 sad	 but	 that	 it	 conveys	 a	 sad	
expression,	the	characteristic	appearance	of	a	sad	person.	This	does	not	amount	
to	denying	that	music	can	be	described	metaphorically.	Describing	Gershwin’s	
Rhapsody	in	Blue	clarinet	glissando	as	the	ascension	and	explosion	of	a	wave	in	
the	ocean	is	a	metaphorical	description	that	can	be	unpacked	and	paraphrased.	
However,	 when	 we	 attribute	 sadness	 to	 Albinoni’s	 Adagio	 we	 point	 to	 a	
property	of	music	that	is	literally	heard	as	sad	and	cannot	be	conveyed	in	other	
																																								 								
46	I	owe	part	of	my	critique	of	the	metaphoric	account	of	music’s	expressive	properties	to	
Stephen	Davies	(1994)	and	Malcolm	Budd	(1985).	
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words	 without	 losing	 part	 of	 its	 meaning.	 So,	 I	 conclude	 that	 when	 we	 say	
emotive	properties	are	in	music,	we	do	so	in	a	literal	sense.	
2.5. 	“Hearing”	emotions	
My	positive	argument	holds	 that	music	does	have	 the	necessary	properties	 to	
explain	 its	 expressiveness,	 and	 that	 those	 are	 to	 be	 found	 in	music.	 In	 other	
words,	 I	 claim	 that	 the	 emotions	music	 is	 expressive	 of	 are	 properties	 of	 the	
work,	properties	that	listeners	recognize	in	the	work	and	can	be	explained	just	
by	appealing	to	music.	The	challenge	is	to	identify	which	sort	of	properties	they	
are,	and	see	how	they	do	their	work.		
2.5.1. The	redness	of	the	apple	
One	way	to	explain	how	music’s	emotional	properties	are	perceived	is	to	appeal	
to	the	analogy	of	color	perception	and	argue	that	music’s	emotive	properties	are	
like	“the	redness	to	the	apple”	(Bouwsma	1950)	and	that	they	are	perceived	as	
part	of	music’s	nature.	According	to	that,	the	sadness	that	we	hear	in	music	is	a	
property	of	the	music,	in	just	the	same	way	that	the	redness	is	a	property	of	the	
apple.		
The	 scientific	 account	 of	 colors	 in	 terms	 of	 wavelengths	 of	 the	
electromagnetic	field	that	we	experience	as	colored	light	is	well	known.	It	is	also	
commonly	 recognised	 that	 there	 is	 a	 subjective	 part	 of	 color	 perception,	 and	
that	 the	 exposure	of	 the	 seen	object	 to	 light	 and	how	 the	brain	 reacts	 to	 the	
stimuli	affect	its	perception,	so	color	becomes	something	experienced	by	vision.	
They	 are	 secondary	 qualities47	of	 objects,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 exist	 for	 the	
sense	 of	 “seeing.”	 But	 under	 normal	 human	 perceptual	 conditions	 and	 given	
																																								 								
47	The	distinction	between	primary	and	secondary	qualities	of	objects	traces	its	roots	back	
to	the	rise	of	modern	science	and	is	commonly	attributed	to	John	Locke	(1959	[1870]).	It	is	
still	 an	 issue	 of	 much	 epistemological	 and	 metaphysical	 debate.	 I	 take	 for	 primary	
qualities	of	 things	the	properties	that	are	 independent	of	observers;	 I	 take	as	secondary	
qualities	of	 objects	 those	 that	produce	 sensations	 in	 the	perceiver,	 such	 as	 color,	 taste,	
smell	or	sound.		
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that	 the	 subject	 is	 not	 affected	 by	 any	 brain	 damage,	 colors	 are	 perceived	 as	
properties	inherent	to	the	object.	That	being	so,	it	could	be	argued	that	emotive	
properties	 in	music	 are	 part	 of	 the	music	 in	 the	 same	way	 colors	 are	 part	 of	
material	 physical	 objects.48	That	 is	 as	 secondary	 properties	 that	 exist	 for	 the	
sense	 of	 “hearing.”	 In	 that	 case,	we	 should	 also	 discover	 the	 “scientific”	 story	
behind	 the	 emotive	 properties	 in	 music	 and	 how	 they	 are	 related	 to	 our	
perception	of	them.	
However,	 there	 is	 a	 notable	 difference	 between	 color	 perception	 and	 the	
perception	 of	 the	 emotive	 character	 of	 musical	 pieces.	 Imagine	 we	 are	
discussing	the	color	of	a	blanket,	and	I	want	to	convince	you	of	its	yellowness.	I	
can	 compare	 the	 color	 of	 the	 blanket	 to	 other	 colors	 perceived	 in	 different	
objects	and	say	“look,	this	dress	is	yellow	too,	a	bit	darker	but	still	yellow;	the	
yellowness	of	the	blanket	is	brighter,	but	both	objects	share	yellowness;	and	if	
you	look	with	proper	light	you	will	realize	that	it	is	not	in	fact	brown...”.	There	
is	no	way	to	point	at	any	quality	in	the	object	to	justify	my	judgment	about	the	
yellowness	of	the	blanket;	there	is	no	way	to	defend	its	yellowness	appealing	to	
features	 in	 the	 object.	 In	 this	 sense,	 colors	 are	 directly	 perceived	 as	 simple	
properties.		
Imagine	now	that	the	blanket	is	exposed	to	sunlight	for	several	days	and	the	
yellow	color	fades	away.	We	now	see	the	blanket	as	pale-brown	or	beige.	From	
the	point	of	view	of	physics	changes	occur	in	the	primary	properties	of	things	
and	 those	 internal	 changes	 have	 an	 effect	 in	 the	 perceptual	 experience	 of	
observers.	One	might	be	 tempted	 then	 to	describe	 in	 the	Lockean	 sense	 that	
secondary	 properties	 such	 as	 colors	 are	 dispositional	 properties,	 that	 the	
blanket	 is	 yellow	 or	 pale-brown	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 tendency	 to	 produce	 in	 the	
observer	 the	 experience	 of	 yellow	 or	 pale-brown.	 But	 note	 that	 such	 a	
disposition	 can	 be	 grounded	 in	 some	 structural	 features	 of	 the	 object	 (its	
physical	properties).	We	can	explain	how	 it	 is	that,	before,	the	blanket	looked	
																																								 								
48	I	will	leave	aside	the	metaphysical	debate	over	whether	secondary	qualities	exist	“in	the	
object”	or	“in	the	mind”	of	the	perceiver.	
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yellow,	and	now	the	color	is	shabby,	and	shows	a	different	tonality	to	our	senses.	
This	explained	by	appealing	to	the	physical	changes	that	have	occurred	in	the	
object.	We	might	 attribute	 the	 cause	 of	 color	 change	 to	 the	 radiation	 of	 sun	
light	onto	the	blanket	and	the	physical	changes	it	causes	in	its	atomic	structure,	
but	when	I	try	to	convince	my	interlocutor	of	its	actual	pale-brown	color	I	still	
cannot	point	to	any	outward	feature	of	the	object	that	justifies	my	claim.	This	is	
the	sense	in	which	colors	are	simple	properties.		
When	 we	 ascribe	 emotive	 properties	 to	 music,	 things	 don’t	 happen	 that	
way.	Imagine	now	a	discussion	about	the	emotive	properties	of	a	piece	of	music.	
I	am	enthusiastic	about	 the	vitality,	power	and	energy	conveyed	by	 the	work.	
However,	my	friend	perceives	threat	and	danger	in	the	same	piece.	The	reasons	
for	such	disagreement	can	be	diverse,	but	it	could	be	the	case	that	one	of	us	has	
payed	closer	attention	to	the	work,	and	captures	details	unnoticed	to	the	other.	
Were	 this	 the	 case,	 we	 could	 try	 to	 persuade	 our	 interlocutor	 and	 point	 to	
features	in	the	music	that	passed	unnoticed	by	her,	for	example,	an	ascending	
figure,	 a	 particular	motive,	 a	 cadence,	 a	 changing	 tonality	 in	 the	 final	 part	 ...	
Regardless	of	our	success,	and	unlike	in	the	case	of	colors,	expressive	features	
are	present	in	music	in	virtue	of	other	basic	properties,	properties	to	which	we	
can	always	point	at	to	identify	where	the	emotive	character	of	the	piece	comes	
from.	This	does	not	mean	that,	when	we	hear	sadness	or	fear	in	a	music	work,	
we	need	to	decipher	consciously	each	little	musical	feature	before	we	notice	the	
emotion.	We	experience	emotive	properties	directly,	we	hear	them	as	inherent	
to	it,	similarly	to	how	we	see	the	colors	as	part	of	the	object.	But	unlike	in	the	
case	of	colors	we	can	point	to	those	musical	 features	to	 justify	our	perception	
and	make	other	listeners	realize	their	mistake	.49		
																																								 								
49	It	is	important	also	to	notice	that	a	small	change	in	the	composition,	say	another	tonal	
resolution	in	the	end	of	the	piece,	may	change	the	emotive	character	of	it.		
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2.5.2. Emotions	in	music	
The	 conclusion	 extracted	 from	 the	 analogy	 of	 colors	 with	 musical	 emotive	
features	is	that	both	are	experienced	directly	(no	conscious	analysis	is	needed);	
that	 neither	 of	 them	 corresponds	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 primary	 qualities	 (they	
depend	on	the	perceiver);	that	in	both	cases	we	might	be	aware	of	the	cause	of	a	
change	occurred	in	the	perceived	object	(the	exposure	to	sunlight,	or	the	tonal	
change).	However,	the	yellowness	of	the	blanket	is	not	yellow	in	virtue	of	other	
qualities	we	perceive;	and	unlike	with	colors,	in	the	case	of	music,	its	expressive	
properties	can	be	explained	by	appealing	to	other	features	of	music	(formal	or	
structural	 properties)	 on	 which	 they	 depend	 (the	 tonality,	 the	 timbre,	 the	
melody	and	so	on).	When	I	make	a	judgment	about	the	emotive	character	of	a	
music-work,	 I	 can	 always	 defend	 my	 claim	 pointing	 to	 specific	 features	 of	
details	 heard	 in	 it.	 Obviously,	 the	 more	 familiarity	 we	 have	 with	 technical	
musical	 vocabulary,	 the	 easier	 it	 will	 be	 to	 detect	 such	 features,	 and	make	 a	
convincing	defense	against	an	interlocutor.	
In	this	sense	emotive	properties	of	music	are	complex	properties	that	result	
from	 the	 combination	 of	 different	 musical	 features	 and	 elements.	 When	
emotive	properties	such	as	melancholy,	cheerfulness	and	the	like	are	detected	
in	a	music	piece,	we	perceive	them	directly,	without	necessarily	being	aware	of	
the	 features	 in	 virtue	 of	which	 they	 are	melancholic	 or	 cheerful.	 But	 the	 fact	
that	music	 embodies	 such	 character,	 depends	on	 the	 combination	of	musical	
formal	features	that	are	singled	out	in	that	specific	work.	One	slight	alteration	
in	a	section	of	the	work,	might	carry	with	it	a	change	in	the	emotive	character,	
and	 a	 different	 perceptual	 experience	 of	 it.	 From	 an	 exactly	 identical	
combination	of	musical	elements,	should	emerge	the	same	emotive	character	in	
a	 work.	 But	 obviously	 perceiving	 a	 similar	 emotional	 tone	 in	 two	 different	
music	pieces	does	not	mean	that	they	share	the	same	musical	features.	Chopin’s	
Tristesse	 (independently	 of	 its	 title)	 shows	 melancholy	 very	 differently	 to	
Albinoni’s	Adagio	or	to	the	Seven	Symphony’s	slow	movement	of	Beethoven.	As	
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I	 said,	music	offers	 infinite	possibilities	 and	very	varied	ways	of	 exhibiting	an	
expressive	color.		
Despite	 the	 dependence	 of	 music’s	 emotive	 qualities	 on	 other	 more	
technical	musical	 features,	we	hear	 them	as	distinct	qualities,	 separated	 from	
those	features	that	give	reason	to	them.	They	are	the	kind	of	qualities	one	may	
call	“emergent”	from	a	whole,	and	“supervenient”50	on	the	way	such	a	whole	is	
composed	and	structured.	The	idea	is	that	emotions	in	music	are	nothing	more	
than	 heard	 properties	 inherent	 to	 it,	 and	 that	 we	 hear	 them	 as	 salient	 and	
distinct	 features,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 anchored	 to	 underlying	 first-level	musical	
features,	and	cannot	be	explained	without	pointing	to	those	first-level	features.	
Expressiveness	then	should	be	understood	as	a	phenomenal	property	of	music	
itself,	that	resides	in	the	way	the	music	sounds	to	the	attuned	listener,	and,	as	I	
will	 argue,	 that	 she	 experiences	 the	 music	 in	 that	 way	 thanks	 to	 the	
resemblance	of	ordinary	emotional	behavior	and	music’s	dynamic	appearance.51			
So,	I	don’t	think	that	the	emotive	character	that	music	emanates	depends	
on	its	propensity	to	elicit	emotions	in	the	listener,	or	that	its	expressiveness	can	
be	explained	by	appealing	to	any	imagined	content.	When	such	emotions	arise,	
or	music	 directs	 our	 thought	 towards	 an	 imagined	 persona	 possessing	 those	
emotions,	or	even	when	music	evokes	personal	recreations	of	our	emotive	life,	
the	cause	of	all	those	responses	would	remain	unexplained.	The	proposal	I	have	
already	 outlined	 takes	 a	 cognitivist	 perspective	 on	 music’s	 expressiveness,	
which	 I	 think	 focuses	on	 the	 root	 of	music’s	 expressive	power	 and	 associated	
human	 affect	 responses.	 As	 we	 said,	music’s	 expressive	 properties	 are	 heard,	
																																								 								
50 	The	 term	 “supervenience”	 was	 first	 introduced	 to	 describe	 a	 physicalist	 and	
non-reductive	 approach	 to	 philosophy	 of	mind.	 Davidson	 takes	 it	 to	mean	 that	 “there	
cannot	be	two	events	alike	in	all	physical	respects	but	differing	in	some	mental	aspects,	or	
that	 an	 object	 cannot	 alter	 in	 some	mental	 respect	 without	 altering	 in	 some	 physical	
respects”	(Davidson	1980	[1970]:	214).	I	develop	this	idea	in	Chapter	3	and	Chapter	4.	
51	The	issue	about	the	dependence	of	emotive	properties	on	first-level	musical	features	will	
be	 picked	 up	 in	 Chapter	 4.	 The	 argument	 for	 a	 resemblance	 account	 of	 music	
expressiveness	is	developed	in	Chapter	5.	
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cognized	and	recognized	as	aspects	of	music,	and	there	are	two	basic	reasons	
why	they	can	be	rightly	explained	as	something	inherent	to	it.	
First,	the	reason	I	just	pointed	out	is	that	music	has	the	power	to	embody	
what	we	perceive	as	emotive	features.	This	power	is	to	be	found	in	its	genuine	
musical	machinery,	the	dimensions	in	which	a	sound	event	is	shaped,	and	the	
features	that	“give	life”	to	it.	Harmony,	rhythm	and	melody	are	the	fundamental	
aspects	 of	music,	 but	 timbre,	 dynamics,	 tempo,	 loudness,	 brightness	 etc.	will	
also	 give	 character	 to	 the	work,	 or	 to	 passages	 of	 it.52	There	 is	 a	 relationship	
between	the	emergent	emotive	properties	of	music	and	the	features	that	ground	
such	phenomena,	a	 relation	 I	am	confident	 that	can	be	explained.	Given	 that	
music	is	a	temporal	art,	its	expressive	character	does	not	need	to	be	found	in	a	
particular	 moment,	 figure	 or	 passage.	 Often	 the	 expressive	 character	 will	 be	
revealed	 only	 gradually,	 after	 we	 hear	 how	 different	 passages	 are	 articulated	
into	the	whole	structure.		
Secondly,	 the	 composer	 is	 aware	 of	 such	 potential,	 and	 thanks	 to	 her	
competence	as	a	musician,	she	knows	which	formal	combinations	can	result	in	
the	 intended	 emotive	 features.	The	 author	uses	her	 technical	 abilities	 to	 give	
expressiveness	to	her	work.	If	successful,	she	chooses	the	appropriate	elements	
and	 combines	 them	 in	 such	 a	 fashion	 that	 creates	 a	 work	 of	 a	 particular	
expressive	 character.	 The	 composer’s	 expertise	 and	 skill	 allows	 thereafter	 the	
attentive	 listener	 to	 recognize	 the	 salient	 emotive	 features	of	 the	music-work	
and	thus	infer	the	author’s	intention	in	this	respect.		
So	 music	 is	 not	 expressive	 because	 it	 makes	 us	 happy,	 or	 moves	 us	
profoundly,	or	because	 it	activates	emotive	remembrances	or	anything	of	that	
kind.	Maybe	being	expressive	can	have	secondary	and	often	pleasurable	effects	
on	 us;	 we	 could	 also	 admit	 that	 sometimes	 those	 effects	 facilitate	 a	 better	
understanding	 of	 the	 work;	 and	 also	 that	 those	 “side	 effects”	 are	 often	 the	
reason	why	we	 listen	 to	music.	 But	 the	 point	 is	 that	 without	 all	 that,	music	
																																								 								
52	I	take	up	this	issue	in	Chapter	5/6	
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remains	expressive.	Its	expressive	capacity	lies	within	itself	and	the	merit	in	the	
composer’s	ability.	
In	 chapter	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 expressiveness	 of	music	 was	 to	 be	 found	 in	
music,	 as	 something	 inherent	 to	 it,	which	owes	 its	power	 to	 the	 sound	event	
and	its	properties,	independently	of	what	the	composer	or	the	listener	feel.	We	
saw	 that	 music	 has	 the	 ability	 of	 showing	 some	 characteristically	 emotional	
features	by	purely	musical	means	and	that	the	composer,	aware	of	such	power,	
makes	use	of	 it	 to	provide	her	work	with	a	particular	emotive	character.	As	a	
consequence,	 listeners	 “hear	 emotions”	 in	 music,	 or	 better	 perceive	 such	
emotive	qualities	in	it.	They	detect	what	the	author	(if	successful)	intended	to	
present	 by	 musical	 means.	 What	 is	 heard	 is	 not	 someone	 manifesting	 felt	
emotions,	but	a	complex	and	structured	sound	event;	and	what	is	perceived	as	
emotive	is	nothing	else	but	a	salient	feature	of	such	sound	event.	
Now,	if	we	accept	that	music	exhibits	emotions	in	this	way,	we	should	find	
the	 properties	 in	 virtue	 of	 which	 a	 musical	 work	 is	 expressive	 of	 specific	
emotions;	 in	 other	 words,	 explain	 how	 emotions	 “get	 into	 the	 music.”	 The	
paradigmatic	example	I	used	for	what	I	called	“X	expression”,	the	air	of	sadness	
exhibited	 in	 the	 Saint	 Bernard	 dog’s	 face,	 is	 explained	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	
physical	features	we	observe	in	its	face,	glance	and	gesture.	They	are	detectable,	
observable,	 and	 identifiable	 by	 sight.	We	 could	 argue	 that	 we	 identify	 those	
features	as	expressive	of	sadness	because	they	simulate	or	look	like	human	sad	
faces.	Whether	 this	 parallelism	between	ordinary	 expressions	of	 emotion	 and	
music	 exhibiting	 emotion	 is	 enough	 grounds	 or	 not	 to	 explain	 how	 listeners	
attribute	emotional	properties	to	music	will	be	discussed	later.		
Whether	 this	 account	 of	 emotions	 in	 non-human	 cases	 in	 terms	 of	
resemblance	 to	 human	 expression	 is	 adequate	 or	 not,	 it	 seems	 particularly	
difficult	in	the	case	of	music.	The	two	main	difficulties	are:	
1) In	 music,	 there	 is	 no	 obvious	 gesture,	 gait,	 or	 visual	 feature	 to	 be	
identified	as	expressive	of	any	particular	emotion,	there	is	just	sound.	There	is	
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no	 obvious	 parallelism	 between	 sound’s	 external	 features	 and	 the	 those	
exhibited	in	full-blooded	emotional	responses.	
2) Following	on	from	on	1),	we	are	presented	with	the	cross-modal	problem:	
we	 would	 have	 to	 explain	 how	 structured	 sound	 is	 able	 to	 resemble	 the	
appearance	of	features	detected	by	sight	(body	movements,	gaits,	gestures	and	
so	on).			
In	any	case,	the	explanation,	I	insist,	is	to	be	found	in	the	musical	work	and	
its	machinery	and	not	outside	it.	The	challenge	now	is	to	find	an	account	that	
answers	 how	 the	 formal	 features	of	music	 and	 its	 emotive	 aspects	 are	 related	
and	show	how	they	are	capable	of	exhibiting	the	emotional	properties	we	hear	
in	music.	As	we	said	before,	the	difficulty	lies	in	explaining	“how	emotions	get	
into	 the	 music.”	 Before	 addressing	 that,	 let’s	 outline	 the	 sort	 of	 emotive	
properties	music	can	exhibit.	
2.6. Which	emotions?	
When	we	say	that	a	piece	of	music	is	expressive	we	might	mean	two	different	
things.		
First,	 we	 sometimes	 quite	 naturally	 describe	 a	 music-work,	 or	 a	
performance	of	it,	as	expressive,	without	necessarily	implying	that	a	particular	
emotive	 character	 is	 detected	 in	 the	 piece.	 “Expression”	 in	 this	 intransitive	
sense	 does	 not	 mean	 expression	 of	 any	 emotion	 in	 particular,	 but	 a	 general	
feature	attributed	to	the	work.	The	same	work	can	be	performed	more	or	less	
expressively	then,	even	if	there	is	no	particular	emotive	property	detected	in	it.		
I	recall	my	music	student	days	when	our	piano	teacher	gave	us	instructions	
for	a	correct	performance	of	a	score.	When	we	interpreted	romantic	music,	the	
general	 command	 was	 to	 play	 espressivo	 (playing	 Bach	 was	 a	 completely	
different	matter,	the	use	of	the	sustain	pedal	was	forbidden	and	everything	had	
to	be	meticulously	and	very	cleanly	executed).	We	understood	that	we	had	to	
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convey	 an	 emotive	 character	 in	our	performance	of	 a	Beethoven	Sonata,	 or	 a	
Chopin	 Nocturne,	 for	 example,	 and	 expression	 marks	 like	 appasionato,	 con	
fuoco,	 afectuoso,	 misterioso	 or	 dolcissimo	 helped	 in	 our	 task.	 We	 were	
conscious	 that	 it	 should	 be	 played	 “with	 feeling”,	 not	 necessarily	 the	 sort	 of	
feeling	detected	 in	one’s	bowels,	but	 avoiding	a	 cold,	distant	or	 too	 technical	
performance.	 I	 still	 experience	 that	 as	 a	 listener	 of	 music	 when	 I	 attend	 a	
concerto,	 or	 compare	 different	 recordings	 of	 the	 same	 work;	 and	 my	 own	
execution	 of	 a	 piece	 of	 music	 or	 song	 can	 vary	 in	 expressiveness	 from	 one	
moment	to	another,	either	when	I	play	the	piano	as	a	soloist	or	rehearse	with	
my	 band.	 Compare	 Chopin’s	 Ballad	 No.	 1.,	 played	 by	 Lang	 Lang,	 and	 by	
Christian	Zimmerman,53	with	all	my	respect	for	both	of	them.	It	is	not	because	
Zimmerman	expresses	melancholy	more	appropriately	that	his	performance	is	
more	expressive.	Despite	appearances,	the	subtlety	and	delicacy	of	Zimmerman	
execution	is	what	gives	the	performance	an	expressive	character,	which	is	not	to	
do	with	this	or	that	specific	emotion,	but	with	being	more	(or	less)	espressivo	in	
a	general	way.	
Second,	when	we	attribute	expressiveness	to	a	work	or	performance	we	may	
be	 suggesting	 that	 a	 particular	 mood,	 emotion	 or	 affect	 is	 detected	 in	 the	
music-work;	 as	 we	 argued,	 it	 is	 not	 an	 ocurrent	 mood	 or	 emotion,	 but	 the	
outward	 features	 of	 the	 music-work	 that	 characterize	 the	 expression	 of	
emotions	 in	 ordinary	 emotional	 experience.	 In	 this	 sense,	we	may	 describe	 a	
music	piece	as	melancholic,	gloomy,	dramatic	or	 joyous,	and	according	to	the	
cognitivist	account	I	defend,	we	do	so	because	emotive	properties	that	coincide	
with	such	descriptions	are	perceived	in	the	music	work.		
The	account	of	music	expressiveness	I	will	defend	is	based	on	the	idea	that	
music’s	expressive	properties	are	detected	and	heard	as	expressive	of	emotions	
thanks	 to	 the	 resemblance	 perceived	 between	 central	 cases	 of	 emotional	
expression	(sounds,	movements,	etc.)	and	the	way	music	presents	its	dynamic	
																																								 								
53	See	https://youtu.be/I6B9Maiuik4	for	Lang	Lang	and	https://youtu.be/RR7eUSFsn28	for	
Zimmerman.	
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features.	 I	 have	 already	 explained	 that	not	 all	 affective	 states	have	distinctive	
physiological	and	behavioral	characteristics.	That’s	why	the	emotions	music	can	
be	 expressive	 of,	 should	 be	 restricted	 to	 those	 that	 show	 some	 characteristic	
outward	 manifestations	 in	 ordinary	 emotional	 experiences.	 It	 is	 common	 to	
describe	 a	 piece	 of	 music	 as	 sad,	 joyful,	 fearful	 and	 the	 like;	 but	 it	 is	 most	
unlikely	that	we	perceive	envy,	hate,	jealousy,	shame,	piety,	dignity	or	pride	in	
them.		
The	 first	group	of	emotions	are	what	we	could	 take	as	primary	emotions.	
Some	authors	 suggest	 that	 emotions	 like	 fear,	 joy,	 sadness	or	 anger	 appeared	
early	in	our	evolutionary	history,	that	they	are	innate	and	pre-organized.	They	
are	 also	 the	 first	 emotions	 that	 a	 child	 experiences	 and	 learns	 to	 identify	 in	
others.	 (e.g.	Damasio	 1997)	 In	general	 they	can	be	characterized	by	 two	main	
features:	
1) Their	 outward	 expression	 is	 easily	 recognizable.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	
conform	to	standard	behavioral	responses.	One	may	recognize	a	sad	expression	
in	 a	 human	 face,	 in	 a	weeping	 pillow,	 in	 a	 creature’s	 face	 and	movement,	 or	
even	in	inanimate	objects	such	as	clouds	or	cars.	We	don’t	need	to	be	aware	of	
the	subject's	feelings	or	her	mental	states	to	work	out	that	what	she	displays	is	
an	expression	of	sadness.	That	being	the	case,	this	characteristic	matches	with	
the	way	in	which	music	is	expressive.	
2) They	 respond	 to	 a	 “pre-organized”	 set	 of	 bodily	 reactions	 that	 we	
recognize	 in	 some	 musical	 features	 and	 associate	 thereafter	 with	 those	
emotions.	 For	 example,	 trembling,	 goose-bumps,	 or	 weakened	 limbs	 are	
ordinarily	the	physiological	reactions	associated	with	fear.	If	music,	in	virtue	of	
its	musical	elements	and	dimensions	is	able	to	display	the	appearance	of	such	
bodily	reactions,	emotions	of	this	sort	can	be	recognized	in	music.	Obviously,	
there	 is	 nobody	 feeling	 fear	 or	 rage	 behind,	 but	 what	 music	 exhibits,	 as	 I	
insisted,	is	the	outward	appearance	of	such	emotions.	
The	 second	 group	 of	 emotions	 is	 what	Moravcsik	 (1982)	 called	 “platonic	
attitudes”	and	which	I	will	refer	to	as	“higher	emotions”	or	secondary	emotions.	
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They	are	distinguished	because	of	several	things;	some	of	them	are	not	relevant	
to	the	issue	at	hand	(viz.	the	emotions	music	can	be	expressive	of),	while	others,	
I	think,	are	key	to	understanding	how	music	can	be	expressive	of	some	kinds	of	
emotion,	and	not	others.		
Higher	 emotions	 normally	 involve	 complex	 cognitive	 content,	 not	 only	
contextual-background	 information.	 Propositional	 attitudes,	 for	 instance,	 are	
likely	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 emotions	 such	 as	 shame	 or	 pride.	 Furthermore,	 they	
normally	imply	an	intentional	object	towards	which	they	are	directed.	But	the	
principal	 reason	 why	 absolute	 music	 cannot	 be	 attributed	 to	 these	 sorts	 of	
emotion	 as	 expressive	 properties	 inherent	 to	 it	 (without	 appealing	 to	 lyrics,	
plots	 or	 extra-musical	 narrative	 content),	 is	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 distinctive	
behavioral	 pattern	 in	 it.	 One	 could	 object	 that	 some	 of	 those	 “platonic	
attitudes”	have	acquired	distinctive	behavioral	patterns.	But	be	that	as	it	may,	
those	would	conform	more	to	conventions	depending	on	culture,	education	etc.,	
than	to	something	attributable	to	music	itself.		
In	 chapter	 1	 I	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 feeling	 components	 in	
human	emotions,	of	the	bodily	reactions	that	emotive	experiences	cause	in	the	
subject,	 and	 also	 the	 importance	 of	 the	way	 that	 ordinarily	 felt	 emotions	 are	
externalized,	 expressed	 via	 gestures,	 facial	 expression,	 voice	modulation,	 gait,	
carriage,	etc..	I	also	clarified	that	moods,	which	many	times	lack	an	intentional	
object,	 an	 “aboutness,”	 and	 are	 more	 general	 than	 emotions	 (in	 the	 narrow	
sense),	share	with	their	analogue	emotions	behavioral	and	feeling	components	
(sadness	with	melancholic	mood;	joy	with	cheerful	mood,	for	instance).		
My	hypothesis	is	that	the	emotions	perceived	in	music	are	those	that	being	
primary	 emotions	 like	 sadness,	 joy,	 fear	 or	 anger,	 can	 be	 presented	 in	 a	
non-specific	 form,	 and	 that	 because	 of	 that	 they	 share	 outward	 features	with	
corresponding	mood	states.	We	don’t	merely	perceive	a	fearful	expression	as	a	
property	inherent	to	music,	but	also	the	tension,	the	instability,	the	turbulence	
or	nervousness	associated	with	such	emotion.	Music	has	not	only	the	power	to	
present	emotions	in	their	appearance	to	listeners,	but	also	many	other	features	
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that	we	associate	with	feelings	and	emotive	experiences	in	general.	A	collection	
of	 qualities	 like	 being	 tranquil,	 vivid,	 agitated,	 energetic,	 somber,	 or	 garish	
(among	many	 others)	 that	 composers	 consciously	 play	with	 to	 give	music	 its	
expressive	character.	I	think	that	the	richness	of	music’s	expressiveness	lies	here,	
in	 its	power	 to	 exhibit	what	 I	 take	as	 feeling	or	 emotive	 components.	 I	 think	
that	attempts	to	justify	the	capacity	of	music	to	express	a	broad	range	of	human	
emotions	surpass	the	boundaries	of	what	is	purely	musical;	and	there	is	no	need	
for	that.			
This	 is	 just	 a	 short	 anticipation	of	 something	 I	will	 deal	with	 in	 the	next	
chapter.	 For	 present	 purposes,	 I	 just	 wanted	 to	 point	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 when	
emotions	 are	 attributed	 to	music,	 and	 if	 we	 refer	 to	 those	 that	 are	 found	 in	
music,	we	must	realize	that	the	list	of	full-blooded	emotions	that	music	can	be	
expressive	of	is	quite	restricted.	In	contrast	the	emotive	components	and	other	
expressive	properties	that	music	is	able	to	present	is	extensive	and	rich.		
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Chapter	3	
3. Aesthetic	properties	of	
artworks		
To	describe	something	in	aesthetic	terms	is	to	describe	it;	
but	 it	 is	 to	 savor	 it	at	 the	same	time:	 to	 run	 it	over	your	
tongue	and	 lick	 your	 lips;	 to	 “investigate”	 its	pleasurable	
possibilities	(Kivy	1975:	210)	
	
The	aim	of	this	chapter	 is	 to	explain	what	aesthetic	properties	are,	 to	prepare	
the	 soil	 for	 further	 inquiries	 into	 music	 and	 its	 properties	 that	 makes	 such	
investigations	so	rich	and	fruitful.	Before	that,	however,	we	have	a	preliminary	
task	to	accomplish.	We	will	need	to	clarify	a	few	things	and	travel	back	to	the	
origins	of	aesthetics	and	the	philosophy	of	art.	In	the	second	half	of	the	chapter,	
I	 analyze	 critically	 Sibley’s	 account	 of	 “aesthetic	 concepts”	 and	 present	 my	
picture	 of	 aesthetic	 properties,	 that	 will	 work	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 my	 account	 of	
music.	
3.1. The	boundaries	of	aesthetics	
The	term	“aesthetics”	 is	often	linked	to	the	beauty	found	in	artworks,	but	not	
exclusively.	 We	 can	 have	 an	 aesthetic	 experience,	 that	 is	 an	 experience	 of	
beauty,	contemplating	a	natural	landscape,	smelling	a	perfume,	listening	to	the	
night-time	sounds	of	the	forest,	observing	a	quotidian	scene	or	just	looking	at	a	
beautiful	human	face.	Something	seems	to	be	beautiful	not	because	it	provides	
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a	material	benefit	or	profit,	but	because	it	is	valuable	for	its	own	sake;	because	
just	 contemplating	 it,	 how	 it	 appears	 to	 us,	 we	 feel	 pleased,	 gratified	 and	
satisfied.	It	seems	that	the	aesthetic	deals	with	what	“appears”	to	us,	with	what	
is	seen,	heard,	noticed	or	felt.		
This	is	just	an	intuitive	approach	to	“aesthetics.”	If	we	are	on	the	right	path,	
an	 aesthetic	 property	 should	 be	 the	 kind	 of	 feature	 in	 the	 object	 (in	 the	
landscape,	 in	 the	 daily	 scene,	 in	 the	 beautiful	 face)	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	
aesthetic	 appreciation	of	 the	object.	The	 intense	blue	 that	 is	perceived	at	 the	
bottom	of	the	sea;	the	fresh	smell	of	a	perfume;	the	background	silence	of	the	
woods;	 the	 geometrical	 composition	 of	 the	 family	members	 on	 a	 countryside	
picnic;	the	serene	countenance	of	an	old	woman’s	face	...	All	of	them	could	be	
examples	of	aesthetic	properties	given	the	appropriate	circumstances.	
But	we	are	not	dealing	with	forests,	families	or	perfumes.	Our	subject	is	art	
and	 particularly	 music.	 What	 interests	 me	 first	 is	 to	 define	 what	 aesthetic	
properties	of	artworks	are,	 to	clarify	what	gives	 something	 its	aesthetic	value,	
what	makes	such	features	deserving	of	aesthetic	appreciation	at	such.	And	also,	
to	decide	 the	 relevance	 that	different	 types	of	aesthetic	properties	have	when	
we	praise	or	criticize	a	work	of	art.	
However,	this	 is	not	enough	if	we	aim	to	find	the	place	that	emotive,	and	
other	emotive-like,	properties	occupy	among	the	aesthetic	properties,	and	their	
relevance	 for	 its	 artistic	 appreciation.	 We	 will	 have	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	
different	types	of	properties	of	artworks,	and	find	and	discuss	the	criteria	that	
classify	them.	We	will	 find	in	Sibley	(2004	[1959])	a	rich	source	of	inspiration.	
The	plan	of	this	work,	however,	is	to	go	a	bit	further	and	offer	a	picture	where	
music	expressive	properties,	and	other	aesthetic	properties	close	to	them,	fit.	
It	 is	 crucial	 though	 that	 we	 first	 clarify	 the	 meaning	 of	 “aesthetic”	 and	
define	 afterwards	 its	 boundaries,	 before	 entering	 into	 the	 particularities	 of	
music.	Let’s	begin	from	its	roots.		
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3.2. Roots:	aesthetics	and	taste	
Etymologically	the	adjective	“aesthetic”	(aisthētikós	 in	Greek)	means	“of	sense	
perception,”	 linked	 to	 the	 outward	 appearance	 of	 something,	 to	 what	 is	
perceived	 by	 the	 senses.	 However,	 the	 use	 of	 “aesthetic”	 applied	 to	 several	
nouns	 and	 also	 “aesthetics”	 as	 a	 philosophical	 discipline	 are	 relatively	 young.	
Many	centuries	before,	back	in	Ancient	Greece,	Plato	and	Aristotle	wrote	about	
aesthetic	 matters,	 discussed	 philosophically	 music,	 poetry	 tragedy,	 but	 they	
didn’t	coin	the	term	“aesthetic”	in	regard	to	artworks.		
It	is	in	the	18th	century	that	a	regular	use	of	those	terms	is	introduced,	and	
also	 when	 “aesthetics”,	 as	 a	 branch	 of	 philosophy,	 acquires	 its	 place	 and	
autonomy.	 In	his	Critique	 of	 Pure	 Reason	 (1950	 [1781])	Kant	was	not	 confident	
about	the	nascent	philosophical	discipline.	This	excerpt	shows	his	scepticism:	
The	 Germans	 are	 the	 only	 people	 who	 currently	 make	 use	 of	 the	 word	
“aesthetic”	in	order	to	signify	what	others	call	the	critique	of	taste.	This	usage	
originated	 in	 the	 abortive	 attempt	 made	 by	 Baumgarten,	 that	 admirable	
analytic	thinker,	to	bring	the	critical	treatment	of	the	beautiful	under	rational	
principles,	and	so	to	raise	its	rules	to	the	rank	of	a	science.	But	such	endeavors	
are	 fruitless.	 The	 said	 rules	 or	 criteria	 are,	 as	 regards	 their	 chief	 sources,	
merely	 empirical,	 and	 consequently	 can	 never	 serve	 as	 determinate	 a	 priori	
laws	by	which	our	judgment	of	taste	must	be	directed.	(Kant	1950	[1781]:	66n)	
	
Baumgarten	 (1954	 [1735]:	 78)	 did	 not	 invent	 “aesthetics”	 as	 a	 subject,	 but	
coined	 the	 term	 in	 1735	 and	 gave	 it	 a	 place	 in	 his	 treatises	 and	 lectures.	 He	
defined	“aesthetics”	as	 “the	science	of	perception”,	consistent	with	 its	original	
Greek	meaning.	 Rationalizing	 aesthetics	 and	 freeing	 it	 from	 the	 empirical,	 as	
German	tradition	intended,	seemed	a	hopeless	matter	to	Kant	though,	too	far	
from	 the	 a	 priori	 principles	 that	 all	 respected	 philosophy	 should	 follow.	
However,	Hutcheson’s	British	tradition	placed	aesthetics	and	moral	philosophy	
in	the	empirical	realm.	Paradoxical	as	it	may	seem,	Kant	changed	his	mind	and	
published	shortly	after	his	Critique	of	Judgment	(2008	[1790]).	It	was	afterwards,	
		 67	
that	 the	 term	“aesthetics”	acquired	a	broader	dimension	and	definitively	 took	
its	place	in	the	philosophical	world.54	
Much	more	recently,	in	the	middle	of	the	20th	century	there	didn’t	seem	to	
be	 much	 hope	 for	 philosophy	 of	 art	 and	 beauty,	 or	 taste	 either.	 Logical	
positivism	and	philosophy	of	language	did	not	help,	and	relegated	those	issues	
to	the	realm	of	“the	emotive.”55	Thanks	to	Nelson	Goodman’s	Languages	of	Art	
(1968),	philosophy	of	art	and	aesthetics	recovered	its	health	and	flourished	with	
renewed	energy.	
There	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 in	 the	 last	 three	 centuries	 has	 been	 linked	 to	
aesthetic	matters:	the	faculty	of	taste,	generally	understood	as	a	special	sort	of	
human	ability	or	aesthetic	sensibility.	Originally	connected	to	culinary	matters,	
back	in	the	seventeenth	century	taste	was	associated	with	an	ability	to	evaluate	
(Bouhours	1960	[1971]).	Hutcheson	and	other	British	followers	speculated	about	
that	 “internal	 sense”	 (Hutcheson	 2004	 [1725]),	 analogous	 to	 the	 five	 senses,	
fitted	for	the	perception	of	beauty.	Soon	after	that,	 it	began	to	be	 linked	with	
aesthetic	value	theories.		
First	 theories	 of	 taste	 came	with	Hume,	Reid	 and	Kant	 in	 the	 eighteenth	
century,56	and	it	became	a	faculty	of	evaluation	of	special	aesthetic	properties	of	
artworks	(say	beauty	or	goodness),	a	faculty	separated	from	reason.		
																																								 								
54	For	further	information	about	the	first	steps	of	Modern	Aesthetics	see	Guyer	(2004).	
55	John	Passmore	(1959)	in	“The	Dreariness	of	Aesthetics,”	and	Stuart	Hampshire	(1959)	in	
“Logic	and	Appreciation”	are	examples	of	this	condemnatory	attitude	towards	aesthetics	
matters.	They	regarded	aesthetics	as	a	function-less	discipline,	without	any	clear	subject	
matter.	
56	Reid	could	be	 regarded	as	an	aesthetic	 realist	 (Kivy	2015,	Zangwill	2015).	 In	contrast	 to	
Hume	and	Kant,	he	believed	that	beauty	 is	a	property	of	the	objects	we	call	“beautiful,”	
and	that	when	“beautiful”	is	tagged	to	an	object,	we	believe	it	is.	
There	is	undoubtedly	a	judgment	in	every	operation	of	taste.	In	the	perception	of	
beauty,	for	instance,	there	is	not	only	a	sensation	of	pleasure	but	a	real	judgment	
concerning	 the	 excellence	 of	 the	 object.	 It	 is	 the	 same	 in	 poetry,	 painting,	
eloquence,	and	music,	&c.”	(Reid	1973	[1937])	
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In	 “Of	 the	 Standard	 of	 Taste”	 (1997	 [1759]),	 Hume	 argues	 for	 the	
mind-dependence	of	beauty,	and	presents	a	subjectivist	position,	claiming	that	
beauty	is	not	a	quality	of	things.		
Beauty	is	no	quality	in	things	themselves:	It	exists	merely	in	the	mind	which	
contemplates	them;	and	each	mind	perceives	a	different	beauty.	One	person	
may	 even	 perceive	 deformity,	 here	 another	 is	 sensible	 of	 beauty;	 and	 every	
individual	 ought	 to	 acquiesce	 in	 his	 own	 sentiment,	 without	 pretending	 to	
regulate	those	of	others.	(1997	[1759]:	352])	
According	 to	him,	 the	nature	of	pleasure	upon	beautiful	 things	 is	a	matter	of	
sentimental	 reactions,	 and	 taste	 a	 kind	 of	 “internal	 sense”,	 a	 secondary	 one,	
which	unlike	the	five	external	senses,	depends	upon	antecedent	perceptions.		
However,	he	avoids	extreme	subjectivism,	admitting	that	often	there	is	no	
doubt	about	which	artwork	 is	better,	or	which	artist	 is	better.	Defending	that	
Milton	is	not	better	than	Ogilby	entails	comparing	what	is	not	comparable	at	all.	
The	 foundation	 of	 general	 principles,	 as	 in	 practical	 sciences,	 is	 a	 posteriori,	
which	 means	 that	 those	 general	 principles	 are	 to	 be	 discovered	 through	
experience,	 “concerning	 what	 has	 been	 universally	 found	 to	 please	 in	 all	
countries	and	in	all	ages”	(Hume	1997	[1759]:	353).	It	is	important	his	idea	that,	
as	 soon	 as	 personal	 sentiments	 and	 views	 are	 involved,	 the	 judgment	 is	
perverted,	 and	 the	 critic’s	 taste	 loses	 all	 credit.	 That’s	 why	 he	 highlights	 the	
importance	of	proper	judgment	of	artworks.57	So	the	true	judge	in	the	fine	arts	
should	be	someone	with	“strong	sense,	united	to	delicate	sentiment,	improved	
by	 practice,	 perfected	 by	 comparison,	 and	 cleared	 of	 all	 prejudice...”	 (Hume	
1997	[1759]:	360).		This	joint	verdict	is	what	Hume	takes	as	the	true	standard	of	
taste.	
In	 the	Critique	 of	 Judgment,	Kant	offers	his	 analysis	of	 the	beautiful.	Like	
Hume,	 he	 takes	 subjectivity	 as	 the	 first	 condition	 of	 judgments	 of	 taste,	 and	
defines	beautiful	as	“which	apart	from	concepts,	is	represented	as	the	object	of	a	
																																								 								
57	This	 idea	of	 the	 true	 standard	of	 taste	 is	 an	 influence	on	Kant,	 and	more	 recently	also	
Hanslick	and	Kivy.	I	will	pick	up	this	issue	when	we	enter	into	the	aesthetics	of	music.	
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universal	 delight”	 (Kant	 2008	 [1790]:	 24).	 Beautiful	 then	 is	 what	 generates	 a	
pleasurable	feeling	in	us,	but	the	nature	of	this	pleasure	(or	pure	judgments	of	
taste)	 can	 only	 be	 properly	 understood	 in	 contrast	 to	 judgments	 of	 the	
agreeable.		
The	 agreeable,	 the	 beautiful,	 and	 the	 good	 thus	 denote	 three	 different	
relations	of	representations	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure	and	displeasure	(...).	The	
agreeable	is	what	GRATIFIES	US;	the	beautiful	what	simply	PLEASES	us;	the	
good	what	is	ESTEEMED	(approved)	...	(Kant	2008	[1790]:	41)	
	
Pure	judgments	of	taste	require	us	to	take	distance,	to	look	at	them	impartially,	
in	 a	 disinterested	 way,	 as	 “free	 delight.”	 We	 judge	 things	 as	 beautiful	
independently	 of	 whether	 they	 serve	 our	 personal	 interest	 or	 not.	 But	 here	
comes	the	second	condition	of	judgments	of	taste:	universality.	Beautiful	things	
are	not	beautiful	just	to	me,	but	to	everyone	else	too.	The	nature	of	pleasure	of	
beautiful	objects	is	special:	they	please	us	because	they	must	please	everybody	
else	too.	We	take	our	pleasure	as	in	necessary	relation	to	the	object	that	elicits	it.	
That’s	why	people	speak	of	beautiful	as	a	property	of	things	and	not	a	personal	
reaction	to	them,	with	a	ground	common	to	all	(Kant	2008	[1790]:	§19).	
According	 to	Peter	Kivy	 (1973),	 the	next	move	of	 the	notion	of	 taste,	was	
from	its	original	realm	of	appreciation	and	evaluation	of	objects,	to	the	realm	of	
aesthetic	perception.	i.e.	the	ability	to	notice	the	qualities－not	just	goodness	or	
badness－of	aesthetic	objects.	And	this	is	where	we	are	now.		
So,	the	terminology	of	taste	we	deal	with	in	our	discussion	doesn’t	point	to	
our	personal	liking	or	preference,	nor	are	we	dealing	with	just	appraisals	about	
the	goodness	or	badness	of	an	object	(as	in	ordinary	language	we	may	do);	taste	
terms	point	 to	 the	properties	we	perceive	 in	 an	 artwork	qua	 artwork	 such	 as	
being	“delicate,”	“elegant,”	“balanced,”	“somber”	and	so	on.	The	notion	of	taste	I	
will	deal	with	here	is	one	that	involves	discernment,	sensitivity	and	criteria	to	
appreciate	what	counts	as	relevant	and	what	does	not.		
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3.3. Philosophy	of	art	and	aesthetics	
It	is	important	to	make	a	clear	distinction	between	the	properties	that	artworks	
may	possess	qua	 artworks,	and	the	aesthetic	properties,	which	are	a	subset	of	
the	 former.	To	put	 it	 simply,	not	all	artistic	properties	count	as	aesthetic;	but	
the	aesthetic	properties	of	an	artwork,	among	the	others,	count	 for	 its	overall	
evaluation.		
Statements	 like	 “Apocalypse	 Now	 is	 a	 good	 film”	 belong	 to	 the	 artistic	
evaluation	of	 artworks.	Behind	 such	assertion	we	may	be	 appraising	different	
aspects	 of	 the	 film,	 the	 photography,	 the	 beauty	 of	 Vietnam	 landscapes,	 the	
special	 effects	of	 the	war	 scenes,	Wagner’s	Valkyries	 in	 the	background	while	
American	 soldiers	 bomb	 civilians,	 how	 the	 plot	 is	 structured,	 the	 story,	 the	
interpretation	 of	 the	 characters,	 the	 originality,	 its	 moral	 message,	 the	
supremacy	of	America,	 the	 climax	 scenes,	 its	historic	 value	or	 its	 commercial	
success	(among	many	others).	Some	of	those	aspects	may	be	artistically	relevant,	
while	others	may	not;	and	some	of	those	aspects	point	to	aesthetic	features	of	
the	film	while	others	refer	to	non-aesthetic	features	of	the	film.	We	can	see	that	
evaluating	 an	 artwork	 is	 a	 challenging	 task	 and	 implies	 weighing	 up	 many	
different	things.		
While	 philosophy	 of	 art	 deals	 with	 the	 recognition,	 appreciation	 or	
criticism	of	artworks	(for	which	all	art-relevant	properties	count),	aesthetics	is	
the	philosophical	 investigation	 into	 the	nature	of	art,	beauty	and	taste.	 I	 take	
art-relevant	properties	of	a	work	to	be	those	that	we	appreciate	in	it	qua	artwork,	
those	we	take	into	account	to	praise	or	criticize	the	work	aesthetically.	 In	this	
work,	 I	 assume	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 aesthetic	 art-relevant	 properties,	
and	 the	 rest,	 which	 I	 call	 non-aesthetic	 art-relevant	 properties. 58 	This	 is	
important	to	keep	in	mind,	especially	 if	 the	artistic	genre	we	are	discussing	is	
absolute	music.	 It	 is	 important	 then	to	sharply	distinguish	between	questions	
aesthetic	 properties	 of	 artworks,	 and	 questions	 about	 other	 sort	 of	 artistic	
																																								 								
58	I	owe	to	Peter	Kivy	most	of	these	conceptual	and	terminological	distinctions.	
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properties,	 and	keep	 in	mind	 that	aesthetic	ones	are	a	 subclass	of	 the	artistic	
realm.		
I	 draw	 also	 on	 Kivy’s	 distinction	 between	 the	 interpretation,	 the	 analysis	
and	the	evaluation	of	artworks	(2015).59	I	call	“interpretation”	that	which	deals	
with	 the	 non-aesthetic	 art-relevant	 properties	 of	 artworks	 and	 involves	 the	
spelling	 out	 of	meaning	 of	 the	 work;	 “analysis,”	 to	 what	 deals	 with	 aesthetic	
art-relevant	 properties	 of	 artworks;	 and	 “evaluation,”	 to	 the	 appraisal	 of	 the	
artistic	merit	 or	 demerit	 of	 it.	 Thus,	when	 an	 artwork	 is	 evaluated,	 the	 critic	
may	consider	elements	that	belong	to	the	aesthetic	realm	exclusively	or	to	other	
non-aesthetic	features	that	add	(or	substract)	value	to	the	work.60		
Back	to	the	example	of	the	movie,	the	critic	may	appraise	various	aspects	of	
it	 before	 reaching	 an	 evaluative	 conclusion.	 She	may	point	 to	 some	 aesthetic	
features,	 at	 how	 the	photography	of	 the	 film	 captures	 the	beauty	 of	Vietnam	
landscapes,	 at	 the	 special	 effects	 of	 the	 war	 scenes	 or	 to	 the	 sublimity	 of	
Wagner’s	Valkyries	 in	 the	background,	 and	 conclude	 that	 it	 is	 a	 good	movie.	
The	 critic	 could	 adopt	 a	different	 view	 though,	 and	point	 to	 the	 imperialistic	
moral	 behind	 the	 film,	 to	 its	 blockbuster	 character	 and	 the	 implicit	 patriotic	
North-American	message,	and	shift	the	balance	in	favor	of	its	artistic	vices.	In	
this	case	the	artistic	demerits	prevail,	whereas	in	the	former	the	critic	highlights	
the	aesthetic	features	of	the	film	to	reach	a	more	favorable	conclusion.	
I	take	the	aesthetic	properties	of	an	artwork	as	those	qualities	in	the	work	
that	 contribute	 to	 its	 aesthetic	 value	 and	 enjoyment	 (positive,	 negative	 or	
neutral).	The	problem	with	this	definition	is	that	it	brings	us	to	a	never-ending	
pinball:	 we	 need	 then	 to	 define	 “aesthetic	 value,”	 then	 “aesthetic	 judgment,”	
																																								 								
59	The	term	“analysis”	is	borrowed	from	the	musical	academic	vocabulary,	which	originally	
consists	in	elucidating	the	formal	structure	of	musical	work.	It	is	the	technique	that	music	
students	 in	 conservatories	 learn	 and	 practice,	 applying	 music-theory	 skills	 to	 the	
elucidation	of	a	score	or	to	a	heard	instance	of	 it.	 It	 is	also	a	helpful	way	to	approach	a	
work	as	a	performer,	to	make	a	good	reading	of	 it,	 in	other	words	to	understand	better	
how	the	composer	intended	her	work	to	be	played.	
60	In	 fact,	 in	 cases	 of	 disagreement	 about	 art,	 there	 is	 often	 confusion	 about	 the	 various	
dimensions	 of	 the	 discussion:	 analysis,	 interpretation	 or	 evaluation.	 See	Kivy	 (2015)	 for	
further	reading	on	this	issue.		
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then	 “aesthetic	 property”	 again.	 So,	 we’d	 better	 define	 aesthetic	 properties	
pointing	 at	 what	 qualifies	 them:	 according	 to	 my	 understanding,	 they	 are	
structural	and	phenomenological	properties	of	the	work;	sensuous	features	for	
which	recognition	by	a	special	sensibility	or	taste	is	required.	This	ability	might	
be	 somehow	 above	 the	 basic	 perceptual	 capacities	 of	 a	 person,	 but	 it	 is	 not	
exclusive	to	a	few	privileged	ones.	So	as	far	as	I	see	it	“the	aesthetic”	refers	to	the	
perceptual	 and	 phenomenological	 properties	 that	 are	 contemplated	 in	 the	
object.61		
3.4. Aesthetics’	close	friends	
Whatever	the	scope	of	“aesthetic”	might	be	thought	to	be,	it	is	predicated	of	a	
wide	range	of	things.	We	talk	about	“aesthetic	experience,”	“aesthetic	pleasure,”	
“aesthetic	 value”	 and	 so	on.	 I	 think	 that	 at	 this	point	 it	will	 be	useful	 to	give	
some	definitions	and	try	to	clarify	concepts	that	will	appear	later	in	this	work.62		
It	is	important	to	distinguish,	first,	two	types	of	statements	about	artworks,	
aesthetic	 judgments	 and	 aesthetic	 (or	 artistic)	 appraisals.63	By	 an	 “aesthetic	
judgment”	 I	mean	 an	 utterance	 or	 declarative	 sentence	 of	 the	 form	 “X	 is	 φ”,	
where	 “φ”	denotes	an	aesthetic	property	of	X.	Aesthetic	 judgements	belong	to	
the	analysis	of	the	artwork.		
By	“aesthetic	(or	artistic)	appraisals”	I	mean	statements	of	the	form	“X	is	ψ”	
where	 “ψ”	 is	 a	 purely	 evaluative	 predicate	 such	 as	 “beautiful”	 (or	 “ugly”)	 and	
“good”	 (or	 “bad”).	 Appraisals	 belong	 to	 the	 evaluation	 of	 artworks,	 and	 the	
predicate	(“ψ”)	behaves	in	a	purely	evaluative	way.	The	evaluation	can	be	purely	
																																								 								
61	I	 hold	 here	 to	 Kivy’s	 usage	 of	 “aesthetic”,	 where	 he	 defines	 it	 as	 “the	 “sensuous”,	
“phenomenological”,	structural,	and	(perhaps)	emotive	properties	of	artworks,	in	contrast	
to	 their	 narrative	 and	 other	 “content.”	 (Kivy	 2011:	 14.)	 A	 notion	 that	 reminds	 us	 of	 the	
classic	 form	and	content	distinction,	 that	would	correspond	to	aesthetic	properties	and	
non-aesthetic	properties.	
62	It	is	important	to	note	that	those	definitions	are	controversial,	but	I’ll	not	try	to	justify	all	
of	them.		
63	See	Kivy	(2015)	and	Korta	(forthcoming).	
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aesthetic,	that	is	to	say,	an	evaluation	that	takes	into	account	only	the	aesthetic	
properties	of	the	artwork	(in	other	words,	 its	analysis);	or	it	can	be	an	artistic	
evaluation,	 which	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 non-aesthetic	 but	 art-relevant	
properties,	that	 is,	the	interpretation	of	the	artwork.	If	you	think	that	there	is	
nothing	else	to	the	value	of	an	artwork	than	its	aesthetic	merit,	you	don’t	need	
the	distinction:	aesthetic	and	artistic	appraisal	would	be	exactly	the	same.	If	you	
think,	 as	 I	 do,	 that	 there	 are	 non-aesthetic	 but	 art-relevant	 properties,	 you	
should	distinguish	between	aesthetic	and	artistic	appraisals.	
3.5. Sibley’s	heritage	
With	 his	 ground-breaking	 paper	 “Aesthetic	 Concepts”	 (2004	 [1959]),	 Frank	
Sibley	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	 contemporary	 philosophical	 discussion	 on	
aesthetic	 properties.	He	 did	 not	 offer	 an	 explicit	 definition	 of	 what	 aesthetic	
properties	are,	but	he	provided	 lots	of	 insights	about	aesthetic	properties	and	
their	relation	with	non-aesthetic	properties.	My	point	here	is	not	to	discuss	in	
depth	 his	 arguments,	 but	 to	 get	 somewhat	 clearer	 about	 aesthetic	 properties	
and	the	predicates	we	use	to	denote	them.	Let’s	have	a	look	at	his	proposal.		
Sibley	distinguishes	two	broad	groups	among	the	remarks	we	make	about	
artworks.	 The	 first	 group	 includes	 “non-aesthetic	 terms”	 and	 the	 second	 one	
what	he	calls	“aesthetic	concepts”	or	“aesthetic	terms”.	In	the	following	passage,	
he	introduces	non-aesthetic	features	of	artworks.	He	writes:	
We	say	that	a	novel	has	a	great	number	of	characters	and	deals	with	life	in	a	
manufacturing	 town;	 that	 a	 painting	 uses	 pale	 colors,	 predominantly	 blues	
and	greens,	 and	has	kneeling	 figures	 in	 the	 foreground;	 that	 the	 theme	 in	a	
fugue	is	 inverted	at	such	a	point	and	that	there	is	a	stretto	at	the	close;	that	
the	 action	 of	 a	 play	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 span	 of	 one	 day	 and	 that	 there	 is	 a	
reconciliation	scene	in	the	fifth	act.	Such	remarks	may	be	made	by,	and	such	
features	 pointed	 out	 to,	 anyone	 with	 normal	 eyes,	 ears,	 and	 intelligence.	
(Sibley	2004	[1959]:	127)	
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These	are	remarks	that,	according	to	Sibley,	“anyone	with	normal	eyes,	ears,	
and	intelligence”	can	make	(2004	[1959]:	127)	and	detect;	as	far	as	I	interpret	his	
words,	 they	 do	 not	 require	 any	 special	 faculty	 or	 sensibility,	 just	 the	 simple	
capacity	 of	 perception	 or	 discernment. 64 	In	 contrast,	 “aesthetic	 concepts,”	
require	 “the	 exercise	 of	 taste,	 perceptiveness,	 or	 sensibility,	 of	 aesthetic	
discrimination	or	appreciation”	(2004	[1959]:	127).65		
He	defines	aesthetic	concepts	as	follows:	
On	the	other	hand,	we	also	say	that	a	poem	is	tightly-knit	or	deeply	moving;	
that	a	picture	lacks	balance,	or	has	a	certain	serenity	and	repose,	or	that	the	
grouping	of		 figures	sets	up	an	exciting	tension;	that	the	characters	in	a	novel	
never	really	come	to	life,	or	that	a	certain	episode	strikes	a	false	note.	(Sibley	
2004	[1959]:	127)	
																																								 								
64	In	footnote	1	(2004	[1959]:	139),	Sibley	clarifies	two	important	things.	One,	that	he	speaks	
about	“aesthetic	terms”	but	acknowledges	that	it	would	be	more	correct	to	speak	of	its	use.	
The	 other	 one,	 that	 he	 refers	 to	 the	 first	 group	 of	 words,	 features,	 concepts	 as	 simply	
“non-aesthetic”	because	none	of	the	predicates	other	writers	have	used	to	refer	to	them	
(“natural,”	 “observable,”	 “perceptual,”	 “physical,”	 “objective”	 (qualities),	 “neutral,”	
“descriptive”	(language))	is	really	apt	for	his	purpose.	Whether	he	discards	those	features	
as	characteristics	of	“non-aesthetic	terms”	is	not	clear.	I	don’t	think	we	should	interpret	
his	 words	 in	 this	 sense.	 However,	 I	 think	 that	 some	 of	 those	 predicates	 reflect	 quite	
naturally	the	characteristics	of	Sibley’s	“non-aesthetic	terms”.		
65	Whether	Sibley	in	his	2004	[1959]	takes	aesthetic	properties	as	strictly	perceptual	or	not	
is	 not	 clear	 enough.	 In	 his	 1965	 essay	 “Aesthetic	 and	 Non-Aesthetic”	 his	 idea	 is	 more	
explicit:	
It	is	important	to	note	first	that,	broadly	speaking,	aesthetics	deals	with	a	kind	of	perception	
(emphasis	mine)	People	have	to	see	the	grace	or	unity	of	a	work,	hear	 the	plaintiveness	or	
frenzy	in	the	music,	notice	 the	gaudiness	of	a	colour	scheme,	feel	the	power	of	a	novel,	 its	
mood,	or	its	uncertainty	of	tone.	They	may	be	struck	by	these	qualities	at	once,	or	they	may	
come	to	perceive	them	only	after	repeated	viewings,	hearings,	or	readings,	and	with	the	help	
of	 critics.	 But	 unless	 they	 do	 perceive	 them	 for	 themselves,	 aesthetic	 enjoyment,	
appreciation,	 and	 judgement	 are	 beyond	 them.	 Merely	 to	 learn	 from	 others,	 on	 good	
authority,	 that	 the	music	 is	 serene,	 the	play	moving,	or	 the	picture	unbalanced	 is	of	 little	
aesthetic	 value;	 the	 crucial	 thing	 is	 to	 see,	 hear,	 or	 feel.	 To	 suppose	 indeed	 that	 one	 can	
make	 aesthetic	 judgements	 without	 aesthetic	 perception,	 say,	 by	 following	 rules	 of	 some	
kind,	is	to	misunderstand	aesthetic	judgement.	(Sibley	2001	[	1965]:	34)	
Kivy	(2001b:	18)	interprets	Sibley’s	“perceptual”	attribution	to	aesthetic	properties	more	like	
an	epistemic	claim	rather	than	an	ontological	presupposition,	meaning	that	by	“perceived”	
is	meant	how	we	experience	it	“the	aesthetic”	more	than	“how	it	is”.		
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These	 are	 that	 sort	 of	 judgments	 that	 require	 “the	 exercise	 of	 taste,	
perceptiveness,	 or	 sensibility,	 of	 aesthetic	 discrimination	 or	 appreciation;”	
understanding	taste	as	“an	ability	to	notice	or	see	or	tell	that	things	have	certain	
qualities”	 (Sibley	 2004	 [1959]:	 127-128).	 Terms	 like	 “unified,”	 “balanced,”	
“integrated,”	 “lifeless,”	 “serene,”	 “somber,”	 “dynamic,”	 “powerful,”	 “vivid,”	
“delicate,”	“moving,”	“trite,”	“sentimental,”	or	“tragic,”	constitute	Sibley’s	(2004	
[1959]:	127)	initial	list	of	aesthetic	concepts.66		
This	 list	 does	 not	 only	 contain	 adjectives,	 but	 also	 expressions	 including	
“telling	contrast,”	“sets	up	tension,”	“conveys	a	sense	of,”	“holds	it	together.”	He	
also	 includes	 adjectives	 that	 have	 mainly	 an	 exclusive	 aesthetic	 use,	 like	
“graceful,”	 “delicate,”	 “dainty,”	 “handsome,”	 “comely,”	 “elegant,”	 “garish,”	
“lovely,”	 “pretty,”	 or	 “beautiful,”	 with	 others	 that,	 depending	 on	 the	 context,	
work	as	aesthetic	expressions	or	not.	He	also	points	at	other	adjectives	that	are	
seldom	used	as	aesthetic	terms,	examples	of	which	are	“red,”	“square,”	“docile,”	
“evanescent,”	 and	 “intelligent.”	 He	 also	 thinks	 that	 sometimes	 we	 press	 into	
aesthetic	 service	words	which	 do	 not	 primarily	 function	 in	 this	manner,	 and	
make	 a	metaphorical	 transference.67	Examples	 of	 this	 kind,	 according	 to	him,	
are	 “dynamic,”	 “melancholy,”	 “balanced,”	 and	 “tightly-knit;”	 however	 he	
concedes	some	of	them	have	acquired	their	place	in	aesthetic	contexts	and	are	
now	recognized	as	“standard	vocabulary	of	that	 language”	(Sibley	2004	[1959]:	
128). 
We	 can	 see	 that	 Sibley	 makes	 a	 clear	 distinction	 here	 between	 what	 he	
takes	 as	 “non-aesthetic”	 and	 “aesthetic”	 properties	 of	 artworks.	 The	 latter	
require	 the	 exercise	 of	 taste,	 for	 which	 discernment	 and	 appreciation	 this	
																																								 								
66	In	 Sibley’s	 “Aesthetic	 Concepts”,	 the	 ontological	 and	 linguistic	 level	 (properties	 and	
terms)	 are	 sometimes	 entangled;	 it	 is	 neither	 clear	 whether	 those	 “aesthetic	 concepts”	
refer	to	properties,	propositions	or	words.	My	interest	is	about	the	ontology	of	aesthetic	
features,	but	the	arguments	require	an	appeal	to	the	linguistic	category	too.		
67	I	discuss	about	the	literalness	or	metaphoric	use	of	aesthetic	terms	in	chapter	2.	
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special	 sort	 of	 sensitivity	 is	 required.	 This	 could	 be	 discussed.68	But	 the	most	
controversial	 point	 is	 that	 he	 takes	 aesthetic	 concepts	 to	 be	 “non-condition	
governed.”69	His	argument	is	as	follows.	
We	 often	 apply	 aesthetic	 terms	 (which	 require	 the	 exercise	 of	 taste)	 to	
artworks,	 and	 justify	 their	 use	 by	 mentioning	 other	 aesthetic	 terms	 or	 by	
pointing	at	 features	 that	do	not	depend	upon	 taste.	For	example,	we	 say	 it	 is	
“dainty	because	of	the	delicacy	and	harmony	of	its	coloring”	(the	first	case)	or	
“delicate	 because	 of	 its	 pastel	 shades	 and	 curving	 lines,”70	(Sibley	 2004	 [1959:	
128]);	 being	 “delicate”	 an	 aesthetic	 term	and	 the	 “pastel	 shades”	 and	 “curving	
lines”	non-aesthetic	 terms	that	denote	non-aesthetic	 features	of	 the	object.	 In	
any	 case,	 we	 point	 at	 something	 to	 justify	 our	 ascription,	 which	 shows	 that	
aesthetic	terms	are	applied	because	they	depend	upon	other	features	that	are,	
he	says,	“visible,	audible,	or	otherwise	discernible	without	any	exercise	of	taste	
of	sensibility,”	i.e.	upon	“non-aesthetic”	features.		
But	 whatever	 kind	 of	 dependence	 relation	 we	 find,	 “there	 are	 no	
non-aesthetic	 features	which	serve	 in	any	 circumstances	as	 logically	sufficient	
conditions	for	applying	aesthetic	terms”	(Sibley	2004	[1959]:	128).	In	other	words,	
we	can’t	find	necessary	nor	sufficient	features	that	warrant	the	application	of	a	
particular	 aesthetic	 term.	 Neither	 can	 we,	 he	 argues,	 point	 at	 a	 number	 of	
relevant	 features	or	conditions	 such	that	some	combination	of	 them	would	be	
enough	to	apply	the	aesthetic	term.	In	contrast	to	“aesthetic	concepts”	there	are	
other	 sort	of	 terms,	 for	example	 “possessive,”	 “capricious,”	or	 “intelligent,”	 for	
which	 such	 conditions	 might	 be	 found.	 Even	 if	 those	 relevant	 features	 (or	
conditions)	might	 not	 be	 sufficient	 alone	 to	 justify	 the	 application	 of	 a	 term,	
when	they	are	combined	with	other	similar	features	they	carry	some	weight	for	
																																								 								
68	Indeed,	I	construe	the	group	of	aesthetic	properties	of	artworks	broader	than	him	and	(as	
I	 will	 argue	 later)	 include	 Sibley’s	 “non-aesthetic”	 properties	 among	 the	 aesthetic	 ones	
too.	
69	Kivy	discusses	thoroughly	this	idea	in	Speaking	of	Art	(1973)	and	other	works	(1975,	1979).	
Unfortunately,	I	cannot	discuss	the	issue	here.		
70	Emphasis	mine.	
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the	 ascription	 of	 the	 property	 to	 the	 object.	 The	 prototype	 example	 used	 by	
Sibley	is	that	of	“intelligence.”	Being	a	good	chess	player	alone	or	being	able	to	
understand	Gödel’s	proof	alone,	may	not	warrant	intelligence,	but	count	to	add	
force	to	that	statement	about	an	individual.	In	the	case	of	aesthetic	properties,	
however,	there	is	no	such	possibility,	according	to	Sibley.	He	allows,	that	at	best,	
some	 features	 count	 only	 characteristically	 in	 one	 particular	 direction	 (for	
example,	 lightness,	 lack	 of	 intense	 colors	 and	 so	 on	 count	 typically	 towards	
delicacy,	and	not	against),	but	that	no	group	of	them	is	ever	logically	sufficient.	
So	aesthetic	 concepts	 are	non-condition	governed	 in	 any	 sense,	 they	 lack	 the	
“governing	conditions”	that	many	other	concepts	possess.		
Summing	 up	 I	 interpret	 Sibley’s	 picture	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 descriptions	 we	
make	about	artworks	and	the	properties	they	denote	as	shown	in	the	following	
table	I.	
PROPERTIES	
OF	
ARTWORKS	
CHARACTERISTICS	 TYPES	AND	USES	 EXAMPLES	
Non-aesthetic	
properties	
No	exercise	of	taste	
involved	
Accessible	to	anyone	
with	normal	capacity	
Condition-governed	
Descriptive	
use	
Features	that	
can	be	
pointed	out	
Great	number	of	
characters,	pale	colors,	
kneeling	figures	in	the	
foreground,	the	theme	of	
the	fugue	inverted,	the	
stretto	at	the	close,	...	
Aesthetic	
properties	
Judgments	of	taste	
involved	
Require	special	
sensitivity	and	
perceptiveness	
Non-condition	
governed	
	
Supported	by	other	
aesthetic	or	
non-aesthetic	
properties	
	
Ambiguous	
use	
Critical-	
context	use	
Unified,	balanced,	
integrated,	dynamic,	...	
Ordinary-	
context	use	
Typically-	
aesthetic	use	
	 Handsome,	elegant,	
comely,	garish,	graceful,	
delicate,	dainty.	Lovely,	
beautiful,	...	
Not-primary	
aesthetic	use	
Metaphorical	
transference	
Melancholic,	sentimental,	
tragic,	lifeless,	
tightly-knit,	...	
Quasi-	
metaphorical	
transference	
Dynamic,	balanced,	...	
Table	I.	Aesthetic	and	non-aesthetic	properties	of	artworks	according	to	Sibley	
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3.6. A	 classification	 of	 aesthetic	
properties	
In	 this	 section,	 I	propose	an	alternative	 to	Sibley’s	 classification.71	We	have	 to	
keep	in	mind	that	aesthetic	properties	belong	to	what	I	called	the	“analysis”	of	
the	artwork.	
I	construe	the	group	of	aesthetic	properties	of	artworks	broader	than	Sibley	
does,	and	include	some	of	Sibley’s	“non-aesthetic”	properties	among	them	too.	I	
will	 define	 them	 first	 (according	 to	 my	 proposal)	 and	 then	 make	 a	 few	
distinctions.	
I	 use	 the	 term	 “first-level	 aesthetic	 properties”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 first	 set	 of	
Sibley’s	 classification,	 properties	 that,	 as	 I	 construe	 them,	 require	 the	 use	 of	
taste	 and	 some	 aesthetic	 discernment.72	They	 can	 be	 located	 and	 pointed	 to	
more	 or	 less	 directly:	 “Look	 at	 those	 pale	 colors	 here,”	 “pay	 attention	 to	 the	
reconciliation	scene	that	comes	now,”	and	so	on.	In	a	word,	what	qualifies	them	
is	that	they	are	structural-formal	features	of	the	work.	
The	remarks	about	those	properties	function	fundamentally	as	descriptive,	
and	convey	formal-technical	information	about	what	is	perceived	in	the	object:	
in	painting,	properties	related	to	colors,	figures,	shapes,	drawings,	lines,	designs,	
and	 so	 on.	 For	 those	 reasons,	 properties	 of	 this	 sort	 have	 been	 qualified	 by	
different	 authors	 as	 “physical,”	 “perceptual,”	 “objective,”	 and	 the	 remarks	 we	
make	about	them	as	“neutral”	or	“descriptive”.	It	makes	some	sense,	but	I	think	
it	fails,73	given	that	the	second	group	of	properties,	as	I	will	argue,	may	also	have	
such	qualities.	
																																								 								
71	This	classification	is	not	complete	and	exhaustive.	I	present	it,	tough,	as	a	first	step	in	the	
right	direction.	
72	I	 adopt	 here	 Korta’s	 (forthcoming)	 terminology,	 but	 not	 exactly	 his	 views	 about	 the	
underlying	concepts.	
73	Sibley	himself	avoids	such	qualifications	as	I	explained	in	footnote	11.		
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At	 first	 sight,	we	may	 think	 that	pointing	 to	 the	 reconciliation	 scene	of	 a	
film,	at	the	pale	colors	of	a	canvas,	or	at	the	inverted	theme	in	a	fugue,	doesn’t	
require	any	special	ability,	and	that	anyone	with	“normal	eyes	or	ears”	can	do	it.	
But	this	is	only	partly	true.	I	contend	that	what	makes	them	“aesthetic,”	is	their	
use	as	aesthetic	remarks	about	features	of	the	work.	Perceiving	the	properties	of	
an	 artwork,	 qua	 artwork,	 requires	 a	 different	 attitude	 to	 that	 adopted	 with	
ordinary	objects.	The	 same	 feature	 in	different	 contexts	has	 a	different	 value.	
That	seems	obvious.	However,	to	keep	it	in	mind	has	some	importance	for	my	
argument.	 The	 pale	 colors	 of	 a	 candy,	 or	 the	 pale	 colors	 of	 an	 impressionist	
painting	have	obviously	very	different	functions,	and	our	attitude	towards	them,	
the	kind	of	perception	we	have	of	 them	differs.	But	 these	same	pale	colors	 in	
Monet’s	 paintings,	where	 the	 interplay	 of	 light	 and	 shadows	 is	 so	 important,	
compared	 to	 some	 other	 painting	 in	 which	 those	 colors	 have	 no	 particular	
significance,	also	change	the	aesthetic	relevance	of	the	property.		
Remarks	of	 the	 sort	 “those	pale	 colors	on	 the	canvas,”	 “this	 stretto	at	 the	
close	of	the	fugue”	or	“that	reconciliation	scene	in	the	movie”	point	to	features	
with	some	relevance	 for	 the	aesthetic	value	of	 the	work.	 I	conclude	 then	that	
these	 “first-level	 properties”	 of	 artworks	 constitute	 the	 base	 of	 what	 I	 call	
“second-level	 properties”.	 If	 following	 Sibley,	 everyone	 accepts	 the	 latter	 as		
aesthetic	 properties,	 I	 see	 no	 reason	 to	 exclude	 the	 former	 as	 being	 also	
aesthetic.	
Second-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 are	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 phenomenological	
properties	that	terms	like	“unified,”	“balanced,”	“integrated,”	“lifeless,”	“serene,”	
“somber,”	 “dynamic,”	 “powerful,”	 “vivid,”	 “delicate,”	 “moving,”	 “trite,”	 or	
“sentimental”	 denote.	 I	 draw	 here	 on	 Sibley’s	 examples	 to	 propose	 another	
characterization	of	those	features	of	artworks.	First	of	all,	I	regard	second-level	
aesthetic	properties	as	complex	properties,	in	the	sense	that	their	perception	is	
the	result	of	several	components	being	combined	in	a	particular	way.	They	are	
not	 reducible	 to	 a	 closed	 set	 of	 structural	 features,	 but	 can	 be	 justified	 by	
appealing	to	them.		
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We	 see	 that	 the	 painting	 is	 vivid,	 that	 the	 dance	 is	 delicate,	 or	 that	 the	
movie	is	sentimental.	It	seems	that	we	perceive	those	features	directly,	without	
any	conscious	inference	involved.	We	don’t	need	to	reflect	(consciously	at	least)	
on	 the	 qualities	 that	 make	 us	 perceive	 a	 piece	 of	 music	 as,	 say,	 gracious	 or	
delicate.	 We	 just	 hear	 them.	 Whether	 second-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 are	
necessarily	perceptual	properties	has	been	discussed.74	In	any	case,	what	I	mean	
is	 that	 they	are	experienced	only	by	direct	acquaintance;	 that	 they	need	 to	be	
seen,	heard,	noticed,	in	order	to	be	enjoyed	and	appreciated.		
Second-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 require	 the	 exercise	 of	 taste	 for	 their	
appreciation.	 Having	 taste	 is	 not	 just	 a	 mere	 perceptual	 capacity,	 neither	
something	 extraordinary,	 but	 the	 ability	 to	 perceive	 and	 appreciate	 those	
second-level	properties	of	an	artwork.75	As	far	as	I	see	it,	taste	entails	perception	
of	those	properties.		
Unlike	 Sibley	 (2004	 [1959]),	 I	 think	 second-level	 aesthetic	 properties	
respond	 to	 some	 conditions	 too.	 I	will	 avoid	 in	my	 account	 the	 controversial	
notion	of	being,	or	not	being,	“condition-governed.”	But	the	core	argument	of	
my	work	 is	 grounded	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 these	 aesthetic	 predicates	 denote	 real	
properties	of	artworks;	and	that	they	can	be	explained	by	appealing	to	first-level	
properties.	 Once	more,	 I	 share	 Kivy’s	 (1973,	 1975,	 1979,	 2015)	 position	 in	 this	
respect.76		
My	account	is	grounded	on	two	basic	ideas:		
i. That	second-level	aesthetic	properties	are	phenomenological	properties	of	
artworks,	 that	 are	 perceived	 as	 simple	 though	 they	 are	 complex	
																																								 								
74	Kivy	(2011),	Carroll	(2004),	Shelley	(2003).	
75	Kivy,	discussing	Sibley’s	“Aesthetic	Concepts,”	defines	taste	as	“an	ability	over	and	above	
the	normal	perceptual	capacities	of	a	person,	and	the	normal	mental	endowments.”	(1979:	
423)	I	distance	myself	from	such	a	definition.	Being	above	normal	capacities	is	not	what	
distinguishes	taste	from	other	faculties,	but	something	else.	
76	Kivy’s	Speaking	of	Art	(1973)	is	a	thorough	discussion	of	Sibley’s	idea	that	aesthetic	terms	
are	in	no	possible	way	condition-governed.	The	same	subject	is	treated	later	by	Kivy	(1975,	
1979).			
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agglomerations	 of	 first-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 on	 which	 they	
supervene.		
ii. That	 emotive	 properties	 are	 one	 among	 various	 types	 of	 second-level	
aesthetic	properties.	
Let’s	 start	 with	 the	 first	 assumption.	 One	 of	 the	 things	 that	 qualify	
second-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 like	 graceful,	 delicate,	 elegant,	 unified,	
dignified,	 stately,	 garish,	 beautiful	 and	 many	 others,	 is	 that	 they	 are	
“phenomenological”	 properties	 of	 the	 work.	 We	 experience	 them	 as	 simple,	
even	 if	 they	are	not.	We	perceive	unity	 in	 the	design	of	a	building	as	a	single	
property,	 but	 it	 is	 not.	 The	 relevant	 idea	 here	 is	 that	 second-level	 aesthetic	
properties	are	complex	properties	that	depend	on	structural	ones,	and	that	the	
former	cannot	exist	without	the	latter.	They	might	not	be	reducible	to	a	closed	
set	 of	 structural	 features	 (in	 Sibley’s	 “condition-governed”	 sense),	 but	 can	 be	
justified	by	appealing	to	some	of	them.	
Recall	 Sibley’s	 comparisons.	 I	 think	 that	 the	 use	 of	 terms	 like	 “lazy”	 or	
“intelligent”	 to	 an	 individual	 is	not	 less	problematic	 than	 the	use	of	 aesthetic	
terms	 like	 “elegant”	 or	 “delicate”	 to	 an	 artwork.	 The	 amount	 of	 “relevant	
features”	or	conditions	needed	 to	qualify	a	 subject	as	 intelligent	or	 lazy	 (with	
more	or	less	certainty)	is	as	indeterminate	as	the	amount	of	features	required	to	
qualify	a	painting	as	elegant.	We	find	the	same	sort	of	difficulty	in	both.		
It	is	not	impossible,	however,	to	find	a	group	or	set	of	features	sufficient	to	
ensure	a	justified	application	of	both	kind	of	terms.	Being	a	good	chess	player,	
together	with	being	able	to	understand	Gödel’s	proof,	and	some	other	features	
of	this	kind,	will	leave	us	in	little	doubt	about	the	subject’s	intelligence,	in	the	
absence	of	other	evidence	to	the	contrary;	similarly,	wearing	beautiful	clothes,	
together	with	light	and	efficient	movements	may	justify	a	person’s	elegance.	So	I	
find	no	 “disanalogy”	between	 terms	 like	 “elegant”	 (aesthetic)	 and	 “intelligent”	
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(non-aesthetic).77	Aesthetic	 terms	 are	 not	 so	 different	 from	 other	 descriptive	
terms	in	ordinary	(non-aesthetic	context)	language.	
Further,	 I	 agree	 with	 Kivy	 and	 others	 that	 first-level	 aesthetic	 properties	
and	second-level	aesthetic	properties	are	related	by	supervenience.78	Properties	
like	 graceful,	 serene,	 turbulent,	 beautiful	 or	 unified	 depend	 upon	 first-level	
properties,	like	the	pale	colors	used,	or	the	kneeling	figures	at	the	front	line.	We	
can	 say	 that	 second-level	 properties	 “emerge”	 as	 new	 entities,	 meaning	 that	
their	existence	depends	on	the	existence	of	first-order	properties.79	For	instance,	
the	 turbulence	 in	 Van	 Gogh’s	 “Starry	 Night”	 would	 emerge	 from	 the	 fluid	
dynamics	of	its	lines,	and	the	interplay	of	movement	and	light	in	the	canvas:	the	
particular	 representation	 of	 light	 and	 its	 motion	 in	 the	 sky;	 the	 intensity	 of	
colors;	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 star	 light	melts	 into	 the	 sky,	 and	possibly	 some	
other	 first-level	 properties.	 That’s	 what	 we	 mean	 that	 second-level	 aesthetic	
properties	 supervene	 on	 first-level	 ones,	 that	 are	 determined	 by	 them,	
grounded	in	them.	
In	conclusion,	the	second-level	aesthetic	properties	conform	to	conditions.	
It	 is	 possible	 to	 find	 criteria	 under	 which	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 second-order	
property	in	an	artwork	is	justified.	In	this	respect,	I	share	Kivy’s	view	(1979:	431)	
in	 that	 it	 may	 be	 difficult	 to	 show	 conclusively	 that	 all	 aesthetic	 terms	 are	
“condition-governed”	in	Sibley’s	sense,	but	the	opposite	cannot	be	shown	either.	
																																								 								
77	Kivy	(1979:	423)	offers	a	very	interesting	argument	against	the	idea	that	aesthetic	terms	
are	 non-condition-governed	 in	 Sibley’s	 sense.	 Kivy	 points	 to	 four	 different	 ways	 to	
understand	 the	 sort	 of	 “entailment”	 Sibley	 has	 in	 mind	 in	 his	 discussion	 on	
condition-governed	 properties.	 One	 is	 by	 deductive	 evidence;	 the	 second	 one	 by	
inductive	evidence;	the	third	one,	what	I’ll	call	the	“under	normal	conditions”	entailment;	
the	fourth	one,	what	Kivy	takes	as	the	“criteriological”	sense	of	entailment,	the	last	one,	
according	to	Kivy,	picks	out	the	way	in	which	aesthetic	terms-properties	are	governed.	
78	See	Davidson’s	(1980	[1970])	definition	in	Chapter	2.	
79	This	is	a	recent	characterization	of	emergentism	(Barnes	2012:	873):		
Emergentism	maintains	that	the	parts	of	a	system,	through	their	collective	activity,	can	
sometimes	give	rise	to	an	entity	which	is	quite	distinct－in	terms	of	 its	structure,	 its	
causal	 powers,	 its	 ontological	 makeup,	 etc－from	 the	 parts	 of	 the	 system,	 or	 from	
anything	these	parts	compose.	
Kivy	(2015)	follows	Barnes’s	characterization.	
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It	 is	 true	 that	what	makes	 an	 artwork	dainty,	 graceful,	 balanced,	 beautiful	 or	
turbulent,	 depends	 on	 how	 different	 first-level	 features	 are	 combined	 in	 that	
particular	work.	The	set	of	criteria	is	difficult	to	define,	but	not	impossible.	
My	second	assumption	is	that	emotive	properties	are	one	type	among	other	
second-level	aesthetic	properties.	Recall	that	by	“emotive	properties”,	I	refer	to	
those	 in	 the	 work.	 I	 do	 not	 take	 them	 as	 dispositional	 properties	 that	 elicit	
emotive	 reactions	 in	 the	 spectator,	or	 those	 felt	by	 the	author	 in	 the	 creative	
moment.80	I	need	to	show	now	their	place	among	other	second-level	properties.	
I	 distinguish	 three	 types:	 dynamic	 properties,	 relational	 properties	 and	
expressive	properties.		
I	call	“dynamic	properties”	those	properties	related	to	physical	features	like	
movement,	fluidity,	weight,	intensity,	velocity,	force	and	so	on.	Examples	of	this	
category	 are	 vivid,	 tranquil,	 heavy,	 fluid,	 agitated,	 spirited,	 vigorous,	 powerful,	
impetuous	and	the	like.		
“Relational	 properties”	 are	 those	 that	 are	 perceived	 as	 the	 relations	 of	
different	parts	of	the	work,	and	the	relations	of	those	parts	with	the	whole.	They	
require	a	global	perspective.	We	cannot	perceive	balance	in	the	composition	of	
a	painting,	 if	we	don’t	adopt	a	global	perspective	and	put	our	eyes	 just	 in	the	
details;	 we	 neither	 can	 appreciate	 that	 the	 Goldberg	 Variations	 of	 Bach	 are	
unified,	 that	 the	 main	 theme	 presented	 in	 the	 Aria	 appears	 with	 different	
shapes	at	each	of	the	Variations,	if	we	just	listen	to	some	extracts	of	them.	We	
could	say	that	relational	properties	require	a	bird’s	eye	view.	Examples	of	this	
type	are	balanced,	symmetric,	harmonious,	unified,	integrated,	and	the	like.		
Finally,	I	call	“expressive	properties”	the	properties	that	are	closely	related	
to	 how	we	 experience	 and	 express	 affects.	 They	 are	 the	most	 problematic	 to	
define,	and	many	accounts	tend	to	locate	them	outside	the	artwork’s	aesthetic	
properties.	 I	 have	 already	 presented	 my	 account	 of	 music	 expressiveness	 in	
Chapter	 2.	 Now	 I	 contend	 that	 expressive	 features	 (in	 any	 artwork)	 are	 also	
																																								 								
80	For	the	the	distinction	between	heard	properties	and	dispositional	properties	in	music,	
see	Chapters	1	and	2	above.	
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aesthetic	 properties	 of	 the	 work,	 which	 are	 perceived	 also	 in	 virtue	 of	 other	
aesthetic	features,	in	a	similar	way	to	how	we	perceive	balance	in	a	painting	or	
unity	in	Bach’s	work.	
Among	“expressive	properties”	 I	 think	we	should	make	some	distinctions.	
My	proposal	includes	what	I	call	“feeling	properties,”	and	“emotive	properties.”	I	
take	 as	 “feeling	 properties”	 those	 like	 upbeat,	 energetic,	 exciting,	 relaxing,	
delicate,	serene	and	the	like,	which	point	at	the	way	we	feel	emotions,	and	the	
bodily	reactions	involved	in	them.	The	turbulence	of	Van	Gogh’s	“Starry	Night”	
would	also	belong	to	this	category.	“Emotive	properties”	are	not	felt	emotions,	
nor	 represented,	 nor	 aroused	 emotions.	 They	 are,	 as	 with	 any	 second-level	
property,	perceptual	properties	of	the	work,	properties	that	can	be	(if	we	go	to	
the	ground)	explained	 in	terms	of	 first-level	properties.	But	at	 the	same	time,	
they	can	be	justified	appealing	to	other	second-level	properties	that	accompany	
them.	 For	 example,	 we	 see	 anguish	 in	 Van	 Gogh’s	 painting,	 due	 not	 just	 to	
“physical”	 aspects	 of	 light,	 contrast,	 shapes	 and	 so	 on,	 but	 also	 because	 we	
perceive	 turbulence	 (a	 feeling	 property)	 and	 agitation	 as	 “phenomenological”	
properties	 too.	 Examples	 of	 emotive	 properties	 are	 sad,	 joyful,	 fearful,	 angry,	
hopeful,	melancholic,	mournful,	chilly,	anguished	and	so	on.		
Finally,	 there	 are	 some	 second-level	 properties	 that	 don’t	 necessarily	
involve	description	of	the	work	and	that	behave	as	purely	evaluative,	or	better	
said,	entail	a	good	or	bad-making	feature	of	the	work.81	Examples	of	this	group	
are	garish,	 dainty,	 lovely,	 beautiful,	 insipid,	 gorgeous,	 pretty,	 comely,	 graceful,		
impressive,	 handsome,	 elegant,	 chilly,	majestic,	 ...and	so	on.	 I	 regard	them	as	a	
distinct	kind	of	property,	because	they	often	“behave”	like	that.	However,	some	
other	 features	 of	 the	 second-level,	 depending	 on	 the	 use	 or	 the	 context	 they	
belong	to,	may	carry	with	them	a	positive	or	negative	valence	too.	For	example,	
tenderness	in	a	romantic	movie	will	probably	entail	a	positive	valence,	whereas	
in	a	gore	film	probably	would	not.		
																																								 								
81	For	discussion	about	 “thin”	 and	 “thick”	 aesthetic	properties	of	 artworks	 see	Kivy	 (2015)	
and	Korta	(forthcoming).	
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I	summarize	these	distinctions	in	the	following	table.	
AESTHETIC	PROPERTIES	OF	ARTWORKS	AND	ITS	TYPES	
PROPERTIES	
OF	
ARTWORKS	
CHARACTERISTICS	 TYPES	AND	USES	 EXAMPLES	
First-level	
aesthetic	
properties	
Structural	properties		
Exercise	of	taste	
Perceptual	
	
	 Great	number	of	
characters,	pale	colors,	
kneeling	figures	in	the	
foreground,	the	theme	of	
the	fugue	inverted,	the	
stretto	at	the	close,	...	
Second-level	
aesthetic	
properties	
Judgment	of	taste	
Phenomenological	
properties	
Complex	properties	
Supervene	on	other	
features	(structural	
ones	or	other	second	
level	properties)	
Require	special	
sensitivity	and	
perceptiveness	
Evaluative	and/or	
descriptive	
	
	
Dynamic	properties82	
	
Vivid,	dynamic,	tranquil,	
heavy,	fluid,	agitated,		
sprinted,	vigorous,	
powerful,	impetuous,	...	
Relational	properties	
	
Unified,	balanced,	
integrated,	harmonic,	
symmetrical.	chaos,	
disorder,	...	
Expressive	
properties	
	
Feeling	
properties	
	
Upbeat,	tragic,	disturbing,	
dull,	calm,	tranquil,	
energetic,	exciting,	
relaxing,	unsettled,	
tender,	turbulent,	serene,	
delicate	...		
Emotive	
properties
83	
	
Sad,	joyful,	fearful,	angry,	
hopeless,	hopeful,	love,	
melancholic,	tragic,	
mournful,	chilly,	
anguished,	desperate,	
happy,	broody,	...	
Table	2.	My	picture	of	aesthetic	properties	of	artworks.	
																																								 								
82	Some	feeling	and	dynamic	properties	can	be	interchanged.	
83	Full-blooded	emotions	and	moods.	
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	 Chapter	4	
4. Expressive	and	other	
aesthetic	properties	of	music	
4.1. Introduction	
In	 this	chapter,	 I	 show	the	place	of	expressive	properties	of	music	among	the	
other	second-level	aesthetic	properties.	Within	a	 realist	approach	 to	aesthetic	
properties,	 I	 clarify	 their	 nature	 and	 show	 that	 expressive	 properties	 like	
sadness,	joyfulness	or	anger	can	be	understood	by	appealing	to	other	aesthetic	
and	non-aesthetic	properties	in	the	work.	In	short,	I	argue	that	the	expressive	
features	of	music	depend	on	other	musical	features	and	“emerge”	from	them.	I	
regard	expressive	properties	as	a	subset	of	second-level	aesthetic	properties.		
I	want	to	show	that	expressive	properties	like	being	sad,	furious,	or	joyful,	
are	not	so	different	from	other	non-expressive	but	also	aesthetic	properties	like	
being	 elegant,	 delicate	 or	 graceful,	 or	 others	 like	 tranquil,	 fluid,	 energetic	 or	
balanced	 and	 unified.	 These	 are	 just	 a	 few	 properties	 that	 we	 commonly	
attribute	 to	 music	 passages.	 I	 think	 that	 when	 we	 talk	 about	 music’s	
expressiveness,	we	should	broaden	our	perspective	and	make	room	not	just	for	
the	reduced	group	of	full-blooded	emotions	music	can	be	expressive	of,	but	also	
for	other	dynamic	and	affective	aspects	that	can	be	heard	in	music,	and	might	
be	constituents	of	ordinary	emotions.	 In	this	chapter,	 I	make	a	proposal	 for	a	
classification	 of	 the	 aesthetic	 properties	 of	music,	 and	 explore	 their	 different	
roles	in	the	work.		
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4.2. Music	alone	and	its	descriptions	
I	must	 start	by	distinguishing	between	artistic	and	aesthetic	properties	 in	 the	
case	of	absolute	music.	Absolute	music	represents	nothing,	and	all	we	have	to	
contemplate	and	appreciate	 is	 the	music	 itself.	What	 is	artistically	 relevant	 in	
music	 then,	 cannot	 be	 found	 in	 any	 propositional	 content,	 and	 when	 we	
evaluate	or	appreciate	a	musical	piece	as	music,	what	is	apprehended	is	nothing	
more	than	a	formal	structure	of	sounds	perceived	more	or	less	directly	by	our	
senses.	Any	external	 factor,	 say	 the	originality	of	 the	work,	 the	novelty	of	 the	
artist,	 the	 impact	 on	 society,	 or	 even	 its	 power	 to	 arouse	 emotions	 in	 the	
audience,	 might	 add	 artistic	 merit	 to	 the	 work,	 but	 cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	
aesthetic	properties	of	it.		
There	 is	 an	apt	 simile	by	Peter	Kivy	which	 reflects	perfectly	what	 I	mean	
and	what	Walter	 Pater	 refers	 to	when	he	 says	 that	 “all	 art	 constantly	 aspires	
towards	the	condition	of	music.”	(Pater	1980	[1893]:	106).	Kivy	writes:	
Suppose	we	think	of	the	traditional	forms	and	genres	of	the	fine	arts,	prior	to	
the	twentieth	century,	as	 lying	along	a	continuum,	with	the	aesthetic	at	one	
extreme	 and	 the	 non-aesthetic	 at	 the	 other.	 On	 my	 view,	 the	 extreme	
aesthetic	 end	 of	 the	 continuum	 would	 be	 occupied	 by	 absolute	 music,	 the	
only	“pure”	aesthetic	art.	(Kivy	2011:	74)	
This	 is	 important	because	when	explaining	 the	expressiveness	of	music,	 some	
accounts	appeal	to	what	I	took	as	“external”	factors.84	Arousalist	theories	claim	
that	the	expressive	power	of	music	resides	in	its	power	to	elicit	emotions	in	the	
listener;	 classic	 expression	 theories	 claim	 that	 said	 power	 resides	 in	 those	
emotions	of	the	composer	that	are	being	expressed	et	cetera.	However,	as	I	have	
argued	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 they	 are	 wrong.	 Expressive	 properties	 are	 aesthetic	
properties	 of	 the	 work,	 more	 or	 less	 relevant	 depending	 on	 each	 case.	 But	
always	 have	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 properties	 that	 we	 apprehend/recover	 from	
																																								 								
84	See	Chapter	1	for	my	criticisms	of	expression,	persona,	and	arousal	theories.	
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how	the	music	event	is	composed	and	organized,	in	how	it	reaches	the	listener’s	
ears.		
That	being	the	case,	if	we	are	to	explore	the	aesthetic	properties	of	music,	
we	 will	 need	 to	 focus	 on	 what	 is	 perceptual	 (or	 quasi-perceptual),	 its	
formal-structural	properties	and	its	outward	appearance,	a	task	that	belong	to	
analysis	 (remember	 the	 distinction	 between	 interpretation,	 analysis	 and	
evaluation	made	in	Chapter	3);	that	will	lead	us	to	break	the	music	work	down	
into	 smaller	parts	and	see	how	they	 interact	with	each	other.	However,	 these	
are	 not	 the	 sort	 of	 aesthetic	 descriptions	 we	 usually	 read	 from	 art	 critics	 or	
make	 ourselves	 when	 we	 discuss	 art.	 An	 attentive	 and	 experienced	 music	
listener,	 even	 if	 devoid	 of	 musical	 mastery	 and	 the	 technical	 terminology	
required	 to	 translate	 the	heard	 events	 into	words,	may	detect	 and	 appreciate	
musical	features	that	are	relevant	in	that	music	piece	and	see	how	it	works.	So,	
we	 may	 describe	 Schumman’s	 Des	 Abends	 as	 “the	 melody	 is	 smoothly	
syncopated	throughout	the	semiquavers	of	the	right-hand,	while	the	left-hand	
accompaniment	maintains	the	actual	beat”	or	we	may	describe	it	as	a	“delicate	
melody,”	 and	 both	 descriptions	 would	 count	 as	 descriptions	 of	 its	 aesthetic	
properties.		
We	can	describe	the	same	piece	of	music	in	several	ways.	I	will	pick	out	four:	
what	I	call	the	“expressive	description,”	the	“disciplined	performer	description,”	
the	“cartographic	description”	and	the	“attentive	aesthetic	description.”		
Let’s	 start	 with	 an	 example.	 Schumann’s	 Fantasiestücke,	 a	 collection	 of	
eight	pieces	written	for	piano	in	1837.	A	work	full	of	expressive	features.85	Take	
the	 first	 piece,	 “Des	 Abends.”	 An	 ordinary	 listener86	could	 describe	 it	 as	 a	
delicate	 piece	 of	music,	where	 the	 notes	 flow	 softly	 forming	 dreamy	melodic	
																																								 								
85 	Schumann	 composed	 those	 pieces	 to	 represent	 the	 duality	 of	 his	 personality,	 the	
dreamer	and	the	passionate	sides	of	his	mind.	They	are	not	prototype	pieces	of	absolute	
music,	I	know,	but	I	will	allow	myself	such	license.	The	author	gave	each	of	them	a	title	
after	composing	them.	However,	as	an	exercise,	we	will	leave	out	this	piece	of	information	
and	focus	on	what	is	heard.	
86	I	 don’t	mean	 by	 that	 someone	 not	 acquainted	 at	 all	 with	 classical	music,	 or	 someone	
devoid	of	interest	and	musical	sensibility;	but	someone	without	musical	training.		
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lines	that	take	rest	at	the	end	of	each	section.	The	listener	perceives	nostalgic	
and	melancholic	 traces	 in	 it,	 composed	exquisitely.	Those	expressive	qualities	
give	the	piece	an	aesthetic	value,	we	judge	them	as	relevant	for	the	appreciation	
and	 evaluation	 of	 the	 piece	qua	 artwork.	What’s	more,	 the	 listener	might	 be	
moved	 by	 its	 beauty	 and	 it	 may	 even	 evoke	 in	 her	 mind	 a	 dreamy	 or	
melancholic	state.	Let’s	call	the	description	above	an	“expressive	description.”	
The	performer	could	point	to	the	instruction	she	finds	at	the	very	beginning	
of	the	score,	“sehr	innig	zu	spielen”	(to	be	played	very	intimately),	and	realize	
that	such	expressive	character	needs	to	be	conveyed	by	playing	the	piece	in	that	
particular	manner.	She	will	realize	the	importance	of	the	length	of	some	of	the	
higher	 notes,	 for	 the	 phrases	 to	 be	 heard	 unified	 and	 appropriately;	 of	 the	
crescendo	 and	 decrescendo	 signs	 that	 indicate	 the	 intensity	 that	 the	 melody	
should	be	played	at,	at	different	moments.	The	performer	will	also	respect	the	
ritardandos	at	 the	end	of	each	section.	She	will	 realize	how	 important	 it	 is	 to	
play	the	notes	that	interpose	from	one	hand	to	the	other	with	the	same	weight.	
The	performer	 is	aware	 that	 the	 listener	 should	not	notice	 that	 the	 fingers	of	
both	hands	have	been	crossed	and	the	thumbs	interlocked	throughout;	on	the	
contrary,	 they	should	hear	 it	as	a	continuous	and	fluid	melodic	 line.	Let’s	call	
this	the	“disciplined	performer	description.”		
A	 formal	 analysis	 of	 the	 piece	would	point	 to	 its	 overall	 structure,	 at	 the	
length	and	of	each	of	the	sections,	and	at	its	slow	tempo.	Something	like	that	
could	 be	 “coldly”	 added:	 most	 of	 the	 bars	 are	 composed	 of	 groups	 of	 six	
semiquavers	on	the	right	hand	and	four	on	the	left	hand.	The	first	section	has	
sixteen	bars	that	should	be	repeated	once.	Following	that	there	is	a	short	bridge	
passage	of	the	same	tonality,	that	brings	us	to	a	new	passage	with	a	changing	
tonality.	The	melody	 is	stressed	by	the	 longer	duration	(quavers)	of	 the	notes	
that	constitute	the	melody.	This	is	the	“cartographic	description.”	
The	analyst	 could	also	 realize	 that	 syncopation	 is	 a	 crucial	 feature	of	 this	
music	piece	and	in	fact	something	aesthetically	important.	The	smooth	melody	
interspersed	throughout	the	semiquavers	of	the	right	hand,	while	the	left	hand	
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accompaniment	 maintains	 the	 actual	 beat	 gives	 the	 piece	 a	 very	 particular	
expressive	character.	The	short	bridge	phrase	presents	us	with	an	unexpected	
rhythmic	change	and	the	syncopation	that	will	be	essential	until	 the	end.	She	
could	also	appreciate	that	the	tonal	change	after	this	short	passage,	combines	
the	 rhythmic	 structure	 of	 the	 initial	 part	 and	 the	 recently	 introduced	
syncopation;	 that	 it	 is	 like	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 initial	 motive.	 This	 helps	 the	
delicacy	 of	 the	 piece	 acquire	 another	 direction,	 adding	 complexity,	 suspense	
and	tension.	But	that	after	such	a	“dialogic”	structure	of	upward	and	downward	
melodic	 lines,	 in	which	 the	musical	 plot	 seems	not	 to	 find	 an	 end,	 the	 piece	
resolves	softly,	again	with	a	piano	in	the	opening	chords	and	short	motives	that	
direct	the	piece	to	a	beautiful	cadential	closure.	This	is	what	I	call	the	“attentive	
aesthetic	description.”	
I	 think	 I	 won’t	 invite	 too	 much	 controversy	 if	 I	 qualify	 the	 “expressive	
description”	and	the	“attentive	aesthetic	description”	as	descriptions	that	focus	
on	what	 counts	 as	 Schumann’s	 first	Fantasiestück’s	 beauty.	 The	 former	 lacks	
technical	descriptions	about	music,	the	listener	might	be	not	familiarized	with	
them,	or	simply	avoids	using	them.	Until	the	last	few	words	all	predicates	refer	
to	the	music	piece	and	the	expressive	features	heard	in	it.	The	listener	appeals	
at	the	end	to	her	response	to	the	beauty	of	the	piece	and	the	melancholic	state	
that	elicits	in	her.87	The	“attentive	aesthetic	description,”	however,	understands	
the	role	that	different	musical	features,	combined	in	a	particular	manner,	play	
in	the	composition,	appreciates	 the	expressive	 features	 that	result	 from	them,	
and	the	contribution	of	all	of	that	to	the	aesthetic	value	of	the	work.		
The	“disciplined	performer”	description	focuses	on	what	is	found	written	in	
the	 score,	 the	 technical	 aspects	 of	 the	 composition,	 and	 the	written	dynamic	
and	 expressive	 instructions	 noted	 by	 the	 author	 for	 a	 correct	 performance.88	
However	it	is	difficult	for	the	composer’s	interpretative	intentions	to	be	wholly	
registered	 on	 the	 music	 sheet.	 Finally,	 what	 I	 labelled	 as	 the	 “cartographic	
																																								 								
87	Whether	all	those	qualities	count	as	aesthetically	relevant	or	not	I	will	discuss	later.	
88	Conventional	aspects	linked	to	particular	styles	or	times	should	also	be	taken	into	account	by	a	
competent	performer.	
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description”	gives	us	a	hint	of	what	a	cold	technical	analysis	of	the	piece	might	
be,	something	that	anyone	with	minimum	musical	knowledge	sitting	in	front	of	
a	score	could	do;	something	similar	to	when	a	draftsman	holds	a	protractor,	a	
triangle	 and	 a	 ruler,	 and	measures	 the	 geometrical	 shapes	 and	distances	 of	 a	
line	drawing.		
Some	 of	 the	 qualities	 that	 the	 previous	 descriptions	 point	 to	 seem	 to	
correspond	with	what	we	regard	as	“aesthetic,”	while	others	may	not.	“A	group	
of	 semiquavers	 alone,”	 “a	melody	 syncopated	 throughout	 the	 semiquavers	 of	
the	 right	 hand	 while	 the	 left	 hand	 accompaniment	 maintains	 the	 beat,”	 “a	
smoothly	 syncopated	melody,”	 “a	 delicious	melody,”	 “a	 beautiful	 melody,”	 “a	
good	melody,”	“a	moving	melody,”	“an	exciting	melody”...	these	phrases	do	not	
seem	to	have	the	same	aesthetic	relevance.		
4.3. Classification	 of	 the	 aesthetic	
properties	of	music	
The	ground	of	any	music	event	is	sound,	the	stuff	that	music	is	made	of.	Sounds,	
however,	the	bearers	of	auditory	properties	like	pitch	or	timbre,89	are	heard	like	
																																								 								
89	Tone,	 pitch	 and	 timbre	 are	 often	 confused,	 and	 more	 if	 they	 are	 translated	 into	 other	
languages	like	Spanish	or	Basque.		
In	English,	pitch	is	the	key	auditory	attribute	of	the	sound,	that	allows	us	to	classify	a	sound	
as	high	or	low,	and	it	is	determined	by	sound	wave	vibrations.	Whereas	frequency	is	a	scientific	
unit	 of	 measurement,	 pitch	 has	 also	 a	 subjective	 component,	 that	 takes	 into	 account	 the	
relative	 placement	 of	 the	 frequency	 within	 a	 established	 tuning	 system	 and	 its	 relations	 to	
other	frequencies.		
Tone	 is	what	 distinguishes	 a	 sound	 and	makes	 it	 recognizable	 for	 its	 constant	 or	 definite	
pitch,	 and	 is	 constituted	 by	 partial	 tones,	 the	 fundamental	 tone	 and	 other	 ones	 called	
“harmonics.”	 The	 tone	 of	 an	 instrument	 generally	 refers	 to	 the	 overall	 frequency	 balance	 of	
tones	and	overtones,	bass-treble	or	low-high	balance.	
Timbre	 is,	 its	 tone-color,	 the	 characteristic	 sound	 of	 a	 particular	 instrument.	 In	 a	 sense,	
timbre	 is	 everything	 that	 lets	 you	 distinguish	 one	 instrument	 from	 another,	which	 results	 in	
combinations	of	different	 factors:	 the	material	of	 the	 instrument,	 the	 tone,	 the	 strength	and	
number	of	harmonics	and	so	on.	
However	in	Spanish	“pitch”	 is	translated	as	“tono”	and	defined	as	“cualidad	de	los	sonidos,	
dependiente	de	su	frecuencia,	que	permite	ordenarlos	de	graves	a	agudos.”	In	contrast,	“tone”	
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tones	when	we	hear	them	as	music.	Obviously	not	just	any	sound	is	music,	even	
if	it	is	produced	at	a	particular	pitch	and	with	a	particular	timbre,	or	seems	to	
have	some	kind	of	organization.90	
Let	me	give	an	example	before	going	further.	In	the	Middle	Ages	bells	had	a	
prominent	 role	 for	 people,	 and	 especially	 for	 monks	 and	 nuns	 living	 in	
cloistered	 monasteries	 and	 convents.	 The	 everyday	 practices	 of	 Benedictine	
monasteries	since	the	eleventh	century,	for	example,	have	been	guided	by	bells	
in	 a	 very	 precise	 way.	 Their	 sets	 of	 bells	 were	 (and	 still	 are)	 extensive	 and	
explicit:	the	call	for	prime	was	made	by	a	bell	called	the	parvulum	signum.	Other	
bells	 such	as	 the	skilla,	 the	signum	minimum	or	 the	minus	 signum	were	 rung	
out	 in	 the	 corridors	 and	 cloisters,	 each	 one	 with	 a	 slightly	 different	 tone,	
indicating	 different	 devotional	 moments	 of	 the	 day.	 The	 tintinabullum,	 a	
light-tone	bell,	was	heard	when	monks	needed	to	hurry	along;	bells	 in	deeper	
tones	called	monks	to	assembly,	and	so	on	(Hendy	2013:	108).		
I	don’t	think	the	Benedictine	monks	listened	to	those	bells	as	music,	but	as	
acoustic	 signals	 with	 different	 conventional	meanings	 for	 their	 everyday	 life.	
They	 were	 distinguished	 by	 the	 monks	 by	 their	 different	 pitches	 and	 other	
particularities,	 such	 as	 conformity	 to	 specific	 patterns	 and	 so	 on.	However,	 I	
wouldn’t	say	they	count	as	music.	What	I	mean	with	that	is	that	not	any	sound	
event	can	be	heard	as	music;	there	must	be	a	previous	purpose	in	mind	for	that	
to	 happen,	 i.e.	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 author	 when	 composing	 her	 work	 and	 a	
particular	kind	of	listening	involved.	When	we	listen	to	music,	we	don’t	merely	
listen	to	acoustic	sounds	but	experience	them	as	musical	tones.		
In	the	following	section,	I	will	keep	in	mind	the	classification	proposed	in	
Chapter	3.	I	aim	to	show	that	aesthetic	properties	of	music	fit	perfectly	into	that	
picture.	
																																								 																																								 																																								 															
is	mostly	 translated	 as	 “timbre”	 and	 defined	 as	 “Cualidad	 de	 los	 sonidos	 determinada	 por	 el	
efecto	perceptivo	que	produce	en	 los	oyentes.	El	 timbre	del	violín.	Su	timbre	de	voz”.	 (Those	
definitions	taken	from	the	REAL	ACADEMIA	ESPAÑOLA)	
90	On	ontological	issues,	see	Chapter	1.	
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4.3.1. Primary	 musical	 components	 and	
first-level	aesthetic	properties	of	music	
Now	back	to	our	account	of	aesthetic	properties,	 let	me	recall	 first	something	
very	 basic:	 that	 the	 sounds	 that	 constitute	music	 are	 organized	 according	 to	
different	 musical	 aspects	 or	 categories,	 of	 which	 the	 most	 fundamental	 are	
rhythm,	harmony	and	melody,	and	other	aspects	like	timbre,	texture,	dynamics	
(volume,	 intensity...)	 or	 tempo	 also	 play	 an	 important	 role.91	I	 don’t	 regard	
those	musical	 elements	 as	 aesthetic	 properties	 per	 se,	 but	 they	 are	 the	 basic	
dimensions	in	which	the	music’s	first-level	properties	can	be	grouped.		
Recall	the	previous	example.	Describing	Schumman’s	Des	Abends’s	passage	
as	two	groups	of	six	semiquavers	in	each	bar	of	the	right	hand	and	four	in	the	left	
hand	does	not	 imply	pointing	 to	 anything	 aesthetically	 significant.	 It’s	 a	 bare	
formal	 description	 that	 any	 computer	 program	 could	 accomplish,	 a	 clear	
example	 of	 what	 I	 took	 before	 as	 a	 “cartographic	 description.”	 It	 could	 be	
compared	with	describing	how	the	chemical	components	of	the	scarlet	red	of	a	
painting	have	been	mixed	to	get	the	color.	The	elements	mentioned	above	are	a	
little	 sample	 of	 the	 raw	material	 of	music,	 notes,	 duration,	 rhythmic	 figures,	
bars,	a	few	basic	components	that	give	music	its	power.		
However,	 if	 we	 observe	 that	 the	 melody	 is	 syncopated	 throughout	 the	
semiquavers	of	the	right	hand	while	the	left	hand	accompaniment	maintains	the	
actual	beat,	something	new	is	entering	into	the	description.	These	are	examples	
of	 first-level	 aesthetic	 properties	of	music,	 features	that	are	directly	heard	 in	a	
music-work,	 perceptual	 properties	 that	 correspond	 to	 the	 technical-formal	
features	of	a	composition,	which	at	least	require	some	training	and	education	in	
order	to	be	heard.	
	
	
																																								 								
91	See	Table	3.	
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I	 take	 them	 as	 aesthetic	 because	 they	 show	 how	 music	 elements	 are	
combined	in	that	particular	piece	and	how	they	become	a	relevant	part	of	that	
music-work.92	They	are	features	that	obey	some	rules	of	music	theory	and	fulfill	
specific	conditions,	clearly	condition-governed	in	Sibley’s	sense.	The	notion	of	
entailment	operative	here	is	based	on	inductive	evidence.	If	we	want	to	justify	
why	we	have	ascribed	a	particular	property	of	this	sort	to	the	work,	we	need	to	
point	at	some	heard	evidence.	“There	is	a	stretto	in	the	final	part	of	the	fugue”.	
Something	like	that	could	be	argued	in	order	to	prove	our	assertion:	“Listen	to	
the	figure	presented	at	the	beginning	of	the	piece,	notice	how	the	same	subject	
appears	 at	 different	 voices	 once	 and	 again	 in	 different	 sections	 of	 the	
composition;	and	now	pay	attention	at	the	final	sequence	and	listen	to	how	it	
reappears	in	one	voice,	but	is	interrupted	by	the	sudden	presence	of	the	same	
motive	in	some	other	voice.”	There	is	sufficient	inductive	evidence	to	justify	our	
judgment.	
	
Describing	musical	passages	like	“there	is	a	stretto	at	such	and	such	bars,”	
or	like	“there	is	an	inversion	at	this	point	of	the	Fugue”	requires	the	deployment	
of	 taste,	which	Sibley	defined	as	 “an	ability	 to	notice	or	 see	or	tell	 that	 things	
have	certain	qualities”.	(2004	[1959]:	128)	For	instance,	to	perceive	the	stretto	at	
the	 end	 of	 a	 fugue,	we	 need	 to	 realize	 that	while	 the	 subject	 in	 one	 voice	 is	
interrupted,	 another	 takes	 up	 the	 chance	 to	 imitate	 the	 previous	 figure.	We	
might	not	know	the	technical	name	of	the	property,	but	that	is	not	a	problem;	
first	and	foremost,	we	need	to	realize	that	there	are	different	voices	entangled.	
But	 to	 recognize	 the	 feature	 and	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 its	 aesthetic	 value	 in	 that	
particular	piece	of	music,	something	more	than	normal	ears	and	intelligence	is	
required.			
																																								 								
92	As	 Sibley	 (2004	 [1959]:	 133)	 points	 out,	 when	 we	 describe	 artworks,	 we	 involve	 and	
concern	ourselves	with	particular	works.	We	talk	about	“its	pale	colors,”	“the	way	the	lines	
converge,”	or	how	the	melody	is	syncopated.	
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Table	3.	Examples	of	musical	first-level	properties	
Noticing	 an	 inversion	 or	 a	 counterpoint	 in	 a	 fugue,	 implies	 being	 able	 to	
identify	the	main	motive	in	voices	that	are	“hidden”,	below	the	top	line	where	
the	untrained	ears	expect	it	to	be.	An	accent	on	that	note,	the	crescendo	before	
that	 climax	 point,	 this	 unexpected	 modal	 change,	 the	 rubato	 ...	 Just	 a	 few	
examples	 to	 show	 that	 those	properties	 are	not	of	 the	kind	 that	 anyone	with	
normal	 intelligence	 and	 ears	 can	 notice.	 You	 need	 to	 perceive	 not	 just	 a	
sequence	of	notes,	but	how	 those	notes	 are	 combined	and	 interact	with	 each	
other	to	create	a	specific	musical	effect.	We	may	discuss	the	relevance	of	some	
first-level	aesthetic	property	in	particular,	but	when	someone	attentively	listens	
to	 Schumman’s	 Des	 Abends,	 as	 (beautiful)	 music,	 she	 stops	 perceiving	 just	
																																								 								
93	Smorzando	is	a	combination	of	ritardando	and	decrescendo.	
94	See	Chapter	4.	
Musical	
dimensions	
Examples	 of	 perceptual	 features	 (first-level	
properties)	
Melody	 Clear	melody,	downward	melody,	upward	melody,	linear	melody,	
arpeggios,	ornaments,	syncopation,	stretto,	...	
Harmony	 Dissonance,	minor	mode,	major	mode,	diatonic	scale,	chromatic	
scale,	active	chords,	...	
Rhythm	 Halting	rhythm,	light	rhythm,	irregular	pauses,	regular	rhythm,	
rubato,	ritardando,	halting,	smorzando,	...	
Dynamic	 dicrescendo,	Crescendo,	pianissimo,	forte,	restrained	dynamics,	
smorzando,93	staccato,	loudness,	conflict	and	resolution,	intensity,	
climax	points,	...	
Timbre	
(tone)94	
Strident,	dark,	grave,	...		
Texture	 Thick	texture,	thin	texture,	orchestral,	instrumental,	vocal,	
counterpoint,	....		
Tempo	 Allegro	,		Andante,		Largo,	Fast	or	slow	tempo,	Presto,	smorzando,	...	
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semiquavers	 and	 notes,	 and	 the	 cartographic	 mind	 changes	 her	 view	 and	
attitude	towards	the	music	piece.	It	is	a	matter	of	taste,	of	being	aware	of	how,	
for	 instance,	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 melody	 is	 drawn	 throughout	 alternated	
semiquavers,	and	significance	of	this	feature	to	the	aesthetic	value	of	the	work.		
What	 I	 take	 from	 it	 is	 that	 the	 perceived	 sounds	 of	 music	 stand	 in	
significant	 relation	 to	 one	 another.	 Noticing	 how	 they	 are	 entangled	 and	
grouped	together	in	that	particular	piece	of	music,	in	that	specific	instant	of	the	
music	 event,	makes	 first-level	 aesthetic	 features	 artistically	 (and	 in	 particular	
aesthetically)	 relevant.	 This	 “disinterested”	 exercise,	 requires	 a	 higher	 faculty	
that	simply	hearing	notes.	It	requires	taste.	Noticing	properties	like	a	stretto,	a	
counterpoint	 or	 a	 rubato,	 is	 the	 first	 step	 to	 the	 aesthetic	 appreciation	 of	 a	
work.		
Summing	 up,	 first-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 of	music	 are	 those	 technical	
features	 perceived	 in	 the	 work	 whose	 recognition	 doesn’t	 depend	 on	 other	
aesthetic	 features,	but	does	require	the	 listener	to	be	aware	and	to	appreciate	
how	several	musical	components	 (rhythmic,	harmonic,	melodic,	dynamic	and	
so	on)	are	structured.	They	are	“non-dependent”	on	“organic”	properties	of	the	
work	for	which	recognition,	appreciation,	and	aesthetic	sensitivity	is	required.	
Moreover,	 I	 think	 that	 those	 are	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 higher-level	 aesthetic	
properties,	such	as	being	elegant,	balanced	or	melancholic,	are	grounded.	This	
leads	us	to	analyze	the	nature	of	those	other	sort	of	aesthetic	properties	next.	
4.3.2. Second-level	aesthetic	properties	of	music	
We	said	that	it	is	natural	to	apply	predicates	to	artworks	without	appealing	to	
the	 specific	 vocabulary	 of	 the	 artistic	 genre,	 but	 by	 using	 terms	 that	 are	 also	
used	in	non-artistic	contexts.95	Let’s	bring	here	what	we	analyzed	in	Chapter	3	
and	 focus	 on	 the	 second-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 of	 music.	 To	 say	 that	 a	
passage	 shows	 tension,	 that	 the	 theme	 is	pompous,	 to	describe	 the	melody	as	
smooth,	as	turbulent,	 that	the	strings	sound	garish	or	the	sonic	atmosphere	is	
																																								 								
95	See	Chapter	2.	
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dreamy	or	melancholic,	sounds	perfectly	natural	to	our	ears	and	these	are	often	
the	type	of	descriptions	that	we	make	of	musical	pieces.		
Someone	could	be	tempted	to	say	that	what	they	denote	is	not	a	property	in	
the	object,	but	mental	constructions	of	the	listener;	and	that	hearing	music	as	
(and	 describing	 it	 as)	 smooth,	 turbulent,	 garish,	 dreamy	 or	 melancholic	 is	
subjective	or	relative	to	the	subject.	What	I	want	to	argue	now	is	that	this	view	
is	not	correct,	and	that	properties	like	melancholic,	turbulent,	garish	or	dreamy	
are	in	music.	
I	 recall	 that	 second-level	aesthetic	properties	of	music	works	are	complex	
properties	 heard	 in	 the	 musical	 event,	 properties	 that	 emerge	 out	 of	 it	 as	
something	 new,	 but	 supervene	 upon	 first-level	 structural	 features,	 and	 are	
justified	by	appealing	to	some	of	those	first-level	structural	features.	And	that’s	
the	reason	why	hearing	them	requires	something	more	than	merely	detecting	
technical	features.	A	listener	trained	in	musical	theory	is	able	to	describe	Bach’s	
Sarabande	as	a	piece	that	resolves	with	a	harmonic	change	or	the	predominant	
D	minor	to	F	major,	and	so	on,	and	make	use	of	knowledge	of	music	theory	and	
technical	 vocabulary.	 But	 this	 is	 no	 more	 that	 “cartographic”	 description	 of	
what	 is	heard	 in	music.	The	 same	 listener	however	might	well	not	be	able	 to	
hear	 the	 piece	 as	 a	 sad	 or	 delicate	 musical	 passage.	 In	 contrast,	 some	 other	
listener,	devoid	of	technical	words	but	having	other	perceptual	abilities,	might	
well	be	able	do	it.		
We	experience	the	gracefulness,	elegance,	or	garishness	of	the	music-work	
as	simple	qualities,	in	the	same	as	way	as	colors,	tastes	or	smells	are	presented	
to	our	senses.	However,	they	are	not	simple	at	all.	If	we	want	to	analyze	what	is	
meant	when	we	predicate	gracefulness	of	a	music-work,	for	example,	we	should	
break	the	work	down	into	several	pieces,	point	to	certain	other	heard	musical	
properties	 related	 to	 the	perceived	 attribute,	 pick	out	many	other	underlying	
features	 that	make	 the	musical	 piece	 appear	 elegant,	 graceful	 and	 so	 on.	 But	
this	is	not	a	simple	task,	and	that’s	why	two	persons	may	disagree	concerning	
what	they	hear.	Should	we	want	to	convince	the	other	that	my	appreciation	is	
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correct,	and	the	work	is	unified,	I	should	point	to	the	formal	features	that	cause	
it	 to	 be	 so.	 The	 structure	 behind	 the	 properties	 of	 elegance,	 balance	 or	
melancholy	is	complex.	The	classification	I	propose	distinguishes	different	types	
of	 second-level	 properties	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 type	 of	 relation	 they	 involve:	
“dynamic	 properties,”	 “relational	 properties”	 and	 “expressive	 properties,”	 and	
among	the	latter	“feeling	properties,”	and	“emotional	properties.”	
Second-level	aesthetic	properties	 Combination	of	first-level	aesthetic	
properties	(examples)	
Types	 Examples	 Music	properties	
Dynamic	properties	 Vivid	 Fast	tempos	(allegro,	presto),	high	
rhythmic	activity,	sharp	and	strident	
timbres,	brilliant	high	notes,	con	fuoco	
dynamics,	colorful	orchestral	effects,	
high	rate	of	events,	...	
Relational	properties	 Unified	 Theme	present	at	different	parts,	clear	
tonal	center,	alternation	of	tension	and	
release,	repetition	of	motives,	
maintenance	of	dynamic	identity,	
consonant	tonality,	continuity,	
structural	coherence,	...	
Feeling	properties	 Turbulent	 Unstable	chords	and	harmonic	
progressions,	dissonances,	minor	
tonalities,	dark	instrumental	color,	
unresolved	cadences,	wide	dynamic	
range,	high	level	rhythmic	activity,	
dramatic	dialog	of	difference	voices,	
staccato,	increesing	speed,	...	
Emotive	properties	 Sad	or	melancholic	 Downward	melodies,	slow	tempo,	
restrained	dynamics,	soft	dynamics	
(pianos),	minor	tonalities,	legatos	and	
continuous	flow	in	phrases,	
smorzandos,	...	
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If	I	describe	Liszt	Transcendental	Etude	No	3	as	an	example	of	a	unified	and	
integrated	musical	 work,	 we	 need	 a	 broader	 perspective	 of	 it;	 e.g.	 hearing	 a	
short	section	may	not	allow	us	to	perceive	such	a	property;	or	one	may	need	to	
listen	 to	 the	 work	 several	 times	 to	 notice	 that	 it	 is	 unified	 and	 its	 elements	
integrated	at	several	levels	over	a	conventional	harmonic	schema.	The	property	
of	being	graceful	or	melancholic	for	example,	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	closed	set	
of	musical	features	that	unequivocally	determines	that	feature.	We	cannot	say	
that	 Chopin’s	 Prelude	 Op.28,	 No.4	 is	 necessarily	 desperate	 due	 to	 its	 slow	
tempo,	its	minor	tonality,	the	way	the	melody	drags	on,	its	dynamic	marks,	the	
final	 smorzando	 and	 so	 on.96	Logical	 reduction	 is	 not	 possible,	 such	 a	 list	 of	
features	 doesn’t	 make	 a	 music	 piece	 necessarily	 desperate.	 Moreover,	 just	 a	
single	musical	feature	added	to	the	set,	can	vary	the	aesthetic	character	of	the	
work	 in	 question.	 Take	 a	musical	 passage	 with	 specific	 elements,	 whichever,	
and	 change	 its	 mode	 while	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 elements	 remain	 identical.	 Most	
probably	the	expressive	character	of	the	work	will	change	with	just	that	single	
variation.	
Table	 4.	 Possible	 combinations	 of	musical	 features	 (first-level	 aesthetic	 properties)	 and	 their	
relation	to	different	types	of	second-level	aesthetic	properties.	Four	examples.		
	
Second-level	aesthetic	properties	involve	two	aspects.	One	is	that	they	may	
carry	 some	 kind	 of	 implicit	 description,	 and	 give	 us	 a	 clue	 to	 what	 is	
“happening”	 in	 the	musical	work.	Such	properties	are	 the	 result	of	a	 complex	
combination	 of	 many	 other	 musical	 features,	 upon	 which	 they	 are	
“ontologically	 dependent.”	 Rhythmic	 patterns,	 harmonic	 structure,	 melodic	
lines,	 dynamics,	 texture	 ...	 are	 structured	 according	 to	musical	 rules	 to	 shape	
sound	into	formal	structures.	When	we	hear	those	complex	structures,	when	we	
																																								 								
96	Two	anecdotes	connected	with	this	beautiful	piece	of	music:	This	composition,	together	
with	Mozart’s	Requiem,	was	played	at	his	request	at	Chopin’s	funeral.	George	Sand	is	said	
to	 have	 given	 titles	 to	 each	 of	 Chopin’s	 Preludes	 at	 their	 estate	 in	Majorca,	 where	 the	
Preludes	were	composed.	However,	that	title	score	is	lost.	
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detect	serenity,	delicacy,	anger,	or	beauty	in	the	music	event,	what	we	hear	are	
also	many	other	formal	features.		
The	second	aspect	is	that	many	of	them	ascribe	value.97	I	admit	that	many	
of	 the	 terms	we	 apply	 to	 aesthetic	 properties	 of	 artworks,	 carry	with	 them	 a	
valence,	 and	a	 value,	positive	or	negative.	 Saying	Stravinsky’s	 symphonies	 are	
unified,	balanced,	or	impressive,	for	example,	connotes	the	ascription	of	positive	
value	 to	 the	work.	Similarly,	being	garish	 entails	 a	negative	one.	But	whereas	
unified	 or	 balanced	 give	 us	 also	 some	 information	 about	 the	 composition,	 I	
cannot	see	what	we	learn	from	“impressive.”	Having	the	general	picture	in	mind	
we	need	to	focus	now	on	what	“expressive	properties”	of	music	actually	are.		
	
																																								 								
97	Kivy	defends	the	idea	that	ascribing	a	second-level	aesthetic	property	“to	an	artwork	is,	
ipso	facto,	to	pass	a	negative	or	positive	judgment.”	(Kivy	2015:	122)	
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Chapter	5	
5. Emotions	in	music	
5.1. Introduction	
Matravers	 (2010)	 says	 that	 there	 are	 two	main	 questions	 concerning	 art	 and	
expression.	One	about	the	properties	that	cause	us	to	experience	a	work	of	art	
as	expressive,	a	task	related	in	part	to	empirical	psychology.	The	other	about	the	
nature	 of	 expression,	 such	 that	 it	 illuminates	 our	 understanding	 of	 art,	 a	
philosophical	 matter.	 In	 Chapter	 2	 I	 argued	 for	 the	 view	 that	 the	 nature	 of	
“expression”	in	music,	is	that	music	exhibits	emotional	properties	by	means	of	
its	 musical	 formal	 features.	 In	 Chapter	 3	 I	 dealt	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 aesthetic	
properties	 and	 the	 place	 that	 expressive	 properties	 occupy	 among	 them.	
Chapter	4	brought	us	back	to	music,	the	main	subject	of	this	work,	to	analyze	
how	 the	 classification	 of	 aesthetic	 properties	 of	 artworks	 in	 general	 could	 fit	
with	music.	Now	it	is	time	take	a	step	further	and	see	how	it	is	that	music	is	able	
to	 include	 those	 expressive	 properties	 in	 it,	 particularly	 emotive	 properties.	
With	 this	 aim	 in	 mind,	 the	 core	 issue	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 explain	 how	 do	
emotions	“get	into	the	music”,	particularly	into	absolute	music.	
The	account	I	present	ties	 together	the	two	questions	mentioned	above.	 I	
argued	that	the	nature	of	expression	in	music	is	located	in	its	musical	properties,	
that	 it	 derives	 from	 properly	 musical	 features,	 and	 that	 it	 is	 precisely	 the	
detection	of	such	properties	which	will	illuminate	its	nature.	Now	it	is	time	to	
explain	 in	 virtue	 of	 which	 properties	 a	musical	 work	 is	 expressive	 of	 specific	
emotive	properties	and	how	listeners	experience	it	as	such.		
In	 Chapter	 2	 I	 used	 as	 paradigmatic	 of	 “X-expression”	 the	 air	 of	 sadness	
exhibited	 by	 the	 face	 of	 the	 Saint	 Bernard	 dog,	which	 could	 be	 explained	 by	
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appealing	to	the	physical	features	we	observe	in	the	face,	its	glance	and	gesture.	
They	 are	 detectable,	 observable,	 and	 identifiable.	 We	 could	 argue	 that	 we	
identify	 those	 features	as	expressive	of	sadness	because	they	resemble	or	 look	
like	human	sad	faces.		
But	in	the	case	of	music,	there	is	no	obvious	gesture,	gait,	or	feature	to	be	
identified	 as	 expressive	 of	 any	 particular	 emotion,	 no	 evident	 parallelism	
between	 those	 features	 and	 the	 ones	 exhibited	 in	 full-blooded	 emotional	
responses.	 However,	 the	 answer,	 the	 explanation,	 should	 be	 about	 what	 is	
properly	musical	and	its	“appearance.”		
Having	 argued	 that	 music	 is	 not	 representational	 and	 that	 music’s	
expressive	properties	are	to	be	found	in	music,	it	is	time	now	to	explain	how	it	is	
that	we	hear	emotions	in	music.	What	I	intend	to	show	now,	is	that	music	does	
have	 the	 necessary	 properties	 to	 explain	 its	 expressiveness,	 and	 that	 those	
properties	are	to	be	found	in	music.	So,	the	challenge	is	to	identify	which	sort	of	
properties	they	are,	and	see	how	expressiveness,	particularly	of	emotions,	could	
be	explained	by	appealing	to	them.	
Recall	that	we	rejected	a	strong	formalist	account	of	music	(Hanslick	1986	
[1891])	and	argued	for	a	place	for	emotive	properties	in	the	formalist	picture.	I	
take	from	formalism	the	primary	role	of	form	and	structure.	At	the	same	time	I	
contend	 that	we	 can	 accommodate	 emotional	 properties	 in	music.	 Assuming	
that	emotive	properties	are	heard	properties	derived	from	its	sonic	structure,	i.e.	
from	its	first-level	aesthetic	properties,	we	can	explain	how	they	“emerge”	to	the	
surface.	The	account	I	present	 is	 inspired	 in	Kivy’s	“enhanced	formalism”,	but	
with	a	few	revisions.		
At	this	point,	I	think	that	we	should	explain	what	“form”	is	and	see	if	there	
is	any	possibility	to	explain	how	expressive	properties	are	heard	within	it.	If	this	
objective	 is	 achieved,	 it	 will	 still	make	 sense	 to	 describe	music	 in	 expressive	
terms	like	“melancholic,”	“anguish,”	or	“joyful”.	It	is	time	to	show	how	it	is	that	
we	“hear	emotions”	in	music.		
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5.2. Music	and	its	emotional	machinery	
5.2.1. The	concept	of	“form”	in	music	theory	
In	music	 theory,	 “form”	 is	 a	 temporal	 pattern	 of	 sounds,	 the	 architecture	 or	
overall	 structure	 of	 a	 music	 work.	 The	 Oxford	 Companion	 to	 Music	 (1977)	
defines	musical	form	as	“a	series	of	strategies	designed	to	find	a	successful	mean	
between	 the	 opposite	 extremes	 of	 unrelieved	 repetition	 and	 unrelieved	
alteration”.	 Examples	 of	musical	 forms,	which	 vary	 in	 time	 and	 style,	 are	 the	
Sonata,	Symphony,	Partita,	Rondo,	Fugue,	Scherzo,	Nocturne,	Waltz	and	many	
others.	 In	 general	 terms,	 they	 differ	 in	 structure,	 but	 also	 in	 length,	 in	 the	
number	or	type	of	movements,	in	the	lineal-temporal	combination	of	parts,	in	
their	role	within	more	complex	structures,	or	in	the	pattern	of	formal	sections	
within	 a	 single	 piece.	 For	 example,	 a	 Rondo,	 follows	 a	 pattern	 of	 this	 sort:	
A-B-A-C-A-D-A,	where	each	of	the	letters	represents	a	thematic	section.		
In	the	following	diagram,	I	show,	just	as	an	example	the	overall	structure	
of	the	Sonata	Form:	
	
	
Sonata	Form	or	also	called	Sonata-Allegro	Form,	in	www.stewartsvillelutheran.org	
This	 example	 is	 a	 diagram	 of	 a	 single	 movement	 based	 on	 conflict	 and	
resolution,	a	dialectic	debate	among	two	opposing	key	centers	and	associated	
themes,	that	evolves	in	three	main	parts:	the	exposition	(or	tonal	opposition),	
the	 development	 (or	 escalation	 of	 tension),	 and	 the	 recapitulation	 (the	 tonal	
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resolution).	 It	 is	often	used	 in	classical	music	as	 the	 first	movement	of	works	
(not	just	in	Sonatas).	In	a	more	thorough	analysis,	we	could	describe	and	dissect	
the	 form	 for	more	details,	 including;	detecting	 climax,	modulation,	 coda	etc.,	
but	I	think	this	the	above	diagram	is	enough	to	get	an	idea	of	what	form	means	
in	music	theory	and	its	role	in	music	expressiveness.	
5.2.2. 	Form	and	music	expressiveness	
Let	us	see	what	formal	elements	of	the	sort	we	just	described	have	to	do	with	
music	 expressiveness.	 As	 I	 said,	 musical	 form	 offers	 a	 view	 of	 the	 overall	
structure	of	a	work.	 It	could	somehow	be	compared	to	a	house	plan	or	a	city	
map.	But	 there	 is	a	 fundamental	difference	with	 these	cases:	house	plans	and	
city	maps	are	spatial	 representations,	whereas	musical	 forms	are	structures	 in	
time.	The	place	of	 its	units	 in	 the	 formal-temporal	 structure,	and	 the	relation	
betweem	 them,	 brings	 to	 the	 listening	 experience	 particular	 sensations	 like	
contrast,	opposition,	development,	tension,	repetition,	release	or	recapitulation.	
That	being	the	case,	the	role	of	a	musical	form	is	to	guide	the	listener	through	
the	work,	and	make	her	perceive	its	general	structure.	The	musical	events	that	
constitute	 a	particular	musical	 form	create	 expectation	 in	 the	 listener	 (Meyer	
1956),	and	in	part	the	understanding	of	them	depends	the	degree	to	which	they	
are	more	or	less	expected.	Moreover,	the	listener	may	hear	emotional	properties	
throughout	the	work	due	to	the	characteristics	of	that	particular	musical	form.	
An	example	will	be	helpful.	
Consider	 Beethoven’s	 Sonata	 no.	 8	 in	 C	 minor,	 Op.	 13.98 	The	 work	 is	
composed	of	three	movements,	like	many	of	the	classical	sonatas.	I	will	describe	
the	first	one	in	some	detail,	and	briefly	summarise	the	other	two.	
The	 first	 movement	 is	 a	 sonata	 form	 (like	 the	 one	 I	 describe	 above),	
composed	in	turn	by	three	main	sections.	The	movement	starts	with	a	slow	and	
intense	Grave	introduction	in	C	minor.	It	is	basically	a	series	of	symmetric	bars	
																																								 								
98	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cg9KQ610biU.	Beethoven’	Sonata	no.	8	 in	C	minor,	
Op.	13.	
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in	ascension	towards	a	short	climax,	which	dissolves	in	a	chromatic	descent	of	
thirty-second-notes.	 The	 introduction	 makes	 way	 for	 the	 Allegro	 con	 Brio	
exposition,	with	a	quick	theme	also	in	C	minor.	The	following	two	themes	in	E	
flat	 minor	 and	 E	 flat	 major	 successively	 contrast	 both	 in	 their	 rhythmical	
patterns	 and	 the	 roles	 both	 hands	 play	 in	 them.	 The	 development	 begins	 by	
returning	 briefly	 to	 the	 Grave	 session	 (First	 Tempo),	 this	 time	 in	 G	 minor,	
which	opens	up	to	a	very	quick	first	theme,	now	in	E	minor,	that	evolves	into	
contrasting	 sections,	 turbulent	 sections,	 and	ends	up	with	a	 single	descent	of	
half-notes	 in	 a	major	 chord	 towards	 the	 recapitulation.	 In	 the	 recapitulation,	
the	first,	second	and	third	themes	are	recovered	this	time	all	 in	C	minor.	The	
closing	 resembles	 the	 first	 theme	but	played	 forte	and	 fortissimo.	Finally,	 the	
Grave	returns	partially	with	piano	and	ends	with	the	first	theme	in	C	minor.	
The	second	movement	is	much	shorter,	the	famous	Adagio	Cantabile	in	A	
flat	major	 adagio	movement,	 of	 rondo	 form	 (A-B-A-C-A).	 It	 interchanges	 the	
piano	melodic	part	(A)	with	sections	in	different	keys	and	rhythmical	patterns,	
a	melody	that	becomes	more	complex	with	time,	fuller	with	notes,	and	develops	
into	a	climax	with	the	crescendo.	The	third	movement	is	in	Allegro	Rondo	form,	
quicker	 and	more	 lineal,	 with	 five	 sections	 in	 contrasting	 keys	 and	 changing	
dynamics.	The	closure	is	a	fast	and	powerful	descent	that	ends	in	C	minor.		
Notice	that	I	have	used	no	expressive	terms	in	the	formal	description	of	this	
Sonata,	and	limited	myself	to	purely	musical,	first-level	property,	vocabulary.	I	
mention	 this,	 because	 it	 shows	 how	 the	 heard	 expressive	 properties	 are	 the	
result	 of	 formal-structural	 properties	 and	 their	 arrangement.	 They	 simply	
“emerge”	 from	this	structure	 full	of	sonic	plays,	 in	the	sense	that	the	“formal”	
descriptions	of	 the	 latter	 can	be	 translated	 into	descriptions	belonging	 to	 the	
former.	
Let	 us	 proceed	 with	 such	 a	 translation.	 The	 introduction	 is	 heard	 as	
dramatic,	 grave,	 with	 suspense;	 the	 first	 theme	 as	 energetic	 and	 agitated,	
dialogic	but	serious,	and	with	force.	The	second	movement,	Adagio	Cantabile,	
is	led	by	the	delicacy	of	the	melody,	exquisite,	clear,	drawing	the	listener	into	a	
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calm	 and	 warm	musical	 experience,	 while	 passion	 and	 force	 comes	 with	 the	
crescendo	 in	 the	 climax	 of	 the	movement.	 The	 third	movement,	 in	 contrast,	
sounds	lively,	light,	jolly,	but	forceful	and	with	a	decision	at	the	end.		
Themes	transported	from	minor	to	major	keys,	active	chords	(unstable	ones)	
that	 resolve	 into	 stable	 major	 chords,	 sudden	 chromatic	 descents,	 constant	
changes	in	dynamic	levels,	the	contrast	in	tempo	of	the	three	movements,	…	all	
these	 musical	 elements	 and	 their	 specific	 combination	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	
composition,	and	emotional	properties	are	heard	thereof.		Explaining	the	role	of	
emotive	properties	within	a	work,	 is	nothing	more	than	explaining	the	role	of	
structural	 and	 sonic	 elements	 of	 music	 within	 that	 work.	 Likewise	 the	
resolution	 from	 a	 minor	 and	 dissonant	 chord	 into	 a	 C	 major	 chord	 can	 be	
explained	as	a	change	from	turbulence	to	calmness	or	stability.	
5.2.3. Syntactical-structural	 events	 and	 their	
sensuous	properties	
There	is	more	than	the	overall	structure	in	music,	more	to	understand	and	to	
appreciate	 in	 form.	 In	 fact,	 all	 formal	 structures	 are	 composed	 of	 sensuous	
properties,	 the	 “raw	material”	of	music:	notes,	chords,	accidentals,	 rhythmical	
figures,	keys,	dynamic	 features	and	many	others.	What	 I	want	 to	show	 in	 the	
following	 lines	 is	 that	 expressive,	 and	 among	 them	 emotional,	 properties	 are	
nothing	more	than	perceptual	qualities	emergent	from	particular	combinations	
of	formal	and	sensuous	elements.99		
We	 should	 give	 now	 a	 second	 step	 and	 identify	 those	 smaller	 musical	
events	that	are	not	part	of	the	form.	A	leaping	melody,	a	chromatic	descent,	a	
diatonic	 sequence	 of	 chords,	 a	 diminuendo,	 a	 coda,	 a	 counterpoint	…	 are	 all	
examples	of	small	structural	events	in	a	composition,	with	particular	properties	
doing	 their	 part	 (first-level	 properties).	 Adopting	 Kivy’s	 idea	 of	 “syntactical	
																																								 								
99	For	the	distinction	between	first-	and	second-level	aesthetic	properties,	see	Chapter	3	for	
art	in	general,	and	Chapter	4	for	music	in	particular.	
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event,”	 they	 are	 defined	 as	 “those	 small	 events	 that	 take	 place	 within	 the	
musical	structure”	(Kivy	2002:	72),	or	anything	that	“happens”	within	a	musical	
structure.	 In	 fact	 when	 I	 described	 Beethoven’s	 Sonata,	 I	 could	 not	 avoid	
referring	to	a	few	of	them.		
We	call	them	syntactical	because	there	are	rules	and	principles	that	govern	
their	 sound	 structure,	 rules	 acknowledged	 by	 the	 composer	 and	 followed	 or	
violated	at	her	pleasure	 (or	by	mistake,	 in	 involuntary	cases).	Notice	 that	 the	
more	familiarized	the	listener	is	with	those	rules,	the	better	her	understanding	
of	the	work.	We	should	also	keep	in	mind	that	rules	change	depending	on	the	
context,	period	and	genre.	But	let	us	leave	this	issue	for	the	moment	and	pick	
up	the	previous	thread.		
In	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 where	 the	 expressiveness	 of	 music	
resides,	 we	 must	 specify	 what	 syntactical	 or	 structured	 sound	 events	 are	
covered	 by	 their	 rules.	 Melody,	 harmony,	 dynamics,	 timbre/tone,	 rhythm,	
texture	and	tempo	are	 the	elements	we	 look	 for.	The	specific	shape	they	take	
will	 contribute	 in	 defining	 the	 properties	 of	 a	 music	 event.	 We	 can	 easily	
imagine	 a	 solo	 of	 the	 rhythmic	 section	 in	 an	 orchestra,	 where	 there	 is	 no	
melody.	But	we	could	hardly	think	about	music	without	any	rhythmical	pattern	
or	harmonic	structure	at	all.	What	I	claim	is	that	any	heard	property	in	music	
could	be	described	by	appealing	to	the	combination	of	some	of	those	elements.	
In	other	words,	any	proper	description	could	be	reduced	to	the	combination	of	
properties	of	those	sound	elements,	independently	of	the	technical	knowledge	
of	the	listener.		
I	might	describe	Chopin’s	Nocturne	Op.	72,	No.1,100	by	pointing	to	its	slow	
tempo,	 minor	 tonality,	 downward	 melody,	 restrained	 dynamics	 and	 halting	
rhythm	in	a	more	or	less	technical	vocabulary.	Similarly,	when	I	hear	sadness	or	
melancholy	 in	 the	 work,	 I	 may	 justify	 my	 perception	 appealing	 to	 a	 more	
detailed	description	of	 the	 features	perceived	 in	 it,	 a	description	of	 the	 sort	 I	
just	made	above.	I	hear	sadness,	because	I	perceive	 its	slow	tempo	and	minor	
																																								 								
100	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5_V-d8HjhU	.		Chopin’s	Nocturne	Op.	72,	No.1		
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tonality,	and	hear	the	melody	unfolding	downwards	in	pianissimo.	The	example	
illustrates	 what	 I	 said	 in	 my	 hypothesis,	 i.e.,	 that	 the	 complex	 emotional	
properties	 heard	 in	music	 supervene	 on	 the	 combination	 of	 those	 perceptual	
properties,	or	as	I	argued	before,	on	the	formal	structure	of	the	work.		
Composers	 avail	 themselves	 of	 their	 expertise	 and	 knowledge	 about	 how	
different	musical	elements	should	be	combined	and	structured	 in	order	 to	be	
expressive	 of	 some	 emotional	 property	 or	 other.	 It	 is	 generally	 agreed	 that	
minor	 keys	 are	 associated	 for	 example	 with	 melancholic	 qualities,	 and	 that	
unresolved	diminished	 chords	 are	 associated	with	 turbulence.	 It	 is	 also	 likely	
that	composers	encounter	expressive	properties	 in	their	work	unintentionally,	
emerging	“casually”	from	the	elements	of	their	composition.	In	any	case,	none	
of	those	possibilities	contradicts	the	thesis	I	just	defended.			
So	 far	 I	 have	 explained	 that	 music	 “possesses”	 emotions	 as	 perceptual	
properties	 and	 that	 those	 complex	 properties	 emerge	 from	 the	 structure	 and	
combination	of	pure	musical	elements	and	form.	However,	I	have	not	clarified	
yet	 how	 or	 why	 some	 musical	 properties	 are	 heard	 as	 some	 emotional	
properties	 and	not	others,	why	minor	 chords	and	 slow	 tempos	are	associated	
with	 sadness,	 or	 major	 keys	 and	 fast	 tempos	 with	 cheerfulness,	 and	 not	 the	
other	 way	 around,	 for	 example.	 Why	 don’t	 we	 just	 perceive	 the	
formal/structural	properties	of	music,	without	hearing	emotions	in	it,	or	as	Kivy	
(2002)	asks	“how	do	emotions	get	into	the	music?”	
5.3. How	 do	 we	 hear	 the	 emotive	
properties	of	music?	
5.3.1. 	A	 resemblance	 account	 of	 music	
expressiveness	
I	 have	 already	 argued	 that	 neither	 expression	 theories,	 nor	 arousalists,	 nor	
persona	theories	offer	a	convincing	account	of	music	expressiveness.	I	have	also	
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argued	 that	 emotions	 are	 not	 literally	 possessed	 by	music,	 but	 that	 they	 are	
exhibited	as	emergent	properties	of	the	pure	sound	structure.	But	the	question	
is,	how?	Why	emotional	properties	usually	attributed	to	humans	are	heard	 in	
music?	Why	and	how	do	we	perceive	and	recognize	them?	
Having	rejected	other	theories	of	music	expressiveness	as	problematic	and	
unsatisfactory,	 the	 correct	 explanation	 in	 my	 view	 should	 follow	 the	 path	
initiated	 by	 Peter	Kivy	 (1980,	 1989)	 and	 developed	 by	 Stephen	Davies	 (1994).	
Kivy	 argues	 in	 The	 Corded	 Shell	 (1980),	 later	 reprinted	 as	 Sound	 Sentiment	
(1989),	 that	 “music	 is	 expressive	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 resemblance	 to	 expressive	
human	utterance	and	behavior”	(1980:	56).	The	idea	of	“contour”	of	music	refers	
to	 its	 “sonic	 shape,	 which	 bears	 a	 structural	 analogy	 to	 the	 heard	 and	 seen	
manifestations	of	human	emotive	expression”	 (Kivy	2002:	40).	He	argues	 that	
because	we	 are	 evolutionarily	 predisposed	 to	 see	 things	 as	 animate,	 like	 “the	
seeing-faces-in-clouds	phenomenon”,	we	tend	to	hear	music	as	animate	too.	
I	claim	that	when	we	attribute	emotional	properties	to	music	it	is	because	
we	recognize	in	it	properties	that	resemble	in	one	way	or	another	how	emotions	
are	expressed	or	felt	by	humans.	In	other	words,	we	perceive	some	similarities	
in	the	outer	“appearance”	(Davies	1994)	or	“contour”	of	a	central	case	emotional	
experience	(genuine	human	emotions),	and	the	appearance	of	music,	 the	way	
musical	properties	are	shaped	before	our	eyes,	or	better,	ears.		
The	 idea	of	 resemblance	 is	 that	music	presents	 features	of	 emotions.	The	
account	is	based	on	the	analogy	of	human	expression	and	music	expressiveness.	
This	can	be	explained	appealing	mainly	to	similarities	in	the	dynamic	structure	
of	 music	 and	 some	 behavior,	 movement	 and	 physical	 reaction	 observed	 in	
people	when	they	experience	emotions.		
Following	 a	 similar	 line,	 the	 account	 defended	 by	 Malcolm	 Budd	 is	
interesting,	especially	the	resources	he	identifies	in	virtue	of	which	music	is	able	
to	 resemble	 some	 aspects	 of	 feeling:	 tension-relaxation,	 upwards-downwards	
direction,	magnitude,	speed,	rhythm	of	felt	movement.	We	could	say	that	music	
sounds	the	way	we	feel:	
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The	basic	and	minimal	concept	of	the	musical	expression	of	emotion	comes	to	
this:	when	you	hear	music	as	being	expressive	of	emotion	E—when	you	hear	E	
in	the	music—you	hear	the	music	as	sounding	like	the	way	E	feels;	the	music	
is	expressive	of	E	if	it	is	correct	to	hear	it	in	this	fashion	or	a	full	appreciation	
of	the	music	requires	the	listener	to	hear	it	in	this	way.	So	the	sense	in	which	
you	 hear	 the	 emotion	 in	 the	 music—the	 sense	 in	 which	 it	 is	 an	 audible	
property	of	the	music—is	that	you	perceive	a	likeness	between	the	music	and	
the	experience	of	the	emotion.	(Budd	1995:	137)	
My	intention	is	not	to	investigate	in	depth	those	similarities	now,	but	just	
to	 argue	 that	 the	 resemblance	 account	 may	 help	 to	 understand	 the	 issue	 of	
expressivity	in	music	and	that	it	deserves	further	and	deeper	exploration.	Let	us	
examine	it	further.		
5.3.2. Facial,	 vocal,	 body	 expression	 and	 music	
expressiveness	
We	can	regard	music	as	expressive	without	entailing	that	what	 is	perceived	is	
the	 expression	 of	 an	 emotion.	 Similarly,	 we	 may	 perceive	 a	 face	 as	 happy	
looking,	but	 this	appearance	may	be	not	 the	expression	of	an	emotional	state	
but	feigned,	or	perhaps	happy-looking	by	nature,	for	instance.	The	example	of	
the	 Saint	 Bernard	 dog’s	 face	 belongs	 to	 the	 latter.	 Their	 sad	 looking	
physiognomy	has	nothing	to	do	with	its	feeling	sad,	but	with	the	appearance	of	
sadness.	It	could	even	be	happy	and	cheerful	but	still	appear	to	be	sad.	It	is	easy	
to	 notice	 the	 resemblance	 of	 its	 demeanour	 or	 facial	 expression	with	 that	 of	
people	 expressing	 (or	 pretending	 to	 express)	 sadness,	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 caricature	
(Kivy	 2001:	 37).	 It	 can	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 the	 combination	 of	 several	 facial	
features,	like	the	downwards	looking	glance,	the	form	of	the	wrinkles,	the	puffy	
face,	 the	 dropping	 jaw,	 the	 wrinkled	 brow,	 the	 drooping	 mouth	 and	 ears…	
Likewise,	 when	 we	 perceive	 an	 expressive	 property	 in	 a	 musical	 piece,	 the	
description	behind	it	involves	complex	features,	not	significant	by	themselves,	
but	significant	in	conjunction	with	other	features.		
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Despite	the	likeness	in	both	cases,	however,	it	is	much	more	difficult	to	find	
a	proper	account	of	 the	perceived	emotional	properties	 in	music	 than	 it	 is	 in	
emotional-looking	faces	or	body	posture	of	non-humans.	There	are	at	least	two	
reasons	 for	 that.	One	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 obvious	 parallelism	between	 human	
face	 or	 body	 expressive	 properties	 and	 those	 in	music.	 The	 other	 one	 is	 the	
temporal	 nature	 of	 music.	 We	 don’t	 call	 a	 musical	 passage	 melancholic	
appealing	 just	 to	 an	 instance	 or	 to	 a	 particular	 expressive	 property,	 but	 it	 is	
rather	the	result	of	musical	features	unfolding	through	time	and	affecting	each	
other.	 However,	 those	 difficulties	 do	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 similarities	
between	human	expressions	of	emotions,	and	the	way	music	exhibits	emotions	
cannot	be	found,	and	therefore,	can	be	perceived	by	the	listener.		
5.3.3. Resemblance	 of	 expression	 of	 emotions	
and	music	expressive	features	
Let	us	try	to	sort	out	some	of	those	similarities.	Humans	express	their	emotions,	
consciously	or	unconsciously,	by	facial	gestures	and	bodily	movements.	Certain	
behaviors,	 movements,	 gaits,	 facial	 and	 body	 gestures	 are	 characteristic	 of	
specific	emotions.	For	instance,	when	someone	is	joyful	or	optimistic,	her	gait	
appears	more	secure,	precise	and	energetic.	One	may	look	upwards,	and	hold	a	
“fixed	gaze”,	the	mouth	will	also	turn	upwards	and	facial	wrinkles	may	recover	
their	muscular	elasticity	and	tone.	Body	gestures	are	also	expressive	of	emotions,	
dropping	 shoulders,	 a	 downward	 tilted	head,	 and	 slow	 gesturing	may	 exhibit	
melancholy-like	 emotions,	 rather	 than	 those	 related	 to	 pleasurable	 of	 joyful	
states.	Moreover,	 the	tone	of	 the	speaking	voice	and	other	voice	 features	may	
also	change	depending	on	the	emotional	state.	For	instance,	sadness	makes	us	
speak	 in	 a	 lower	 pitch	 or	 tone	 of	 voice,	 the	 timber	may	 also	 be	 altered,	 the	
rhythm	becomes	slower	and	less	deliberate.			
Turning	 to	music,	we	should	 identify	 the	properties	 that,	being	part	of	
music	 and	 arranged	 in	 a	 particular	 way,	 can	 lead	 us	 to	 hear	 emotional	 or	
affective	 qualities	 in	 music.	 I	 have	 mentioned	 before,	 that	 the	 musical	
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machinery	is	composed	of	several	elements.	Let's	try	to	match	those	elements,	
with	 perceptible	 features	 of	 human	 emotional	 reactions	 and	 examine	 some	
examples.	I	have	drawn	a	table	that	shows	what	I	take	as	the	basic	perceptible	
musical	 aspects	 or	 elements,	 key	 words	 associated	 with	 those	 aspects,	 and	
examples	 that	 are	 useful	 to	 compare	 with	 cases	 of	 genuine	 descriptions	 of	
emotions.		
Musical	aspects	or	
dimensions	
Perceptual	properties	
(Keywords)	
Predicates	(examples)	
Melody	 Arrangement	of	sounds,	succession,	phrase	
arpeggiated,	chromatic,	
descending,	
leaping,ornamented,	…	
Harmony	
Verticality,	chords,	mode,	key	 colorful,	dissonant,	diatonic,	
major	mode,	minor	mode,	…	
	
Dynamics	
Intensity,	volume	 con	fuoco,	crescendo,	
diminuendo,	forte,	piano,	
unchanging	dynamics,	…	
Timbre	(tone)	 Tone	color,	description	of	
sound,	instruments	
dark,	mellow,	sonorous,	
strident,	...	
Rhythm	
Pattern,	time,	duration,	
metric	extraction	
	
cadence,	constant,	halting,	
repetitive,	rubato,	
Texture	 Layers,	quality,	combination,	instrumentation	
counterpoint,	instrumental,	
orchestral,	thick	texture,	…	
Tempo	
Rate,	pace,	speed	 accelerando,	allegro,	
cantabile,	largo,	ritenuto,	
walking	speed,...	
Table	 5.	Relation	between	musical	 aspects	or	dimensions,	perceptible	 features	 and	 some	
related	predicates.	
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If	we	have	a	look	at	the	descriptive	keywords	associated	with	those	musical	
elements	and	their	examples,	we	see	that	most	of	them	can	be	associated	with	a	
speaking	voice	and	its	features,	with	how	people	express	themselves.		
We	 may	 describe	 a	 cheerful	 voice	 pointing	 to	 characteristics	 that	 could	
somehow	 be	 described	 as	 its	 “timbre,”	 “rhythm,”	 “melody,”	 “tempo”	 or	
“dynamics.”	 It	 is	 probably	melody	 the	musical	 aspect	 that	 is	most	 commonly	
associated	 with	 the	 modulations	 of	 the	 speaking	 voice,	 and	 regarded	 as	 a	
primary	 source	 of	 expressiveness.	 It	 may	 sound	 anguished,	 crying,	 harsh,	 or	
mellow,	melancholic	and	peaceful	depending	on	how	it	is	arranged.	Dissonant	
passages,	 sudden	 melodic	 changes	 and	 leaps,	 irregular	 pauses,	 downward	
successions	 or	 notes	 et	 cetera,	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 heard	 as	 unpleasant	
emotions	like	anguish	or	torment,	just	as	when	someone	liguistically	expresses	
her	 emotion	with	 vocal	modulations	 of	 this	 sort.	 In	 contrast,	music	 heard	 as	
peaceful	and	calm	is	more	likely	to	be	arranged	in	a	more	linear	pattern,	with	
softer	swings,	balanced	phrases	and	medium	register.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 most	 musical	 formal	 aspects	 are	 heard	 in	
combination	with	others.	Melodies	are	drawn	into	rhythmical	patterns,	belong	
to	 specific	 time	 signatures	 (metric),	 and	 are	 part	 of	 a	 tonal	 system.	 The	
beautiful	 downward	 melody	 of	 Chopin’s	 Nocturne	 Op.	 72,	 No.1	 is	 heard	 as	
melancholic	at	 least	 in	part	due	 to	 the	 slow-andante	 tempo,	E	minor	 tonality	
and	 halting	 rhythmical	 pattern.	 Therefore,	 determining	 exactly	 how	 different	
musical	aspects	affect	each	other	would	take	us	very	long,	and	need	much	more	
space	and	time.			
Dynamics,	the	aspect	that	plays	with	intensity,	volume	and	modulation	of	
sounds	is	taken	in	music	performance	as	an	essential	aspect	of	expressiveness.	
The	same	score	played	without	attending	to	those	expression	signs,	without	the	
crescendos,	 fortes	 or	 pianissimos	 sounds	 much	 colder	 and	 mechanical.	 The	
rubatos,	 for	 instance,	 are	 often	 to	 be	 understood	 without	 any	 specific	
instruction	 in	 the	 score	 that	 indicates	 them.	 They	 allow	 expressive	 and	
rhythmic	 freedom	by	speeding	up	or	slowing	down	the	tempo	of	a	piece,	and	
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entail	a	global	understanding	of	the	work,	of	how	the	structure	of	sounds	needs	
to	be	interpreted	or	played.	I	would	say	that	similar	properties	are	heard	when	
someone	is	expressing	emotions	not	only	with	the	speaking	voice,	but	also	by	
means	 of	 the	 strength,	 decision,	 vigor	 or	 lassitude	 of	 body	 gestures	 and	
movements.	Listening	to	the	dynamic	aspects	in	a	music	work	helps	to	engage	
emotionally	with	 it,	 and	hear	affective	properties	 that	otherwise	could	not	be	
extracted.		
At	first	sight,	it	may	seem	that	there	is	not	a	straightforward	explanation	of	
why	we	attribute	specific	emotions	to	music,	appealing	to	resemblance	with	the	
contour	of	body	movements,	gestures	or	 facial	 expressions	 in	cases	of	human	
emotional	 responses.	Musical	 elements	 are	 shaped	 in	 sound,	whereas	 human	
expression	 is	multimodal,	a	combination	of	 sound	(voice)	and	visual	 features.	
There	 is	 nothing	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 music,	 unless	 we	 are	 not	 reading	 a	 score	 or	
watching	 a	 concert.	 So,	 in	 order	 to	 find	 a	 convincing	 explanation	 of	 music	
expressiveness,	we	should	face	this	cross	modal	problem:	we	hear	sounds,	but	
we	do	not	“see”	anything	moving	or	making	gestures	of	one	or	another	sort.	It	
may	be	objected	that	movement,	motion	in	music	is	not	literally	heard,	that	it	
can	only	be	metaphorical	to	apply	visual	properties	to	heard	properties.		
However,	I	claim	that	this	does	not	need	to	be	understood	in	that	way.	In	
fact,	 I	 think	 that	 there	are	some	properties,	particularly	 those	associated	with	
movement,	which	can	be	identified	with	both	sight	and	sound	(Davies	1994).	As	
I	mentioned	 before,	 the	 special	 expressive	 power	 of	music,	 in	 comparison	 to	
other	 artistic	 media,	 is	 due	 in	 large	 part	 to	 its	 temporal	 nature.	 Music	 is	
dynamic,	and	unfolds	through	time.	I	suggest	that	musical	elements	or	aspects	
(see	the	table	above)	are	combined	in	such	a	way	that	sound	structure	acquires	
several	“dimensions.”		
1.	 The	 harmonic	 structure	 and	 its	 associated	 properties	 (modes,	 chords,	
key-signature)	provide	a	“vertical”	sense	to	music.	
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2.	 Rhythm,	 melody	 and	 tempo	 have	 a	 linear	 structure,	 acquire	 their	
significance	 over	 time.	 I	 label	 this	 dimension	 as	 “horizontality,”	 the	 temporal	
ground	in	which	the	rest	of	the	elements	integrate.	
3.	Finally,	dynamics	(intensity	of	sounds),	texture	(complexity	and	richness	
of	sounds)	and	timbre	(color	of	sounds)	provide	music	with	a	third	dimension,	
what	I	will	call	“profundity.”	
The	 structural	 organization,	 its	 temporal	 nature	 and	 combination	 of	 all	
those	elements,	makes	music	complex,	rich,	and	special.	Here	resides,	I	suspect,	
the	 necessary	 machinery	 for	 emotional	 properties	 to	 be	 heard,	 perceived	 or	
identified	by	humans	when	listening	to	a	musical	work.	Many	things	advanced	
here	 require	 further	 research,	 exploration,	 and	maybe	 also	 empirical	 testing,	
and	I	shall	identify	some	challenges	for	this	project.	
5.4. Some	objections	and	problems	
First,	 I	don’t	 intend	 to	 try	 to	defend	 the	claim	that	music	has	 the	capacity	 to	
exhibit	just	any	kind	of	emotion	or	mood.101	It	is	hardly	possible	for	listeners	to	
hear	music	 being	 expressive	 of	 envy,	 pride,	 or	 arrogance	 for	 example.	 At	 the	
same	 time	 “the	 garden	 variety	 of	 emotions”	 (Kivy	 1980),	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 the	
ordinary	 emotions	 like	 fear,	 anger,	 hope,	 anguish,	 sadness	 and	 a	 few	 others,	
cannot	 be	heard	 in	any	 form.	What	 I	mean	by	 that	 is	 that	we	perceive	 some	
basic	 emotions,	 and	 only	 “in	 a	 general	 form”	 (Kivy,	 1990:	 174-175).	 The	
resemblance	 account	 expounded	 above	 suggests	 a	 explanation	 for	 this	
difference.	 Some	 emotions	 (fear,	 anger,	 sadness…)	 have	 identifiable	 outward	
characteristics	in	central	case	experiences,	whereas	others	have	not	(envy,	pride,	
jealousy…).	 Kivy,	 following	Moravcsik,	 refers	 to	 these	 as	 “Platonic	 Attitudes”,	
emotions	“noncontingently	attached	to	their	objects”	(Kivy	1980,	1990).	For	the	
latter	ones	to	be	recognized,	we	need	more	context,	and	absolute	music	cannot	
provide	it	in	absence	of	lyrics	or	program.	It	could	be	possible	to	hear	grandeur	
																																								 								
101	See	Chapter	2.	
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in	a	Beethoven’s	composition,	but	in	order	to	perceive,	say,	pride,	we	need	some	
beliefs	 and	 knowledge	 about	 the	 background	 of	 the	 work	 that	 music	 alone	
doesn’t	provide.	
Second,	 to	my	mind,	 resemblance	 as	 an	 account	 of	music	 expressiveness	
fails	to	explain	how	properties	that	belong	to	aspects	of	harmony	play	a	role	in	
the	perception	of	emotive	properties	in	music.	It	is	a	fact	that	minor	chords	and	
modes	 contribute	 to	 the	 hearing	 of	 sadness,	 melancholy	 or	 gloom,	 and	 are	
associated	with	pessimistic	and	negative	moods;	diminished	chords	produce	a	
sensation	of	instability,	anguish,	incompleteness,	turbulence,	uneasiness	about	
something	 that	needs	 to	be	 resolved.	Discordant	 chords	produce	 tension,	 are	
disturbing	 and	 sound	 unpleasant.	 In	 contrast,	 major	 chords	 and	 harmonic	
structures	 are	 commonly	 related	 to	 higher	 spirits,	 like	 joy,	 cheerfulness,	
excitement,	vigor	and	the	like.		
However,	I	don’t	find	a	satisfactory	explanation	of	how	or	why	we	attribute	
such	 qualities	 to	 those	 musical	 properties,	 why	 a	 minor	 chord	 is	 heard	 as	
melancholic,	 major	 as	 cheerful,	 and	 not	 the	 other	 way	 around.	 Kivy	 himself	
acknowledges	that	“the	contour	theory	cannot	be	the	whole	story”	(2002:	43).	
The	base	of	harmony	is	mathematical,	and	the	principles	governing	the	relation	
of	 tones	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 numeric	 functions,	 by	 frequency	 of	 air	 waves	
measured	in	hertz.	Combinations	of	different	tones	make	us	hear	them	as	more	
consonant	or	dissonant,	and	consequently	each	tone	will	play	a	different	role	in	
the	 harmonic	 structure	 of	 a	 piece	 of	 music.	 Since	 the	 ancient	 Greeks	 it	 is	
thought	 that	 musical	 modes	 are	 connected	 to	 mood	 tones,	 and	 since	 then	
modes	have	been	classified	according	to	the	intervals	between	the	notes	within	
a	 musical	 scale.	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 the	 case	 that	 we	 are	 somehow	 hardwired	 to	
perceive	some	pitch	relations	as	more	appropriate	 than	others,	and	 that	 their	
combination	 causes	 in	 us	 feelings	 of	 the	 sort	 I	 have	 just	 described	 in	 the	
previous	examples.		
Third,	 it	 may	 also	 be	 objected	 that	 appealing	 to	 resemblance	 does	 not	
explain	 the	 significance	 or	 the	 importance	we	 attribute	 to	music’s	 expressive	
		 117	
power;	 that	 similar	 emotional	 resemblances	 are	 found	 in	 other	 artifacts	 or	
natural	 elements,	 for	 example,	 and	we	do	not	 take	 them	as	deserving	 special	
attention,	or	call	them	expressive	just	because	we	are	aware	of	some	apparent	
similarities.	We	could	respond	to	 this	objection	by	pointing	out	 that	music	 is	
ingeniously	 designed	 by	 the	 composer,	 and	 deliberately	 used	 as	 a	 source	 of	
aesthetic	 pleasure.	 I	 think	 this	 is	 sufficient	 to	 clarify	 why	 the	 perception	 of	
resemblance	 between	 music	 and	 emotional	 properties	 acquires	 special	
relevance,	 and	 is	 regarded	 as	 musical	 expressiveness.	 In	 fact,	 part	 of	 the	
amazing	power	of	music	resides	in	its	capacity	to	exhibit	emotions.	
5.5. Music	and	conventions	
I	would	 like	 to	 finish	 this	 chapter	by	 clarifying	 that	 I	 am	not	denying	 that	 in	
music	 perception	 and	 consequent	 appreciation	 there	 is	 also	 a	 contextual,	
cultural	 or	 conventional	 factor.	 Conventions	 related	 to	 styles	 and	 different	
periods,	cultural	context	or	personal	background	can	affect	the	appreciation	of	
some	musical	features	rather	than	others,	or	to	the	emotional	attributions	made	
to	them.		
Western	 music,	 for	 example,	 has	 developed	 and	 established	 the	
major-minor	 tonal	 system	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 last	 centuries,	 a	 system	
accompanied	by	“a	whole	arsenal	of	musical	themes	and	harmonic	techniques,	
whose	 emotive	 character	 [becomes]	 instantly	 recognizable	 to	 the	 competent	
listener”	(Kivy	2004:	163).		
The	same	piece	of	music	may	be	expressively	clear	or	opaque	depending	on	
how	 familiarized	 the	 listener	 is	 with	 it,	 and,	 obviously,	 depending	 on	 her	
particular	 musical	 sensibility	 too.	 I	 might	 not	 feel	 anything	 in	 particular	
listening	to	Eastern	traditional	music,	not	appreciate	its	virtues,	and	as	a	result	
not	enjoy	the	aesthetic	experience	of	 listening	to	 it.	The	same	may	happen	to	
listeners	that	are	not	acquainted	with	any	particular	music	style.	The	more	we	
get	into	it,	the	more	we	understand	it,	and	the	more	we	appreciate	and	enjoy	it.		
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As	I	said,	there	might	be	some	element	of	truth	in	this	idea.	But	as	far	as	I	
know,	there	 is	 little	comparative	research	done	in	this	regard,	and	it	could	be	
also	argued	that	emotions	are	not	equally	experienced	in	all	cultures.	There	is	a	
great	 deal	 of	 learning	 behind	 our	 emotional	 life,	 acquired	 by	 experience	 and	
imitation	from	our	near	context.	However,	there	is	empirical	evidence	showing	
that	 some	basic	emotions	and	 the	way	humans	express	 them	are	not	cultural	
but	biological	endowments	(Juslin	&	Sloboda	2010).	
Anyway,	 I	 think	 that	 in	 spite	of	particular	 examples	 and	associations,	 the	
account	 of	 music	 expressiveness	 I	 have	 just	 presented	 could	 be	 applied	 in	 a	
general	 manner.	 I	 claim	 that	 what	 is	 sometimes	 taken	 as	 the	 mystery	 of	
emotions	in	music	does	not	need	to	be	found	in	anything	else	but	the	music.	
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Chapter	6	
6. Responses	to	aesthetic	
experience	and	affective	
reactions	to	absolute	music	
	
So	 far	 we	 have	 dealt	 with	 the	main	 theme	 of	 this	 work,	 which	 is	 explaining	
music	 expressiveness,	 and	 particularly	 emotive	 properties	 as	 (second-level)	
aesthetic	properties	of	absolute	music.	But	as	 I	suggested	 in	the	 introduction,	
the	interest	in	music	and	the	affective	attachment	to	it	also	results	from	what	
the	audience	experiences	listening	to	music.	We	feel	sadness	while	listening	to	
melancholic	 music,	 we	 may	 cry	 with	 gloomy	 music,	 cry	 with	 joy,	 jump	 and	
dance	with	a	rhythmic	song,	be	startled	at	a	surprising	or	sudden	change	in	the	
musical	work,	 feel	 tension	 and	 expectation,	 be	 reminded	of	 past	 experiences,	
projected	into	future	actions,	become	relaxed,	excited	or	nervous	depending	on	
the	 piece.	 The	 relation	 of	 music	 to	 the	 emotive	 life	 is	 an	 ancient	 issue	 in	
philosophy,	which	takes	us	back	to	Plato,	Aristotle	and	the	stoics.	
Moreover,	we	are	not	just	affected	by	music,	but	we	even	choose	specific	
styles	depending	on	what	we	are	looking	for:	to	help	concentration	for	studying,	
to	 change	 our	mood,	 to	 cheer	 up	 or	 slow	down,	 to	 have	 fun	with	 friends,	 to	
create	 a	 romantic	 atmosphere,	 or	 even	 encourage	 sexual	 intercourse.	We	 are	
touched	by	music	in	several	ways	and	forms,	and	we	listen	to	it	in	our	everyday	
life.		
The	effects	of	specific	pieces	of	music	on	listeners	are	studied	and	tested	
empirically	 by	 experimental	 psychologists;	 there	 is	 research	 on	 how	 music	
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affects	 our	 behavior,	 encourages	 us,	 or	 pushes	 us	 to	make	 decisions	 or	 urges	
potential	consumers	to	go	on	a	shopping	spree.		
Not	everybody	is	moved	by	music	in	the	same	way,	though.	Many	factors	
may	 influence	 the	 individual	 listener’s	 experience:	 genetic	 factors,	 cultural,	
psychological,	 personal,	 et	 cetera.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 intend	 to	 clarify	 what	 is	
meant	 when	 someone	 is	 said	 to	 be	 emotionally	 moved	 by	 music,	 and	 what	
music	carries	with	it	in	order	for	such	emotional	responses	to	happen.		
To	begin	with,	I	want	to	discuss	what	has	been	taken	as	a	paradox	in	regard	
to	emotional	reactions	to	fiction	(novels,	plays	or	films).	Emotional	reaction	in	
ordinary	life,	 involves	an	object	for	which	the	subject	may	feel	something	and	
react	emotionally.102	My	point	here	is	to	analyze	the	so	called	“Fiction	Paradox”	
and	the	possible	ways	out	of	this	problem,	and	see	in	which	way	it	can	help	us	
to	understand	how	and	why	we	respond	emotionally	to	music,	and	especially,	
to	absolute	music,	devoid	of	lyrics,	plot	or	narrative	content	of	any	sort.			
6.1. The	fiction	paradox	
In	order	to	analyze	the	possible	ways	out	of	the	puzzle	of	emotional	reactions	to	
music,	 I	 will	 call	 attention	 to	 what	 Radford	 (1975)	 identified	 as	 the	 “fiction	
paradox”,	 known	 hereafter	 as	 “Radford’s	 paradox”,	 a	 paradoxical	 argument	
regarding	our	emotional	reactions	to	fiction.	I	would	like	to	highlight	the	fact	
that	 what	 is	 seen	 as	 paradoxical	 in	 fiction,	 has	 even	 possibly,	 stronger	
consequences	when	we	consider	the	case	of	music.		
It	 is	a	 fact	 that	subjects	regularly	exhibit	apparently	genuine	emotional	
responses	to	characters	and	situations	that	they	explicitly	take	to	be	fictional,	i.e.	
non-existent.	At	 first	sight,	 there	 is	something	puzzling	about	our	responding	
emotionally	to	stories,	 to	made-up	stories.	How	could	this	happen,	given	that	
we	know	those	stories	are	fictional?	This	can	be	observed	in	literature,	cinema	
																																								 								
102	See	Chapter	1.	
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or	theater	plays.	We	feel	pity	and	cry	for	the	fate	of	Anna	Karenina,	feel	sorrow	
for	 the	 death	 of	 Mercutio	 in	 Romeo	 and	 Juliet	 or	 are	 moved	 by	 Madame	
Bovary’s	plight.	The	following	statements	seem	to	be	simultaneously	true,	but	if	
this	is	so,	we	cannot	avoid	a	paradox.	They	can	be	stated	as	follows	(cf.	Radford	
1975;	Gendler	&	Kovakovich	2005):	
a) Readers	 or	 audiences	 often	 experience	 genuine	 emotional	 responses	
toward	fictional	objects	(e.g.	pleasure,	fear,	pity,	sadness).	This	has	been	
called	“the	response	condition”.	
b) A	necessary	 condition	 for	 experiencing	 genuine	 emotions	 is	 that	 those	
experiencing	them	believe	the	objects	of	their	emotions	to	exist,	i.e.,	that	
they	don’t	believe	that	the	character	or	situation	is	purely	fictional.	This	
has	been	called	“the	coordination	condition”.	
c) Readers	 or	 audiences	 believe	 that	 those	 characters	 and	 situations	 are	
fictional,	 that	 they	 don’t	 exist.	 This	 has	 been	 called	 the	 “belief	
condition”.103	
The	 way	 out	 of	 this	 dilemma	 requires	 rejecting	 at	 least	 one	 of	 these	
mutually	inconsistent	propositions.	Different	solutions	have	been	proposed.		
Denial	of	the	response	condition	
One	possibility	is	to	deny	the	response	condition	(a)	and	argue	that	it	is	not	real	
or	fully-fledged	emotions	that	readers	or	audiences	experience	towards	fictional	
characters	or	situations,	but,	say,	quasi-emotions.	Walton’s	(1978,	1990)	theory	
is	one	of	the	most	prominent	of	this	group	of	solutions.	He	admits	that	in	order	
to	appreciate	fiction	one	must	think	that	the	character	or	situation	is	fictional,	
that	they	don’t	exist.	At	the	same	time,	he	thinks	that	genuine	emotion	requires	
believing	 in	 the	 existence	 of	what	 justifies	 this	 emotion,	 or	 the	 object	 of	 the	
emotion.	
																																								 								
103	The	names	used	for	the	three	conditions	are	to	be	found	in	Gendler	(2013).	
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Facing	 these	 constraints,	 he	 dissolves	 the	 paradox	 arguing	 that	 what	
appear	to	be	genuine	emotions	are	in	the	context	of	engagement	with	imagined	
content,	 “quasi”,	 “pretended”	 or	 “fictional”	 emotions,	 that	 is,	 affective	
components	of	 emotions	 that	we	 imagine	 to	be	 fully-fledged.	 In	other	words,	
our	 emotional	 responses	 to	 fiction,	 are	 themselves	 fictional,	 matters	 of	
pretend-play	 or	 make-belief.	 They	 differ	 from	 their	 corresponding	 actual	
emotion	in	the	source	(what	is	believed	to	be	real	versus	what	is	believed	to	be	
fictional)	and	most	of	 the	 time,	 in	 their	motivating	component,	which	 in	 real	
emotional	 experiences,	 prompts	us	 to	 act.	 But	 they	 share	physiological	 (body	
changes)	 and	 psychological	 aspects	 (the	 feeling	 of	 those	 body	 changes)	 with	
genuine	 emotions.	We	may	 feel	 quasy-pity	 for	 Anna	Karenina,	we	 feel	 it,	 we	
may	cry	for	her,	but	this	does	not	move	us	to	console	her	or	to	try	to	help	her.		
Denial	of	the	belief	condition	
Another	possibility	is	to	deny	the	belief	condition	(c)	and	claim	that	readers	or	
audiences	of	 fiction	 temporarily	 cease	 to	 represent	 the	depicted	characters	or	
situations	 as	 imaginary	 or	 fictional.	 This	 has	 been	 explained	 as	 the	 result	 of	
some	 confusion,	 illusion,	 or	 a	 “suspension	 of	 disbelief”.	 Such	 views	 have	 few	
adherents	 in	contemporary	philosophy,	and	are	mostly	mentioned	in	order	to	
be	later	dismissed.	(cf.	Radford	1975:	302)		
But	for	an	illusion	to	occur,	we	need	to	be	aware	of	what	is	happening,	
i.e.,	that	the	characters	or	situation	are	not	real.	Thus,	the	paradox	remains.	The	
“suspension	 of	 disbelief”	 implies	 that	 those	 objects	 are	 thought	 of	 as	 real.	 It	
seems	to	me	improbable,	except	in	pathological	cases,	that	audiences	or	readers	
forget	that	Anna	Karenina,	Mercutio	or	Madame	Bovary	are	not	real,	that	those	
emotional	objects	may	prompt	them	to	action,	to	try	to	save	them	or	help	them.	
Moreover,	believing	(even	temporarily)	that	those	characters	are	real,	we	would	
be	 appalled,	 and	 it	 would	 not	 help	 explain	 why	 audiences	 or	 readers	 enjoy	
horror	 fiction	 (Carroll	 1990)	 or	negative	 emotional	 experiences	 in	 general.	As	
Samuel	 Johnson	writes	 in	his	Preface	 to	 Shakespeare,	 “The	delight	 of	 tragedy	
proceeds	from	our	consciousness	of	fiction;	if	we	thought	murders	and	treasons	
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real,	they	would	please	no	more”	(Johnson	1974	[1765]).	Those	theories	seem	to	
be	at	odds	with	the	presupposition	that	fiction	makes	appreciation	possible.	
Denial	of	the	coordination	condition	
The	most	prominent	solution	to	the	dilemma	is	the	group	of	possibilities	that	
rejects	the	coordination	condition	(b).	It	lies	behind	the	requirement	posed	by	
cognitivists	about	emotions,	 i.e.,	 the	supposition	that	emotions	require	beliefs	
about	the	existence	of	characters	or	events	that	comprise	the	objects	of	 those	
emotions.	So	one	way	out	of	the	paradox	is	to	deny	one	or	some	aspects	of	the	
cognitive	theory	of	emotions,	in	particular,	to	deny	that	beliefs	are	necessary	for	
emotions	to	occur.	For	example,	 it	may	be	argued	that	objects	we	know	to	be	
fictional	 can	 stir	 emotional	 responses.	 It	 is	 not	 required	 to	 believe	 that	 the	
things	we	are	moved	by	are	actual.	Versions	of	 this	 sort	of	 “thought	 theories”	
have	been	offered	by	Noël	Carroll	(1990),	Susan	Feagin	(1996),	Richard	Moran	
(1994)	and	Jennefer	Robinson	(1994).		
It	is	interesting	that	philosophers	of	the	so	called	“thought	theories”	like	
Carroll	 (1990),	have	 argued	against	 the	purely	 cognitivist	 claim	 in	 the	 case	of	
fiction,	 and	 have	 explained	 that	 we	 experience	 genuine	 emotions	 in	 fiction	
because	 of	 the	 content	 of	 thought	 that	 we	 entertain	 towards	 a	 character	 or	
event.	We	may	feel	fear	standing	on	a	precipice,	although	security	is	guaranteed	
and	no	belief	justifies	this	emotion.	But	the	thought	of	falling	over	the	edge,	the	
mental	 representation	 of	 falling	 over,	 which	 is	 the	 content	 of	 our	 thought,	
elicits	 a	 fearful	 response.	 Likewise,	 in	 fiction.	 The	 thought	 of	 a	 fearsome	
character	 like	Dracula	 is	 something	that	can	be	entertained	without	believing	
that	Dracula	exists	(Carroll	1990).	Both	beliefs	and	thoughts	have	propositional	
contents,	 but	 according	 to	Carroll,	 the	 difference	 is	 essential	 for	 emotions	 in	
fiction	 to	 make	 sense.	 Beliefs	 involve	 commitment	 to	 the	 truth	 of	 the	
proposition,	whereas	thoughts	do	not.	Carroll	clarifies	that	the	content	of	our	
thoughts	in	fiction	is	not	to	be	understood	as	a	product	of	imagination,	because	
it	comes	by	and	large	from	the	outside.	So,	we	don’t	need	to	add	anything	from	
our	 imagination	 in	 order	 to	 find	 a	 way	 out	 of	 the	 paradox.	 His	 critique	 of	
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cognitive	full	blooded	theories	of	emotions	rests	on	the	assumption	that	such	a	
theory	 is	 not	 a	 comprehensive	 account	 of	 all	 the	 responses	 that	 people	 call	
emotions.	
It	 could	 also	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 belief	 component	 is	 not	 necessary	 in	
emotional	 experiences	 in	 fiction,	 and	 say	 that	 it	 is	 not	 belief	 but	 some	 other	
non-object-directed	 mental	 state	 that	 is	 involved.	 It	 may	 be	 argued	 that	 we	
transform	 fictional	 characters	 and	 situations	 into	 mental	 representations,	
identifiable	 through	 descriptions	 derived	 from	 fictional	 language	 and	 its	
propositional	 contents,	 and	 that	 we	 respond	 emotionally	 to	 those	
representations	or	thought	contents	(Lamarque	2004	[1981]).		
This	 may	 explain	 how	 we	 can	 respond	 emotionally	 to	 something	 we	
know	is	 fictitious,	 to	something	we	don’t	believe	to	exist,	 “belief	and	disbelief	
stay	 in	 the	 background	 when	 we	 are	 engaged	 with	 fiction”	 (Lamarque	 2004	
[1981]:	 335).	 According	 to	 him,	 we	 react,	 for	 example,	 to	 the	 killing	 of	
Desdemona	in	Shakespeare’s	Othello,	much	as	we	would	do	to	the	thought	of	a	
real	killing.	This	means	 that	we	can	be	moved	by	a	 thought	 independently	of	
accepting	 it	 as	 true,	 and	 the	 thought	 and	 the	 emotion	 are	 real.	 The	
transforming	of	fictional	characters	into	thoughts	determines	the	limits	of	the	
emotional	reactions,	which	unlike	cases	of	real	killing	events,	will	not	prompt	
us	to	act	or	intervene.	
Some	authors	argue	that	sometimes	audiences	or	readers	empathize	with	
the	 emotions	 in	 fictional	 characters,	 simulating	 the	 emotions	 they	 feel	
imaginatively	 inducing	 them	 in	 themselves.	 That’s	 why	 we	 may	 come	 to	
understand	Anna	Karenina’s	behavior	(Feagin	1996).	An	alternative	option	is	to	
say	 that	 we	 do	 not	 feel	 with	 her,	 but	 for	 her	 (sympathize),	 adopting	 a	 third	
person’s	 perspective	 (Robinson,	 2004).	 I	 can	 feel	 sorry	 for	 the	 fate	 of	 Anna	
Karenina,	and	this	happens	because	the	author,	Tolstoy	in	this	case,	makes	me	
“feel	my	interest	and	values	to	be	at	stake	in	my	encounter	with	this	object	of	
imagination,	then	I	can	respond	emotionally	to	it	(“her”)”	(Feagin	1996:	185).		
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Other	anti-coordination	views	reject	(b)	on	empirical	grounds.	Following	
Damasio’s	 work	 on	 cognitive	 neuroscience	 (1997,	 1999),	 Gendler	 and	
Kovakovich	 (2005)	 suggest	 that	 emotional	 engagement	 with	 imagined	
situations	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 human	 practical	 reasoning.	 Potential	 decisions	 are	
tested	in	imagination,	rejected	or	accepted	based	on	the	emotional	reactions	to	
imagined	outcomes.		
In	general,	it	could	be	questioned	whether	what	we	experience	in	those	
imagined	emotional	episodes	are	genuine	emotional	experiences.	It	seems	quite	
obvious	that	there	is	a	qualitative	difference	between,	e.g.	experiencing	fear	at	
the	 brainless	 driving	 of	 the	 driver	 of	 a	 taxi	 I	 took,	which	may	 prompt	me	 to	
shout	 or	 beg	 him	 to	 decrease	 the	 velocity,	 and	 the	 representation	 of	 this	
situation	 in	my	 imagination.	 I	 agree	with	 the	 idea	 that	 those	 representations	
may	help	us	make	a	better	decision,	or	act	more	reasonably,	when	I	experience	
something	 similar	 in	 real	 life.	 But	 this	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 imagined	
emotional	 representation,	 or	 the	 thought	 content,	 as	 Lamarque	 calls	 it,	 is	 a	
fully-fledged	emotion.	Those	“emotional	experiences”	lack	any	real	intentional	
object,	there	is	no	crazy	taxi	driver	that	is	believed	to	threaten	my	security,	nor	
a	situation	appraised	as	dangerous.		
6.2. The	 fiction	 paradox	 transposed	 to	
music	
So	 far	 I	 have	 sketched	 a	 general	 picture	 of	 the	 solutions	 put	 forward	 for	 the	
fiction	 paradox	 by	 different	 authors.	 Prima	 facie,	 it	 looks	 like	 we	 could	
transpose	it	into	music	and	try	to	clarify	the	issue	of	emotions	in	the	listener	as	
a	 response	 to	music.	 Let’s	 see	 to	 what	 extent	 this	 is	 possible,	 and	 if	 it	 is	 so,	
whether	this	transposition	may	help	to	elucidate	our	issue	or	not.	
Unless	we	admit	a	pure	formalist	account	of	music,	it	is	rare	to	deny	that	
music	moves	us	 in	one	way	or	another.	We	often	describe	ourselves	as	being	
“touched,”	 “saddened,”	 or	 “exhilarated”	 after	 listening	 to	 an	 expressive	
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music-work.	There	is	little	agreement,	however,	on	the	nature	of	this	affective	
reaction.	 Comparing	 to	 emotional	 experiences	 in	 real	 life,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
absolute	 music,	 there	 is	 no	 obvious	 content	 for	 which	 the	 listener	 may	 feel	
touched,	 saddened	of	 exhilarated	 about.	 The	 incongruity	 seems	bigger	 in	 the	
case	of	music	if	we	compare	it	to	our	reactions	to	fictional	characters,	which	at	
least	 are	 something	 towards	 which	 the	 audience	 may	 direct	 her	 emotional	
reaction.	Be	that	as	it	may,	we	feel	somehow	moved	by	music	too.		
But	 as	 soon	 as	we	 attempt	 to	 reformulate	 the	 statements	 of	 Radford’s	
paradox	 for	 fiction	 in	 music,	 we	 realize	 that	 the	 equivalent	 of	 the	 fictional	
characters	 (or	 objects)	 of	 novels	 and	 plays	 in	 music	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 define.	
Remember	 this	 part	 of	 the	 paradox	 as	 stated	 previously:	 (a)	 Readers	 or	
audiences	 often	 experience	 genuine	 emotional	 responses	 toward	 fictional	
objects	 (response	 condition);	 (c)	 Readers	 or	 audiences	 believe	 that	 those	
characters	and	situations	are	fictional,	that	they	don’t	exist	(belief	condition).	
The	 so-called	 “coordination	 condition”	 (b)	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 an	
alleged	relationship	between	emotions	and	beliefs,	a	cognitive	requirement	for	
some	 theories	 of	 emotions,	 something	 that	 can	 be	 discussed,	 and	which	will	
depend	on	the	notion	of	emotion	we	adopt.	But	notice	that	the	fiction	paradox	
holds	because	of	the	“belief	condition”	(c),	i.e.,	the	supposition	that	readers	or	
audiences	 do	 not	 belief	 that	 those	 characters	 are	 real,	 together	 with	 the	
assumption	that	emotional	reactions	towards	them	occur	(a).	We	believe	that	
Anna	Karenina	 is	a	 fictional	character,	but	we	still	get	moved	by	her	 fate	and	
pity	 her.	However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	music,	 for	 the	 belief	 condition	 (c)	 to	make	
sense,	we	need	to	identify	an	object	in	music	that	we	believe	to	exist	(or	don't)	
just	 like	 in	 fiction.	 It	 is	 preposterous	 to	 allege	 that	music	 itself,	 the	musical	
structure	 as	 an	 object,	 is	 the	 candidate	 for	 this	 statement.	 Thus,	 in	 order	 to	
transpose	fairly	the	fiction	paradox	into	music,	we	could	state	it	as	follows:		
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a) Listeners	 often	 experience	 emotions	 towards	 the	 fictional	 objects	
(personae)	depicted	in	music	(response	condition).104	
b) A	necessary	 condition	 for	 experiencing	 genuine	 emotions	 is	 that	 those	
experiencing	 them	 believe	 the	 objects	 of	 their	 emotions	 to	 exist	
(coordination	condition).	
c) Listeners	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 the	 objects	 (personae)	 depicted	 in	music	
exist	(belief	condition).	
Behind	the	formulation	of	the	paradox,	there	 is	a	sine-qua-non	condition,	
i.e.	 a	 presupposition	without	which	 the	 paradox	 does	 not	 hold:	 the	 idea	 that	
music	represents	or	depicts	something.	Unless	we	attribute	meaning	to	music	
and	a	content	represented	by	the	musical	properties,	we	cannot	state	whether	
listeners	experience	emotions	towards	those	objects,	nor	state	they	don’t	(admit	
or	 reject	 (a)).	 The	 same	may	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 belief	 condition.	 In	 order	 to	
accept	 it	 or	 deny	 it,	 we	 must	 admit	 the	 existence	 of	 some	 sort	 of	 object,	
character,	situation,	or	plot	that	music	represents.		
In	the	case	of	music	however,	especially	if	we	limit	ourselves	to	absolute	
or	pure	music,	it	is	hard	not	only	to	identify	fictional	characters	or	events	in	it,	
but	also	to	define	or	guess	which	sort	of	propositional	content	(not	just	beliefs)	
is	involved	in	the	“music-emotional	episode”.	Listening	to	sad	music,	or	music	
expressive	of	sadness,	may	move	us,	but	not	to	sadness.	 In	other	words,	 if	we	
hold	 a	 formalist	 account	 of	music,	 statement	 (a)	 gets	 simpler	 and	we	 should	
explain	 whether	 it	 makes	 sense	 or	 not	 to	 hold	 that	 listeners	 experience	
emotions,	not	directed	 towards	what	music	means	or	 represents,	but	 towards	
music	itself.	I	will	argue	later	that	those	“music	directed”	emotions	have	a	place	
in	a	formalist	picture.	But	also	that	it	is	not	the	whole	story.	Before	that,	I	will	
consider	first	the	possibility	that	music	has	some	sort	of	narrative	content,	see	
																																								 								
104	I	 explained	 the	 idea	 of	 the	musical	 persona	 in	 chapter	 1.	 In	 short,	 “persona	 theories”	
explain	music	expressiveness	by	assuming	that	we	listen	to	expressive	music	as	if	 it	was	
inhabited	by	an	imaginary	character	that	expresses	the	emotions	we	hear	in	it.	
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how	the	paradox	may	be	solved	by	this	way,	and	analyze	the	problems	for	this	
view.	
6.2.1. A	narrativist	account	of	music		
Let	us	consider	what	I	will	take	as	a	narrativist	account	in	music.	We	may	argue	
that	music	is	not	just	pure	form,	but	has	a	semantic	content,	a	content	beyond	
the	 pure	 musical	 features,	 which	 makes	 the	 work	 meaningful.	 A	 musical	
passage	means	something	that	the	attentive	listener	must	discover.	Similarly	to	
narrative	 works	 or	 pictures,	 novels,	 films	 or	 plays,	 music	 could	 be	 taken	 as	
representational	 and	 depictive	 of	 a	 situation	 or	 story.	 In	 Tolstoy’s	 Anna	
Karenina,	 as	 the	 story	 develops,	 her	 affections	 and	 passions	 fluctuate,	 and	 it	
might	be	argued	that	in	music	it	happens	the	same.	If	we	take	the	analogy	to	an	
extreme,	we	may	describe	it	in	all	kinds	of	detail,	assigning	even	proper	names	
to	the	characters	of	the	plot	underlying	music,	something	that	needless	to	say,	I	
think	has	little	ground.		
Behind	 a	 narrativist	 account	 of	music,	 usually	 lies	what	 I	 have	 already	
called	 an	 arousalist	 conception	 of	 emotions	 and	 music.	 In	 general	 terms,	
arousal	 theories	 focus	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 expression	 in	music	 and	 the	 arousal	 of	
emotions	in	the	listener.	Music	is	expressive	of	an	emotion	in	virtue	of	its	power	
to	arouse	the	corresponding	emotion	in	the	listener,	and	expressiveness	is	taken	
as	a	dispositional	property.	Music	is	sad,	because	under	normal	circumstances	it	
makes	the	listener	sad.	In	the	absence	of	such	a	response,	music	is	regarded	as	
devoid	of	expressive	properties.105	
The	literary	analogy	for	absolute	music	has	been	popularly	defended	by	
the	so-called	persona	theory	of	musical	expressiveness.	I	discussed	this	account	
of	music	 in	chapter	2,	and	will	 just	mention	the	main	idea	here.	According	to	
this	account	of	music,	while	listening	to	a	piece	of	music,	the	listener	imagines	
the	 persona	 expressing	 her	 emotions	 in	 music	 as	 the	 externalization	 of	 her	
inner	psychology	(Levinson	1982,	1996,	2005;	Robinson,	1994).	A	music	passage	
																																								 								
105	See	critiques	of	arousalism	in	Chapter	1.	
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might	be	heard	as	sad	because	the	hypothetical	character	is	imagined	to	be	sad.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 listener	 responds	 emotionally	 to	 music,	 either	
sympathizing	with	the	persona	and	feeling	for	her,	or	identifying-empathizing	
with	the	character,	and	feeling	sad	herself.			
Levinson	illustrates	this	idea	with	the	example	of	the	sweeping	pianistic	
gestures	in	a	Rachmaninoff	piano	concerto	as	they	come	from	the	very	heart	of	
the	romantic	hero	who	is	the	musical	persona;	or	the	movements	and	features	
(rhythmic,	 melodic…)	 of	 the	 music	 itself,	 that	 may	 represent	 the	 drooping	
posture	 of	 a	 melancholic	 person,	 for	 instance,	 or	 the	 leaping	 around	 of	 the	
joyful	one.	So,	 if	we	consider	this	account	of	emotions	 in	the	listener,	even	in	
the	case	of	absolute	music,	which	of	course	 lacks	 the	advantage	of	words,	we	
might	still	explain	how	listeners	respond	emotionally	to	the	imagined	character	
or	situation	of	the	work,	like	in	a	novel	or	play.		
This	narrative	recognition	of	emotions	expressed	in	music,	may	lead	the	
listener	to	an	empathetic	identification	with	the	persona,	and	to	“end	up	feeling	
as,	 in	 imagination,	 the	 music	 does”	 (Levinson	 1982:	 337-338),	 just	 as	 we	
empathize	 with	 a	 real	 person	 when	 she	 expresses	 emotions.	 This	 does	 not	
necessarily	mean	 that	 the	 listener	 feels	 as	 the	 persona	 (in	 imagination)	 feels,	
but	by	imagining	that	she	feels	like	the	persona	feels,	she	ends	up	experiencing	
physiological	and	affective	components	of	 that	particular	emotion	 in	her.	Sad	
music	 may	 evoke	 a	 kind	 of	 sadness	 response,	 and	 the	 listener	 may	 feel	
symptoms	 of	 sadness	 and	 an	 indeterminate	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 something	 or	
someone,	the	imagined	persona,	to	be	sad	about.	Even	if	we	acknowledge	that,	
those	emotional	responses	lack	a	determinate	intentional	object	,	in	contrast	to	
many	everyday	life	emotions,	we	may	still	“feel	sad”	listening	to	a	piece	of	music,	
and	this	sadness	will	be	directed	at	some	“featureless	object	posited	vaguely	by	
my	imagination”	(Levinson	1982:	319-22).	
It	 might	 also	 be	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 not	 that	 we	 empathize	 with	 the	
imagined	persona	and	feel	with	her,	but	sympathize	with	her	or	feel	for	her.	The	
environment	that	interacts	with	our	emotions	can	be	imagined,	or	just	thought	
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(not	 real),	 and	 still	 arouse	 emotions.	 I	 can	 have	 emotional	 reactions	 to	 the	
contents	 of	my	 thoughts	 or	 imaginings	 as	 a	 result	 of	 evaluating	 them,	 like	 I	
might	 feel	 sorry	 for	 Anna	Karenina’s	 fate	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 evaluation	 of	 her	
pathetic	 situation.	 But	 I	 don’t	 need	 to	 be	 identified	 with	 the	 character	
(Robinson	 1994,	 2010).	We	 could	 apply	 this	 schema	 to	 emotions	 aroused	 by	
music	in	the	listener,	if	we	consider,	as	previously	argued,	the	possibility	of	an	
imagined	persona	embodied	in	music,	and	engage	with	her	emotions.	
Therefore	 the	 fiction	 paradox	 transposed	 to	 music,	 similarly	 to	 the	
original	Radford’s	paradox,	could	be	solved	rejecting	the	coordination	condition	
and	attributing	to	music	an	imagined	narrative	content.	Imagination	takes	the	
place	of	beliefs.	
6.2.2. Advantages	 and	 problems	 of	 a	 narrativist	
account	of	music	
A	narrativist	account	may	at	 first	sight	be	taken	as	a	plausible	answer	to	how	
emotions	in	music	are	aroused	in	the	listener,	and	at	the	same	time	avoid	the	
downgrading	 of	 the	 affective	 experience	 of	 the	 listener	 to	 “lower”	 forms.	Not	
committed	 to	 the	 truth	 or	 actual	 existence	 of	 the	 objects	 of	 emotions,	
narrativists	see	no	such	a	problem	in	the	alleged	paradox	and	simply	extend	the	
emotional	 engagement	with	 fictional	 characters	 and	 situations	 to	 the	 case	 of	
music.		
Particularly,	persona	theories	have	a	triple	“advantage.”	They	provide	an	
explanation	of	music	expressiveness,	by	means	of	the	fictional	character	whose	
emotions	 are	 embodied	 in	music	 and	 “tell”	 us	what	 the	music	means.	By	 the	
same	token,	the	arousal	of	emotions	such	as	 joy,	 fear,	anger	or	melancholy	 in	
the	listener	seems	to	be	justified.	There	is	something,	someone,	like	in	fiction,	
towards	which	 listener’s	 emotions	 are	 directed	 to.	 Intentionality	 is	 explained	
appealing	to	what	music	means	and	represents.	A	simple	solution.	Finally,	the	
persona	theory,	presumably,	offers	an	explanation	to	listeners’	interest	in	music.	
Listeners,	 allegedly,	 recognize	 the	 emotions	 depicted	 by	 music	 and	 this	
		 131	
upgrades	the	musical	experience	to	a	higher	level.	Listening	to	music	is	seen	as	
a	way	to	try	out	in	imagination	a	variety	of	affective	states	and	learn	from	them,	
states	that	commonly	are	not	found	in	our	everyday	life	(Levinson	1982).	
But	I	think	that	the	idea	of	appealing	to	imagination	to	justify	why	we	get	
moved	by	music	 is	neither	necessary	nor	right.	We	have	seen	in	regard	to	the	
paradox	in	fiction	the	account	given	by	Carroll	(1990,	2003).	In	the	examples	of	
the	precipice,	and	Dracula	as	a	fictional	character,	Carroll	explains	that	one	may	
form	a	mental	representation	of	falling	from	the	precipice,	without	committing	
to	the	truth	of	the	proposition.	Likewise,	the	reader	may	represent	the	content	
of	her	thought	about	such	a	fearful	character	as	Dracula	without	believing	that	
he	exists.	In	both	cases,	we	may	feel	fear	(or	quasi-fear),	but	without	appealing	
to	 our	 personal	 imagination.	 We	 don’t	 imagine	 or	 create	 a	 thought	 out	 of	
nothing,	as	it	seems	this	“naïve	arousalist”	(as	Kivy	(2002)	calls	persona-theory	
advocates)	 thesis	might	 imply.	However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	music	 and	 emotions,	
Levinson	particularly,	makes	too	strong	an	appeal	to	imagination.	According	to	
him,	 for	 instance,	 I	 can	 recognize	 “unrequited	 passion”	 (Levinson	 1982)	 in	
music’s	 persona,	 imagine	 that	 I	 am	 experiencing	 that	 passion,	 and	 as	 a	
consequence	feel	the	psychological	and	affective	components	of	this	passion.		
Too	much	 imagination	 for	my	 liking	 and	 too	 little	 grounding	 in	 what	
music	itself	may	offer	to	the	listener.	Robinson,	after	Levinson,	embraces	more	
cautiously	the	idea	of	a	persona	in	the	work	that	the	listener	of	absolute	music	
engages	with,	arguing	that	she	may	respond	emotionally	to	the	character	of	the	
persona	in	the	work,	interpreting	the	work,	via	music,	as	a	psychological	drama.		
Non-cognitive	emotional	responses	to	music	
Another	way	to	reject	 the	coordination	condition	(b)	of	 the	paradox	 is	by	
denying	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 cognitive	 theories	 of	 emotions,	 in	 particular	 the	
belief	 component.	 Just	 as	 in	 fiction:	A	way	out	of	 the	dilemma	 in	 the	 case	of	
music	is	to	find	a	“non-cognitive”	phenomenological	explanation	for	arousal	of	
emotions	in	listening	to	music,	something	that	could	solve	the	problem	posed	
by	cognitivists.		
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We	may	try	to	resolve	the	problem	not	only	by	appealing	to	an	imagined	
content	or	thought	content	of	the	emotions	in	the	listener,	but	also	by	arguing	
that	 not	 all	 emotional	 responses	 to	 music	 are	 cognitive,	 even	 if	 they	 are	
emotional.	 Let’s	 take	 the	 most	 plausible	 approach.	 We	 should	 admit	 that	
cognitive	 theories	 of	 emotions	 are	 wrong,	 and	 that	 not	 all	 emotional	
experiences	necessarily	 require	 cognitive	processes	 to	be	 involved.	Disturbing	
passages	may	disturb	me	or	reassuring	ones	may	reassure	me,	as	a	 result	of	a	
direct	and	non-cognitive	response	to	the	piece	of	music.	Listeners	may	respond	
without	cognitive	 involvement	 to	a	 fortissimo	bass	drum	 in	 the	 same	way	we	
get	startled	by	a	 thunderclap	(Robinson	 1994,	2010).	Moreover,	 this	picture	of	
emotional	 reactions	 in	 the	 listener	 does	 not	 involve	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	
possibility	 that	 music	 can	 involve	 emotions	 with	 cognitive	 content,	 but	 just	
aims	 to	 stress	 the	 idea	 that	 so	 called	 “direct	 emotions”	 may	 reinforce	 more	
cognitively	complex	emotions.	All	in	all,	the	expressiveness	of	a	piece	as	a	whole	
can	 only	 be	 grasped,	 according	 to	 this	 view,	 if	 listeners’	 direct	 feelings	 are	
aroused	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 they	 provide	 the	 clue	 for	 understanding	 the	
structure	of	a	piece	of	music.	
The	 advantages	 of	 the	 argument	 about	 the	 idea	 of	 “direct	 emotions”	
aroused	 by	 music	 may	 be	 considered	 as	 follows.	 First,	 the	 idea	 that	 direct	
emotions	are	readily	elicited	may	at	first	sight	seems	to	match	our	experience	
while	 listening	 to	music.	Music	makes	 us	 feel	 relaxed	 or	 tense,	 disturbed	 or	
calmed	down,	excited	and	unsettled,	it	might	make	us	tap	our	feet,	or	push	us	
to	dance	(Robinson	1994,	2010).		
Second,	if	we	consider	that	emotions	vary	in	degree	and	also	in	regard	to	
cognitive	 involvement,	we	have	no	need	of	 cognitivism’s	 over-intellectualized	
involvement	(that	claims	that	attentive	listeners	recognize	emotional	properties	
in	music	 as	 an	 act	 of	 perception	 and	 cognition,	 without	 having	 to	 feel	 them	
inside),	 to	get	 soothed	or	excited	by	 the	musical	 form	and	structure.	 It	 is	not	
mandatory	to	understand	what	is	technically	happening	in	the	development	of	
the	work	to	feel	perturbed,	surprised,	or	whatever.	Music’s	expressive	properties	
may	affect	us	directly.	I	don’t	need	to	hold	a	belief	about	the	alleged	object	of	
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musical	emotion,	or	require	an	 intellectual	 involvement	 in	order	to	be	moved	
while	listening	to	music.		
Third,	 assuming	 this	 thesis	we	 could	 still	maintain	 that	music	 arouses	
emotions	that	are	somehow	connected	to	the	expressive	properties	in	the	music,	
and	 give	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 intuition	 that	 when	 I	 listen	 to	 “sad	 music”,	 for	
instance,	I	get	“sad”.		
Fourth,	we	could	also	argue	that	this	account	explains	away	the	problem	
cases	of	resemblance	accounts	of	music’s	expressiveness	discussed	 in	previous	
chapters.		
I	 think	 there	 are	 some	 useful	 ideas	 behind	 the	 position	 of	 direct	
emotions	aroused	by	listening	to	music.	In	fact,	“affective	reactions”	to	musical	
features	of	 the	kind	described	above	are	difficult	 to	 reject	 if	we	appeal	 to	our	
own	experience	when	listening	to	music.	What	I	will	argue	in	the	next	section	is	
precisely	 that	 those	 reactions	occur,	and	 that	 some	of	 them	might	be	derived	
from	musical	properties.	A	calm	adagio	form	might	make	me	feel	calm	when	I	
listen	to	it.		
On	the	other	hand,	if	we	admit	these	sorts	of	direct	emotions,	which	are	
explicitly	described	as	more	primitive,	less	sophisticated	forms	of	emotions	by	
Robinson	(1994),	 then	there	 is	no	need	to	appeal	 to	any	 imaginary	content	 in	
music,	or	anything	of	this	sort.	The	formulation	of	the	paradox	makes	sense,	as	I	
anticipated	before,	if	and	only	if	we	admit	a	sort	of	imagined	content	that	music	
represents.	
6.2.3. Conclusions	
Notice	that	in	any	case,	surpassing	the	purely	musical	boundaries	in	the	case	of	
emotions	 aroused	 by	 music	 is	 problematic	 and	 even	 more	 implausible	 than	
appealing	 to	 the	 composer's	 alleged	 emotional	 state.	 Let’s	 consider	 some	 of	
those	 problems,	 and	 see	 why	 persona-theories	 or	 narrativist	 accounts	 of	
emotional	reactions	to	music	are	wrong.	
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a)	 There	 is	 nothing	 in	 music	 that	 clearly	 points	 at	 an	 intentional	 object	
(except	 if	 we	 take	 music	 as	 such	 objects)	 towards	 which	 our	 emotional	
responses	might	be	directed	and	justified.	There	is	not	a	causal	explanation	for	
our	 fearful	 or	 melancholic	 response	 in	 the	 musical	 properties,	 no	 narrative	
content	to	hand.	I	may	hear	those	emotional	properties,	but	this	does	not	imply	
I	get	fearful	or	melancholic,	because	there	is	nothing	to	justify	those	emotional	
reactions.	Appealing	 to	 representation	 implies	 there	 being	 something	beyond	
music	 that	 is	 depicted	 by	 it,	 like	 when	 a	 canvas	 represents	 a	 sunset	 in	 the	
outside	world,	something	that,	except	for	cases	where	instruments	are	intended	
to	 imitate	 auditory	 phenomena	 (birds,	 weeping,	 flowing	 water...),	 does	 not	
happen	in	music.	
b)	 Narrativist	 views	 ground	 music’s	 expressiveness	 in	 the	 listener’s	
response.106	I	cannot	see	how	this	could	be,	if	the	listener’s	emotional	response	
depends	 (at	 least	 in	 part)	 on	 her	 personal	 imagination.	 Even	 in	 the	 standard	
condition	of	a	qualified	listening	experience	-	where	the	listener	pays	attention	
to	 the	 music,	 is	 familiarized	 with	 the	 music	 that	 she	 is	 listening	 to,	 has	 a	
minimal	 background	 knowledge	 about	 that	 particular	 musical	 form	 and	
grounds	 the	 appreciation	of	 the	work	 in	what	 is	 heard	 in	 the	work	 -	 there	 is	
little	 possibility	 to	 reach	 a	 unified	 conclusion	 about	 “the	 valid	 emotional	
response”	appealing	to	what	is	suggested	to	the	listener’s	individual	imagining.	
It	 seems	 impossible	 to	 me	 to	 decide	 among	 the	 competing	 accounts	 of	 the	
contents	 imagined.	 In	 any	 case,	 it	 fails	 to	 explain	 how	 to	 detect	 a	 particular	
emotion,	because	often	there	is	not	such	a	big	difference	in	the	non-cognitive	
affective	components	of	different	emotions.	
c)	I	don’t	think	absolute	music	has	the	material	to	give	a	description	with	
the	 power	 of	 attributing	 emotions	 or	 any	 other	 sort	 of	 mental	 states	 to	 an	
imagined	 persona.	 In	 fact,	 I	 suspect	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	music	 that	 will	
allow	us	to	infer	any	propositional	content.	A	piece	of	absolute	music,	lacking	
lyrics	 or	 titles	 that	 may	 suggest	 what	 the	 composer	 had	 in	 mind	 when	
																																								 								
106	See	Chapter	1.	
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composing	 in	 a	 particular	 way,	 is	 a	 sound	 event,	 more	 or	 less	 charged	 with	
expressive	properties	that	may	lead	the	listener	to	hear	“emotions”	in	the	work.	
Music	has	a	 form,	a	complex	sort	of	resource	that	provides	 it	with	a	syntactic	
structure,	but	lacking	any	semantic	significance.	The	only	content,	if	we	want	to	
call	it	that,	is	purely	musical,	just	sound.			
d)	 Trying	 to	 attribute	 meaning	 to	 music	 by	 appealing	 to	 an	 imagined	
persona	or	 character,	may	 shift	 the	direction	of	 the	 emotional	 response	 from	
music	 to	 the	 listener’s	 particular	 associations,	 who	 projects	 into	 the	 music	
idiosyncratic	peculiarities	and	this	leaves	music	in	a	very	poor	place.	I	am	not	so	
much	 interested	 in	 the	 psychological	 wanderings	 of	 listeners,	 but	 on	 what	
music	has	to	offer,	respecting	somehow	its	aesthetic	autonomy.		
e)	Audiences	often	 react	 to	 fictional	characters’	 emotional	depictions,	not	
empathically	feeling	like	them,	but	just	the	opposite.	I	just	want	to	clarify	that	
even	 if	 we	 admit	 that	 the	 expressive	 properties	 of	 a	music	work	may	 have	 a	
relation	with	the	emotional	response,	it	does	not	imply	that	listeners	must	feel	
as	the	music	does	(as	Levinson	argues,	 1982).	Listeners	do	not	necessarily	 feel	
sad	when	listening	to	sad	music.	
f)	 Finally,	 as	 many	 have	 pointed	 out,	 were	 the	 persona	 theorist	 right,	 it	
would	be	hard	to	explain	why	we	tend	to	 listen	to	music	 that	 is	expressive	of	
negative	emotions,	 if	we	assume	they	drive	us	to	 feel	 them	in	ourselves.	Take	
Aristotle’s	 catharsis,	 the	 idea	 that	 negative	 expressive	 art	 results	 in	 a	
psychological	purgation	of	negative	emotions	(Halliwell:	2006),	and	follow	with	
Levinson’s	explanation	that	negative	emotions	makes	it	possible	for	us	to	savor	
them,	 and	 check	 ourselves	 in	 a	 potential	 emotional	 situation	 of	 that	 kind	
(Levinson	 1982).	 I	 think	 in	any	of	 them	 it	 remains	unexplained	our	persistent	
attraction	to		listen	to	melancholic	music,	for	example,	over	and	over	again;	or	
prefer,	and	I	talk	now	based	on	my	personal	taste,	minor	and	diminished	chords	
to	major	ones,	something	that	not	just	me,	but	many	people	commonly	do.					
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All	in	all,	this	explanation	does	not	answer	to	what	music	is	and	to	how	
we	 experience	 and	 appreciate	 it.	 I	 think	 the	 analogy	 of	 emotions	 aroused	 by	
fiction	and	by	music	simply	does	not	hold.	
Having	 dismissed	 narrativism	 and	 arousalism	 as	 explanations	 for	
emotions	in	the	listener,	the	following	approaches	to	the	issue	come	to	mind:		
1. We	 may	 hold	 “somehow”	 the	 arousalist	 thesis	 and	 maintain	 that	
there	 exists	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 expressive	 properties	
perceived	 in	music	 and	 some	of	 the	 listeners’	 responses;	 but	 at	 the	
same	 time	 reduce	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 listener’s	 affective	 response	 to	
what	is	just	“inside	music”	abandoning	the	näive	emotivists’	appeal	to	
the	persona	theory.	
2. We	may	reject	the	arousalist	claim	and	search	for	separate	answers	to	
the	issue	of	expression	in	music,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	emotional	
responses	of	the	listener,	on	the	other.	
3. We	may	deny,	adopting	a	purely	formalist	view,	that	music	moves	or	
that	 listeners’	 emotional	 responses	 have	 any	 relevant	 role	 in	music	
appreciation.	
4. We	may	argue	that	the	first	and	second	options	are	both	right	in	part,	
and	find	different	answers	to	different	sorts	of	affective	reactions	to	
music.	
So	far	I	have	argued	that	pure	or	absolute	music	cannot	be	attributed	to	any	
representative	 or	 narrative	 content,	 any	meaning	 beyond	music	 itself	 and,	 in	
particular,	an	imagined	persona	or	situation	towards	which	listeners	may	direct	
their	emotional	response.	However,	the	idea	that	music	moves,	and	if	this	is	so,	
the	question	of	how	this	emotional	reaction	occurs,	still	remains	unsolved.		
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6.3. My	 picture	 of	 emotions	 in	 the	
listener	
Having	argued	against	this	possibility	it	is	time	to	clarify	the	question	of	what	
we	do	mean	when	we	say	that	music	moves,	and	how	it	is	possible,	given	that	
there	is	no	intentional	object	beyond	the	pure	musical	event	towards	which	our	
affective	reactions	are	directed.	
We	 may	 adopt	 a	 purely	 formalist	 approach	 to	 music	 and	 deny	 the	
emotive	 role	 in	 it,	 taking	music	as	devoid	of	 expressive	properties,	or	at	 least	
posing	 those	 properties	 at	 a	 secondary	 level.	 Holding	 tightly	 to	 a	 cognitivist	
theory	 of	 emotions	 and	 also	 of	 music,	 we	 may	 say,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 that	
absolute	music	cannot	provide	the	material	for	such	an	arousal	of	emotions	to	
occur.	And,	on	the	other	hand,	that	the	purpose	of	music	is	neither	to	represent	
nor	 to	 arouse	emotions,	 and	 if	 it	does,	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 aesthetically	 irrelevant	
(Hanslick	 1986	 [1891]).	 In	 this	 view	 the	 only	 aspect	 of	 music	 relevant	 to	 its	
appreciation	is	its	form,	music	as	pure	sound	structure.	
I	 think	 however	 that	 pure	 formalism	 does	 not	 respond	 to	 the	
phenomenology	of	our	musical	experiences.	I	think	emotional	engagement	with	
the	work,	even	if	not	always	absolutely	necessary	for	appreciating	a	work,	most	
of	the	time	helps	to	understand	it	better.	I	may	appreciate	the	perfection	in	the	
counterpoint	of	a	Bach	fugue,	 its	 “mathematical”	harmony,	 its	complexity	and	
craftsmanship	 from	a	purely	 intellectual	 perspective,	without	 feeling	 it	 in	my	
“guts”.	But	as	soon	as	I	recognize	that	it	is	not	just	a	perfect	composition,	but	a	
beautifully	composed	piece	of	art,	emotions	get	involved,	and	this	is	not	totally	
irrelevant,	 but	 may	 help	 to	 understand	 it	 better.	 I	 claim	 that	 listening	 with	
affection	is	not	just	a	way	of	apprehending	the	work,	but	also	that	it	can	help	in	
a	better	understanding	of	the	music-work,	provided	it	does	not	take	attention	
away	from	the	work	in	personal	digressions,.	
What	I	want	to	consider	and	explain	now	is	that	music	indeed	does	move,	
and	not	just	in	a	single	way.		
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On	the	one	hand,	genuine	and	very	intense	emotions	are	aroused	when	
listening	to	music.	In	fact,	music	moves	people	in	an	unique	way.	The	relation	
of	music	to	our	emotive	life	acquires	special	relevance	because	many	emotional	
episodes	 stimulated	 in	 the	 listener	 (also	 in	 the	 performer)	 are	 not	 found	 so	
easily	in	everyday	life.	I	will	argue	that	listening	to	music	is	such	a	pleasurable	
aesthetic	experience	for	many	of	us,	in	great	part	because	of	this	special	power	
to	move.		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 another	 sort	 of	 affective	
phenomena	 provoked	 by	 music	 in	 the	 listeners.	 Those	 affective	 states	 are	
directly	related	to	the	emotional	properties	perceived	in	the	musical	event.	The	
melancholy	 perceived	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 combination	 of	 a	 slow	 tempo,	 a	
downward	 melodic	 line	 and	 a	 minor	 chord,	 for	 instance,	 may	 prompt	 the	
listener	to	feel	accordingly	affected.	What	I	want	to	clarify	is	that	this	affective	
reaction	lacks	part	of	what	is	supposed	to	belong	to	fully-fledged	emotions,	but	
it	 is	 still	a	mental	 state	of	an	affective	kind.	Understanding	moods	as	distinct	
from	 full-blooded	 emotions	 might	 give	 us	 a	 clue	 to	 explain	 how	 music’s	
expressive	properties	elicit	in	the	listener	affective	responses.	
6.3.1. “Aesthetic	emotions”	in	music	
If	we	adopt	a	cognitivist	standpoint,	one	that	takes	cognitive	elements	such	as	
beliefs	 about	 the	 intentional	 object	 of	 emotion	 as	necessary	 for	 an	 emotional	
response	 to	 occur,	 it	 seems	 difficult	 to	 explain	 how	 listeners	 respond	
emotionally	towards	music.	We	could	think	that	there	is	no	apparent	reason	for	
us	to	have	our	emotions	aroused	by	a	musical	experience.	
However,	I	think	that	there	is	a	way	in	which	the	musical	“object”	may	
move	us	to	tears,	or	get	us	carried	away	with	joy.	I	am	talking	about	the	musical	
event	itself,	the	object	of	my	perception.	I	don’t	need	to	appeal	to	imagination	
or	other	contrivances,	and	make	up	an	imagined	persona	inhabiting	the	music	
or	refer	to	the	“the	composer’s	voice”	(Cone	1974).	That	move	is	not	necessary.		
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First,	 because	 being	 moved	 by	 music	 does	 not	 imply	 accepting	 the	
arousalist	 thesis.	 According	 to	 them,	 as	 I	 have	 explained	 before,	 music	 is	
described	 as	 melancholic,	 cheerful	 and	 so	 on,	 in	 virtue	 of	 making	 listeners,	
under	normal	conditions,	melancholic,	cheerful	and	so	forth.	But	I	think	I	can	
hear	melancholy	 in	music,	without	necessarily	 feeling	melancholic	afterwards.	
The	fact	that	I	am	moved	by	Chopin’s	Ballade	no.	1,	has	nothing	to	do	with	the	
arousal	in	me	of	melancholy	while	listening	to	its	melancholic	passages.	In	fact,	
and	 appealing	 to	my	 own	 experience	 as	 listener	 and	 performer,	 “melancholic	
music”,	 if	 it	 is	 beautifully	 melancholic,	 and	 aesthetically	 valuable	 for	 some	
reasons	that	I	appreciate	in	the	work,	might	make	me	cry,	but	not	of	sadness,	
but	joy.		
And	second,	because	it	is	the	purely	musical	work,	the	composition,	the	
combination	of	 form,	structural	elements	and	emergent	expressive	properties,	
that	my	emotions	are	directed	to.	I	am	not	trying	to	argue	that	music	expressive	
of	sadness	moves	us	to	sadness,	or	that	music	expressive	or	anguish	moves	us	to	
anguish,	as	arousalists	do.	There	may	be	some	truth	in	all	this	too,	but	that’s	not	
the	point	of	the	way	of	“moving”	I	am	analyzing	now.	What	I	mean	is	that	the	
aesthetic	appreciation	of	a	music	work,	its	beauty,	its	technical	complexity,	how	
the	development	 of	 the	musical	 event	 creates	 expectation	 in	 the	 listener,	 the	
manner	 in	 which	 expressive	 properties	 are	 constructed	 and	 exhibited	 etc.	 is	
what	moves	us	 to	awe,	marvel,	delight,	wonder	or	 joy.	And	all	 those	affective	
experiences	 are,	 I	 think,	 real	 and	 genuine	 emotions,	 fully-fledged,	 neither	
quasi-emotions	 nor	 illusions.	 These	 are	 not	 emotions	 directed	 to	 a	 story,	 an	
imagined	persona,	or	by	extension,	towards	what	a	music-work	is	expressive	of.		
I	 feel	wonder	at	Oscar	Navarro’s	Concert	 for	Clarinet	 and	Orchestra,107	
and	I	cried	when	I	listened	to	its	performance	a	short	time	ago,	I	cried	with	joy,	
pleasure,	 and	wonder.	 The	 core	 element	 of	wonder,	 for	 instance,	may	 be	 the	
belief	that	I	am	listening	to	a	wonderful	piece	of	music,	and	the	justification	for	
																																								 								
107 		 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRXfahnwtwo.	 Oscar	 Navarro’s	 Concert	 for	
Clarinet	and	Orchestra.	
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this	belief	may	be	 found	 in	 its	musical	 elements:	 the	mystery	 induced	by	 the	
subtle	 percussion	 in	 the	 introduction,	 the	 expectation	 produced	 by	 the	
instrumental	 unfolding	 of	 the	 orchestra,	 the	 masterful	 use	 of	 the	 technical	
possibilities	 of	 the	 clarinet,	 the	 passionate	 expressiveness	 of	 the	melody,	 the	
exquisite	 introduction	 of	 jazzistic	 elements	 in	 what	 is	 a	 piece	 of	 classic	
contemporary	music.	There	is	no	need	to	find	an	aboutness	for	my	emotional	
state	beyond	what	is	purely	musical,	it	is	much	simpler	and	obvious	than	that.	
The	 object	 of	musical	 emotion	 is	 nothing	 else	 but	music.	 There	 is	 no	
need	 to	 resort	 to	 a	 fictional	 character	 inhabiting	 the	music	 that	 the	 listener	
imagines	 as	 expressing	 her	 emotions.	 There	 is	 neither	 any	 necessity	 to	 belief	
those	exist;	as	Kivy	(2002:	 129)	says,	 “the	object	of	 the	musical	emotion	(…)	 is	
the	 set	 of	 features	 in	 the	 music	 that	 the	 listener	 believes	 are	 beautiful,	
magnificent,	or	 in	 some	other	ways	aesthetically	admirable	 to	a	high	degree.”	
The	emotion	is	object-directed	and	the	belief	is	about	something	real,	palpable,	
perceptible,	that	exists,	a	sound	event.	And	it	is	precisely	this	emotional	power	
that	gives	music	its	grandeur.	
Currently	 there	 are	 two	major	 lines	 of	 investigation	 in	 philosophy	 and	
psychology	 of	 emotions:	 a	 feeling	 centered,	 and	 a	 cognitive	 centered	 one.108	
There	is	a	constant	swinging	from	one	trend	to	the	other,	but	the	truth	is	that	
most	 of	 the	 current	 approaches	 are	 hybrid,	 and	 involve	 several	 components	
from	 both	 approaches	 when	 explaining	 the	 nature	 and	 the	 generation	 of	 an	
emotion.109	What	 is	 usually	 argued	 is	 that	 “musical	 emotions”	 (if	 they	 can	 be	
called	 so),	 lack	 any	 specific	 intentional	 object	 toward	 which	 the	 emotion	 is	
directed,	 in	contrast	 to	moods	which	are	more	general.	Many	things	could	be	
discussed	in	this	regard,	starting	from	the	very	definition	of	emotion,	following	
with	the	question	of	whether	intentionality	is	essential	in	an	emotional	episode	
or	not,	 or	wondering	 if	 that	 a	 particular	 object	 is	 necessary	 for	 intentionality	
(e.g.	 to	 be	 sad	 about	 the	 death	 of	 a	 friend)	 or	whether	 intentionality	 can	 be	
																																								 								
108	See	Chapter	1.	
109	For	more	information,	see	Goldie	(2010)	and	Prinz	(2002).	
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explained	 by	 appealing	 just	 to	 a	 formal	 property	 represented	 by	 the	 emotion	
(e.g.	to	be	sad	about	an	irrevocable	loss).110	
But	 our	 current	 case	 is	 independent	 of	 these	 discussions.	 No	 matter	
which	theory	of	emotions	we	hold,	it	does	not	affect	the	fact	that	emotions,	and	
really	vivid	ones,	 are	caused	 listening	 to	and	appreciating	music.	 It	 is	not	my	
intention	 to	 suggest	 that	psychological	 theories	of	emotion,	empirical	data	or	
neurological	research	cannot	help	understand	how	the	aesthetic	experience	of	
an	 emotion	 happens.	 But	 what	 I	 mean	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 force	 the	
phenomenological	evidence	in	order	to	fit	the	theory.	
6.3.2. Other	affective	responses	to	music	
Affective	reactions	to	music	may	take	several	forms,	and	have	different	causes.	I	
think	 that	 among	 the	 affective	 reactions	 provoked	 by	music,	 there	 are	 other	
“emotional”	 (in	 a	 broad	 sense)	 experiences	 different	 to	 those	 previously	
described.	 I	 use	 the	 term	 “affective	 realm”	 as	 a	 generic	 “umbrella	 term”	 that	
covers	 different	 affective	 phenomena	 and	 processes	 like	 moods,	 feelings,	
sentiments,	affective	traits	or	emotions	in	the	narrow	sense	of	emotion.	Before	
addressing	the	different	possibilities,	I’d	like	to	make	a	couple	of	clarifications.	
In	my	view	much	of	the	literature	about	emotions	and	music	has	fallen	
into	error.	The	 root	problem	 is	 the	conflation	 (see	Levinson	 1982,	 1996,	 2005;	
Robinson,	 1994,	 2010)	 of	 the	moving	 character	 of	music	with	 the	 assumption	
that	 for	being	so,	music	must	be	able	 to	elicit,	 in	 the	 listeners,	what	Kivy	has	
called	 “the	 garden	 variety	 of	 emotions”	 (Kivy,	 1980);	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 emotions	
such	as	sorrow,	sadness,	joy,	fear,	anger,	despair,	hope	et	cetera.	Moreover,	they	
need	to	explain	how	it	is	possible	for	this	to	happen,	and	also	why	it	is	possible	
that	 listeners	 seek	 musical	 experiences	 that	 cause	 negative	 emotions	 like	
																																								 								
110	See	Prinz,	2004,	for	further	discussion	about	this	topic.	
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sadness	or	despair;	 and	 for	 that,	 they	often	draw	upon	psychological	 theories	
and	experimental	data	about	emotions	aroused	while	listening	to	music.111	
	 In	 the	 next	 two	 sections,	 I	 leave	 behind	 what	 I	 called	 “aesthetic	
emotions”	to	focus	on	those	other	affective	reactions	to	music.	I	am	referring	to	
the	 affective	 responses	 produced	 when	 listening	 to	 specific	 expressive	
properties	 in	 music.	 My	 aim	 is	 to	 clarify	 the	 nature	 of	 those	 responses,	 the	
nature	of	“becoming	sad”	while	listening	to	sad	music,	or	“becoming	cheerful”	
while	listening	to	cheerful	music.	I	will	analyze	several	possibilities	and	present	
my	conclusions.	
6.3.2.1. Quasi-emotions	and	“weaker”	emotions		
In	the	case	of	absolute	or	instrumental	music,	as	we	have	already	seen,	there	is	
nothing	right	there	for	which	I	may	feel	emotional,	nothing	beyond	the	purely	
musical	 event.	 There	 is	 nothing	 real	 or	 imaginary,	 for	 which	 I	may	 feel	 sad,	
angry	or	 fearful	about	when	 listening	to	sad,	angry	or	 fearful	music.	However	
there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 relation	 between	 the	 emotional	 properties	 music	 is	
expressive	of,	and	the	affective	reaction	of	the	listeners,	a	reaction	that	rises	up	
directly	 from	 the	 perceived	 musical	 properties.	 Are	 listeners	 confused	 when	
they	describe	 their	 experiences	 in	 emotive	 terms?	Or	do	 they	 interpret	 those	
experiences	as	something	that	they	really	are	not?	How	can	it	be	explained?	
A	way	out	of	this	puzzle	is	to	claim	that	what	listeners	feel	in	a	musical	
experience	are	not	genuine	emotions.	As	we	have	seen,	when	we	say	that	“this	
music	makes	me	 sad”,	 holding	 to	 cognitivist	 constraints,	we	 cannot	 take	 this	
“sad	state”	as	genuinely	emotional,	especially	if	we	deal	with	absolute	music.	It	
shares	probably	some	of	the	affective	components	of	genuine	sadness,	but	lacks	
others.	In	this	section,	I	will	consider	three	modes	of	understanding	this	idea.	
1.	 One	 possibility	 that	 deserves	 consideration	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 listeners’	
responses	 to	 music	 cannot	 be	 categorized	 as	 fully-fledged	 emotions,	 but	
																																								 								
111	A	similar	criticism	is	explicitly	made	by	Kivy	(1990,	2012)	and	I	endorse	it	for	the	present	
purposes,	but	just	in	part,	as	I	will	argue	in	subsection	6.3.3.	
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quasi-emotions.	 The	 term	 “quasi”	 refers	 in	 general	 to	 something	 that	 shares	
some	but	not	all	the	features	of	a	kind,	something	that	is	neither	paradigmatic	
nor	genuine.		
However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	music	 and	 emotions,	 this	 term,	 in	 parallel	 to	
emotions	 in	 fiction,	 has	 been	 adopted	 to	 refer	 to	 physiological	 and	
psychological	states	that	being	similar	to	real	emotional	states,	we	 imagine	to	
be	 fully-fledged,	 by	 a	 play	 of	 “make-belief”	 (Walton	 1990).	 In	 the	 case	 of	
absolute	music,	the	role	of	imagination	becomes	more	significant	than	in	fiction	
because	there	is	nothing	behind	that	which	we	pretend	to	be	real.	The	idea	of	
“make-believe”	when	listening	to	music	makes	Schiller’s	metaphor	of	art	as	play,	
literal	and	precise.	This	idea	of	quasi-emotion	makes	expressive	music	the	cause	
of	imaginative	perceiving	and	imaginative	introspection.	The	listener	imagines	
herself	 experiencing	 emotions,	 sentiments	or	moods	 like	 excitement,	passion,	
fervor,	 despair	 etc.	 when	 listening	 to	music.	 This	 psychological	 participation	
creates	quasi-emotions,	so	music	is	expressive	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	listening	
to	it	we	are	aware	of	our	feelings	and	states	of	mind	(Walton	1988).	
2.	We	could	also	argue	that	the	idea	of	quasi-emotions	doesn’t	necessarily	
imply	imagination,	and	that	they	are	emotion-like	in	that,	simply,	they	are	not	
full-blooded	 or	 lack	 some	 component	 of	 genuine	 emotional	 responses,	 like	 a	
particular	 intentional	object	 and/or	 a	motivating	 component	 that	move	us	 to	
react.		
At	the	end	of	the	day,	the	important	thing	is	not	the	label	we	stick	to	our	
response	 (quasi-emotions	or	 any	other),	but	what	we	understand	by	 it.	Thus,	
the	“imagine	version”	of	the	idea	of	quasi-emotions	in	music	is	not	convincing.	I	
don’t	think	that	the	emotional	experience	resulting	from	listening	to	expressive	
music	is	imaginary.	When	the	response	depends	on	the	listener’s	imagination,	
music	 expressiveness	 has	 little	 to	 say.	 We	 perceive	 emotions	 in	 music	 as	
perceptual	properties	in	it,	derived	from	its	musical	features	and	accompanied,	
sometimes,	by	emergent	expressive	properties.	It	is	not	the	case	that	we	create	a	
“fake-emotional”	 or	 pseudo-emotional”	 state,	 or	 as	 Walton	 puts	 it	 a	
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“constellation	of	sensations”	(Walton,	1990).	I	claim	that,	although	we	may	not	
experience	 such	 emotions	 in	 a	 full-blooded	 sense,	 we	 are	 truly	 affected	 and	
moved	listening	to	music.		
Let’s	 take	 an	 example.	 When	 I	 listen	 to	 the	 first	 passage	 of	
Rachmaninoff´s	 Piano	 Concerto	 number	 3, 112 	I	 hear	 the	 short	 oscillatory	
introduction	 in	D	minor	 of	 the	 orchestra	 that	 paves	 the	way	 to	 an	 exquisite	
piano	solo	opening	theme.	The	delicate	expressiveness	of	that	passage	helps	the	
listener	 perceive	 a	 sentient	 plea,	 with	 a	 hint	 of	 sorrow.	 As	 the	 movement	
develops,	it	reaches	ferocious	climaxes,	especially	at	the	cadenza,	helped	by	the	
explosion	of	the	pianistic	chord	sections	and	overlapping	figures-of-eight	in	left	
and	 right	 hand.	 I	 hear	 those	 expressive	 features	 in	music,	 in	 how	 it	 exhibits	
them.		
	
Rachmaninoff,	Piano	Concerto	No	3	in	D	minor,	Op,	30.	Beginning	of	the	main	theme	and	
portion	of	the	cadenza.	
	
This	 expressive	 power	 is	 caused	 by	 the	 combination	 of	 purely	 musical	
elements.	 I	 don’t	 find	 it	 necessary	 to	 appeal	 to	 imaginary	 introspection	 and	
claim	that	music	induces	me	to	imagine	myself	in	a	state	of	sorrow	and	entreaty	
in	order	to	justify	why	I	get	affected	by	this	listening	experience.	The	emotional	
																																								 								
112	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MOOfoW5_2iE.	 Rachmaninoff,	 Piano	Concerto	No	
3	in	D	minor,	Op,	30	
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properties	are	simply	heard,	and	can	be	described	by	a	more	or	 less	 technical	
description.	 I	 believe	 that	 there	must	 be	 another	 explanation	 about	 how	 and	
why	 the	 expressive	 properties	 of	 music	 drive	 us	 to	 correspondent	 affective	
states,	 a	more	 satisfactory	 explanation	 than	 the	 imaginary	mode	described	 in	
the	previous	point.	
Moreover,	 appealing	 to	 imaginative	 introspection	 leaves	 no	 way	 to	
decide	which	of	the	competing	accounts	of	the	imagined	state	is	correct.	Again,	
I	 want	 to	 stress	 that	 appealing	 to	 listeners	 imaginative	 capacity,	 distorts	 the	
intrinsic	expressive	power	of	music,	 and	deviates	 the	emotional	experience	of	
the	 listener	 from	 an	 aesthetically	 concerned	 perspective,	 to	 psychological	
accounts	that	are	irrelevant	to	the	issue	of	this	thesis.		
However,	 if	 we	 get	 rid	 of	 that	 particular	 interpretation	 of	
“quasi-emotion”	 (Walton’s	 imaginative	version)	 that	 I	have	explained	above,	 I	
think	the	concept	could	broadly	explain	the	nature	of	our	emotional	experience	
with	music,	given	that	our	emotional	responses	to	the	expressive	properties	of	
music	are	not	fully-fledged	and	lack	some	of	the	affective	components	that	an	
ordinary	emotional	experience	have.	
3.	 An	 alternative	 to	 quasi-emotions	 is	 admitting	 a	 sort	 of	 mirroring	
response	 to	 music	 expressiveness	 without	 appealing	 to	 imagination	 or	
compromising	with	ideas	that	may	suggest	(like	Walton	does	in	his	parallelism	
with	 fiction)	 a	depictive-representational	 approach	 to	 emotions	 in	music.	We	
may	argue	that	the	resulting	emotional	response	is	different	in	that	it	lacks	an	
emotional	 object	 and	 that	 the	 perceptual	 object	 (the	musical	 event)	 is	 what	
triggers	or	causes	the	affective	reaction,	without	implying	it	is	the	object	of	our	
reaction.	In	other	words,	our	emotional	response	would	not	be	directed	at	the	
perceptual	object,	but	on	the	contrary	this	would	be	the	cause	of	our	reaction.	
This	“weaker	version”	of	emotions	(defended	by	Davies	1994)	may	sound	
a	 bit	 blurred	 or	 undefined,	 but	 I	 think	 it	 suggests	 interesting	 ideas.	 First,	 it	
rejects	 the	 idea	 that	music	describes	 (like	 language)	or	depicts	 (like	pictures)	
something	 else.	 In	 other	 words,	 divesting	 the	 idea	 of	 music	 representing	
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anything	else,	we	also	avoid	falling	into	the	trap	of	looking	for	properties	it	does	
not	possess.	Second,	I	think	it	is	important	to	distinguish	the	intentional	object	
of	an	emotional	response	with	the	cause	of	it.	We	could	compare	it	with,	when	
in	 real	 life	we	witness	 an	 emotional	 episode	 and	 the	perception	of	 this	 event	
unleashes	 as	 if	 by	 contagion	 an	 affective	 process	 in	 our	 system,	 echoing	 that	
episode	in	us,	but	not	because	I	feel	for	the	characters	of	the	event	(they	are	not	
the	 objects	 of	 my	 emotional	 response).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 music,	 the	 ability	 to	
describe	 emotions	 is	 located	 within	 itself.	 In	 Davies’	 (1994)	 words,	 music	
presents	 the	 “aural	 appearance”	 of	 what	 he	 calls	 emotions’	 “characteristics”.	
Similarly,	 our	 mirroring	 response	 to	 music’s	 expressiveness	 echoes	 the	
expressive	appearance	of	its	perceptual	properties.		
Following	 this	 argumentative	 line,	 we	 could	 add	 that	 the	 mental	
representation	 of	 the	 perceived	 event	 (the	 musical	 event	 and	 its	 particular	
features,	the	tempo,	the	pattern	of	rhythms,	the	harmony,	the	key	etc.)	elicits	
bodily	responses	as	well	as	a	mental	process	with	the	result	of	detecting	traces	
of	the	perceived	emotional	properties	in	the	hearer.113	If	this	 is	right,	we	could	
say,	 that	 music	 does	 not	 represent	 emotions,	 but	 rather	 that	 emotional	
properties	 perceived	 in	 music	 (purely	 musical	 features)	 are	 mentally	
represented	by	the	listener	and	that	this	elicits	the	affective	process.	
6.3.2.2. Feelings	and	moods	elicited	by	the	expressive	properties	of	music	
We	 have	 seen	 that	 endorsing	 a	 cognitive	 theory	 of	 emotion	 poses	 some	
constraints	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 emotion,	 and	 that	 those	 constraints	 make	 it	
difficult	to	explain	how	emotions	are	aroused	by	music	 in	the	listener.114	I	will	
																																								 								
113	I	borrow	here	explanations	developed	by	some	theorists	of	emotions	like	Prinz,	2004.	
114	Despite	 the	 many	 ways	 to	 understand	 cognitivism,	 all	 cognitive	 theories	 of	 emotions	
hold	that	emotions	possess	cognitive	states	directed	at	objects	that	are	subsumable	under	
some	general	criteria	(as	 the	object	of	an	occurrent	episode	of	 fear	meets	 the	necessary	
condition	 of	 harmfulness).	 This	 idea	 has	 been	 recently	 reformulated	 as	 “appraisal”,	
understood	(see	Lazarus	1991;	Kivy	2004:	14)	as	“evaluations	of	what	one’s	relationship	to	
the	 environment	 implies	 for	 one’s	 well	 being”.	 The	 identity	 of	 a	 particular	 emotion	 is	
defined	by	a	pattern	of	appraisal	giving	rise	to	them:	the	core	relational	theme.	Example:	
anger	 as	 a	 demeaning	 offense	 against	 me.	 All	 in	 all,	 the	 idea	 of	 intentionality	 and	
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argue	that	it	is	not	necessary	to	violate	those	constraints	in	order	to	explain	how	
listeners	are	“moved”	as	a	response	to	music’s	expressive	properties.	I	will	show	
that	 other	 feeling	 charged	 responses,	 rather	 than	 properly	 emotional	 ones,	
comprise	the	characteristics	of	the	affective	responses	to	music,	and	avoid	the	
problems	mentioned	in	what	we	have	been	discussing	up	to	now.	
I	 have	 already	 argued	 that	 absolute	 music	 cannot	 arouse	 the	 garden	
variety	of	emotions,	not	at	least	in	a	full-blooded	form,	because	it	is	devoid	of	
narrative,	 conceptual	 or	 representational	 content.	 We	 cannot	 get	 angry	 in	
virtue	 of	 perceiving	music	 expressing	 properties	 of	 anger	 or	 sad	 in	 virtue	 of	
perceiving	 sad	 properties.115	But	 I	want	 to	 show	 that	music	 induces	moods	 in	
different	ways	and	that	some	of	those	moods	satisfy	our	required	conditions.	I	
also	claim	that	this	approach	is	compatible	with	a	cognitive	theory	of	emotions	
and	a	formalist	account	of	music’s	expressiveness,	and	that	it	may	explain	our	
intuition	of	being	moved	to	a	particular	affective	tone	when	listening	to	music.	
For	this	purpose,	I	need	to	consider	the	following	issues:	
1. The	 evidence	 that	 shows	 that	 music	 can	 engender	 moods	 or	 similar	
affective	 reactions	 in	 the	 listener,	 in	 virtue	 of	 perceiving	 the	
corresponding	emotive	properties	that	music	is	expressive	of.	
2. A	plausible	explanation	for	the	hypothesis	that	those	moods	are	elicited	
by	the	expressive	properties	perceived	in	music,	and	not	otherwise.	
3. Whether	 among	 the	mood	 states	 elicited	 by	music,	 some	 of	 them	 (at	
least)	may	be	considered	as	complementary	to	an	attentive	 listening	of	
the	 music	 work,	 qua	 art,	 qua	 music,	 i.e.	 independent	 of	 listener’s	
particular	imaginative	recreations	or	other	extra	musical	purposes.	
To	begin	with,	I	must	admit	that	there	is	plenty	of	evidence	that	shows	
that	 music	 can	 affect	 people’s	 moods.	 Music	 is	 used	 in	 therapy	 to	 arouse	
																																								 																																								 																																								 															
evaluation	are	essential	in	cognitive	theories.	This	cognitive	process	results	then	in	bodily	
or	somatic	changes,	feelings	and	action	tendencies.	
115	I	agree	with	Kivy’s	formalism	at	this	point.	
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positive	mood	states	and	other	cognitive	predispositions;	as	a	tool	in	marketing	
to	encourage	shopping;	as	a	mode	of	arousing	spirituality;	as	an	effective	way	to	
evoke	 calm,	 anxiety,	 gloom	 or	 happiness	 in	 movies;	 as	 a	 way	 to	 encourage	
athletes	and	soldiers;	to	encourage	group	cohesion;	as	a	torture	instrument,	and	
in	many	other	ways.	It	seems	obvious	that	in	one	way	or	another,	with	more	or	
less	 cognitive	 implication,	music	 has	 the	 power	 to	 channel	 people’s	 affective	
states	 and	 reactions.	 But	 how	 could	 this	 happen?	Where	 does	music’s	 power	
reside?	And	if	this	is	so,	are	those	affective	responses	the	result	of	an	attentive	
listening,	i.e.,	do	they	have	any	relevant	aesthetic	significance?	
What	 we	 need	 to	 find	 is	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 music	 triggers	 those	
affects	in	the	listener.	I	don’t	intend	to	prove	that	music	has	the	machinery	to	
elicit	all	kinds	of	mood,	in	the	same	way	that	music	cannot	be	expressive	of	just	
any	emotion	(see	chapter	1).	Mood	states	elicited	by	music	in	this	way	may	be	of	
less	intensity	and	duration	compared	with	moods	generated	by	life	conditions.	
In	fact,	despite	cases	in	which	the	listener	has	a	previous	tendency	to	feel	in	a	
particular	way,	 they	 are	usually	 transitory	 states,	 that	may	be	modulated	 and	
altered	even	along	the	listening	experience	of	the	same	work.		
A	 Sonata	 form	 for	 example,	 composed	 of	 three	 or	 four	 movements	
depending	on	the	period,	allows	the	listener	to	experience	different	tempos	and	
emotive	 tones	 in	 what	 has	 been	 composed	 as	 a	 unitary	 work.	 Beethoven’s	
Sonata	no.	8	in	C	minor,	op.	13,	evolves	from	the	Grave	and	its	tragic	spell	and	
dramatic	 changes,	 to	 the	 famously	 expressive	 Adagio	 Cantabile,	 driving	 the	
listener	through	an	atmosphere	of	lyric	calm	and	serenity.	After	this	parenthesis,	
the	 Rondo-Allegro	 sounds	 nervous	 again,	 with	 brio,	 reminiscing	 in	 some	
passages	the	general	tone	of	the	Sonata.	
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Beethoven’	Sonata	no.8	in	C	minor	op	13.116	Opening	bars	of	the	three	movements.	
	
I	 think	 there	 are	different	ways	of	 listening	 to	music,	 in	 the	 same	way	
that	 there	are	different	 sorts	of	appreciation,	and	we	should	not	discredit	 the	
less	 cognitively	 involved	 modes	 before	 appraising	 their	 aesthetic	 relevance.	
Following	the	critique	made	by	Feagin	(2010)	to	the	over	intellectualization	of	
some	 formalist	 theorists,	 I	 disagree	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 only	 aesthetically	
involved	mode	of	listening	to	music	is	the	exclusively	cognitive	one.	Moreover,	
listening	with	feeling	may	help	a	better	apprehension,	although	at	other	times	it	
may	 divert	 one’s	 attention	 from	 what	 is	 properly	 music	 to	 other	 sort	 of	
experiences	and	personal	digression.	
																																								 								
116	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cg9KQ610biU.	 Beethoven’	 Sonata	 no.8	 in	 C	 minor	
op	13.	
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Listening	to	music	attentively,	we	may	perceive	how	it	exhibits	particular	
emotional	 properties	 via	 the	 sonic	 resources	 that	 the	 author	 used	 in	 the	
composition.	By	means	of	 that	music’s	 intrinsic	properties,	 the	composer	will	
try	 to	 “play”	 with	 the	 listener.	 How	 this	 recognition	 is	 possible	 has	 been	
discussed	 at	 length	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 I	 recall	 that	 perceiving	 the	
resemblance	between	 the	dynamic	character	of	music,	 and	 the	human	body’s	
expression,	movement,	gait,	bearing,	or	modulation	of	the	human	voice	when	
expressing	particular	emotions,	plays	 the	central	 role.	Those	emotional	 traces	
are	heard	in	the	work,	and	its	expressive	properties	perceived	“in	appearances”	
(Davies	 1994),	or	as	 “contour”	 (Kivy	 1980).	There	 is	nothing	and	no	one	 there	
expressing	her	emotions.	Music	expressiveness	is	the	perceptual	object	and	the	
cause,	 but	 not	 the	 intentional	 object	 of	 the	 affection	 elicited	 in	 the	 listener,	
because	as	Davies	says	“musical	expressiveness	is	neither	believed	nor	imagined	
to	 answer	 to	 the	 appropriate	 formal-object-description”	 (Davies	 1994:	 301).117	
Moods	 elicited	 by	 music	 have	 a	 perceptual	 object	 but	 not	 any	 particular	
emotional	object.		
But	 how	 do	 we	move	 from	 here	 to	 the	 elicitation	 of	 parallel	 affective	
reactions	in	us?	My	argument	is	as	follows.	
Emotions	 often	 share	 feeling	 components	 with	 thematically	
corresponding	moods.	My	heart	beat	may	race	up	when	I	get	angry	during	an	
argument,	 in	 a	 similar	 fashion	 to	 when	 I	 am	 in	 an	 anxious	mood	 without	 a	
particular	reason	 in	hand,	perhaps	with	 just	 the	accumulation	of	a	number	of	
minor	 problems.	 The	 only	 explanation	 I	 can	 find,	 without	 resorting	 to	 what	
happens	 in	 our	 brains	 when	 such	 affective	 reactions	 occur,	 is	 that	 the	
perception	 of	 certain	 musical	 features	 combined	 together,	 like	 a	 particular	
tempo,	the	harmonic	structure,	the	melodic	line,	the	rhythmical	patterns	or	the	
combination	 of	 different	 timbres,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 orchestral	 composition,	
																																								 								
117	Remember	Prinz’s	distinction	between	 the	particular	object	 (the	event,	 the	cause)	and	
the	formal	object	(what	the	emotion	represents)	of	an	emotion.	
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triggers	 certain	 feeling	 states	 in	 our	 system,	 affectively	 charged	 and	 bodily	
sensed.		
In	the	case	of	the	aforementioned	example,	my	stomach	contracts	as	the	
introductory	grave	bars	of	Beethoven’s	Sonata	develop,	I	take	air	when	it	seems	
the	 tension	 will	 disappear.	 But	 suddenly,	 the	 Allegro	 con	 Brio	 attacks,	 and	
startled,	my	blood	pressure	increases,	and	I	prepare	for	further	surprises.	I	feel	
restless.	Finally,	the	resolution	of	the	first	tempo	gives	me	goose	bumps	(and	I	
may	cry	with	joy,	but	this	is	another	matter).	I	think	that	the	pleasure	we	take	
when	we	are	moved	by	music	in	this	way	is	reflected	in	our	nerve	endings,	and	
has	 an	 impact	 in	 our	 bodies,	 and	 that’s	 why	 we	 often	 experience	 a	 musical	
passage	as	a	feeling	in	our	guts.	
I	would	say	that	the	dynamic	and	temporal	nature	of	music	is	one	of	the	
major	 music	 levers	 in	 regard	 to	 feeling	 responses.	 Music	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	
continuum,	as	the	musical	structure	being	unfolded	through	time.	I	think	that	
this	feature	of	music	encourages	the	involvement	of	the	listener	in	the	artistic	
process.	A	sudden	change	in	the	tempo	for	instance,	or	an	instant	of	silence	just	
after	 an	 energetic	 chromatic	 explosion	 of	 notes,	 may	 change	 completely	 the	
appreciation	of	a	musical	passage,	and	impact	on	the	listener	in	an	unexpected	
way.	What	 triggers	 our	 affective	 response	 is	 not	 an	 atomic	 element,	 but	 the	
specific	combination	of	all	of	them.		
This	property	of	music	is	what	makes	it	especially	expressive,	and	drags	
the	 listener	 into	 its	 trap,	 creating	expectation	along	 the	way,	 and	making	her	
shake	and	quiver.	In	all	likelihood,	music’s	dynamic	nature,	its	intrinsic	relation	
with	time	(the	rhythm,	tempo,	measure,	cadences)	is	what	activates	affectively	
charged	reactions	in	the	listener.	It	is	a	fact	that	music	moves	us	“emotionally”	
(in	 its	 broad	 sense)	 as	 well	 us	 physically.	 As	 Carroll	 points	 out,	 when	 we	
describe	music	movement	as	“speeding	up	and	slowing	down,	rising	and	falling,	
pushing,	 plodding,	 going	 against	 the	 tide…”	 (2003:548)	 we	 may	 not	 only	 be	
describing	the	musical	passage,	but	how	the	music	sounds	and	feels	to	us.		
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Nothing	else	but	the	object	of	my	perception,	an	expressive	music-work	
and	 all	 its	 machinery	 is	 what	 has	 elicited	 this	 feeling	 process.	 My	mind	 has	
registered	the	perceived	stimuli	and	is	doing	its	part.	The	feelings	and	somatic	
and	 physiological	 components	 registered	 are	 presumably	 associated	 with	 a	
mood	or	class	of	moods	in	our	brains.	The	affective	process	leaves	me	in	a	state	
of	excitement	and	restlessness,	and	this	particular	mental	state	may	contribute	
to	the	activation	or	modulation	of	my	attention	to,	and	awareness	or	appraisal	
of	what	surrounds	me.		
The	affective	traces	after	listening	to	a	beautifully	expressive	music-work,	
even	though	they	don’t	last	long,	leave	in	the	listener	a	special	flavor,	one	that	
cannot	be	found	so	easily	in	other	emotive	experiences	of	everyday	life.	I	find	it	
almost	impossible	to	listen	to	a	piece	of	this	sort	without	affective	involvement,	
of	one	kind	or	another,	at	least	if	we	are	“listening”	to	it,	and	not	using	the	piece	
as	a	mere	soundtrack.118		
In	this	particular	case,	I	claim	that	this	affective	process,	less	cognitively	
involved	on	its	own,	a	bit	visceral	at	first	sight,	if	we	want	to	call	it	like	this,	may	
be	 the	 perfect	 complement	 to	 what	 Kivy	 calls	 “a	 canonical	 case	 of	 music	
listening”	 (2009:	 93).	 I	 consider	 that	 this	 humble	 explanation	 of	 how	 feeling	
processes	and	mood	states	are	elicited,	responds	to	the	issues	considered	at	the	
beginning	of	this	subsection.	Back	to	Beethoven’s	Sonata,	we	can	affirm	that:	
(1)	 They	 are	 triggered	 or	 caused	 by	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 formal,	
structural	and	expressive	qualities	of	the	music	work.		
(2)	The	listener's	attention	has	been	focused	on	this	piece	of	music	
and	its	development	over	time,	appreciating	it	qua	music,	qua	an	artistic	
piece	that	deserves	attention.		
(3)	The	experience	has	not	been	corrupted	by	the	listener’s	particular	
imaginings,	 fictional	 personae	or	 idiosyncratic	 associations	 of	 any	 sort,	
																																								 								
118	I	 refer	 to	 the	 two	 ways	 of	 getting	 moved	 developed	 in	 this	 dissertation,	 namely	 the	
“aesthetic	emotions”	and	moods.	
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that	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	 music,	 and	 also	 that	 the	 motivation	 or	 the	
attitude	was	not	either	to	change	or	modulate	a	mood,	as	if	the	is	a	magic	
pill,	but	one	of	enjoyment	and	pleasure	at	an	artistic	work.		
I	want	 to	 clarify	 that	 affective	 reactions	 to	music	 of	 the	 sort	 described	
may	be	less	cognitively	charged	than	what	I	have	called	the	“aesthetic”	ones,	not	
so	 far	 from	 those	 “direct	 emotions”	 that	 Robinson	 talked	 about.	 We	 allow	
ourselves	to	be	driven	by	feelings,	but	even	so,	they	are	not	devoid	of	cognition.	
Attention	and	evaluation	of	what	is	heard	are	probably	involved	in	the	affective	
process.	Moreover,	the	question	here	is	not	to	defend	one	way	of	being	moved	
by	music	against	the	other.	On	the	contrary,	both	are	complementary.		
I	disagree	with	the	idea	defended	by	Kivy	that	the	only	relevant	way	in	
which	music	moves	are	what	I	called	the	“aesthetic	emotions”	(Kivy,	1990,	2002,	
2009).	A	listener	may	decide	to	listen	to	a	piece	of	rock	music	not	because	she	
wants	to	have	a	pure	and	contemplative	aesthetic	experience,	but	because	the	
properties	of	the	song	makes	her	dance	and	bring	her	a	positive	mood.	There	is	
no	 need	 to	 divide	 the	 mind	 in	 two,	 or	 discriminate	 against	 one	 of	 them.	 If	
someone	likes	music,	appreciates	good	music,	enjoys	the	aesthetic	pleasure	this	
experience	offers,	and	is	predisposed	to	listen	to	it	 in	that	particular	moment,	
both	modes	of	 listening	can	go	 together,	 simultaneously,	and	this	co-reaction	
may	help	to	an	even	better	understanding	of	the	work	and	apprehension	of	its	
expressive	properties.			
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Chapter	7	
7. Conclusions	
It	 is	 less	 than	 four	 years	 ago	 that	 this	 story	 began.	 I	 love	 music	 and	 also	
philosophy.	 I	 am	 a	 musician	 myself	 and	 have	 been	 teaching	 philosophy	 for	
many	 years,	 but	 I	would	never	have	 thought	 that	 one	day	both	paths	 should	
converge.	I	was	finishing	my	Master	courses	when	I	decided	on	a	topic	for	the	
final	 dissertation.	 Talking	 with	 the	 professor	 I	 had	 back	 then	 for	 the	 course	
“Language	and	Art”	I	decided	that	the	research	topic	had	to	do	with	both	music	
and	 philosophy.	 And	 here	 I	 am	 now,	 tired	 but	 satisfied	 at	 having	 (almost)	
finished	 this	 research	 project	 at	 a	 moment	 of	 my	 life	 when	 things	 are	 quite	
complicated.	However,	I	have	enjoyed	it	and	I	would	like	to	keep	on	enjoying	it	
for	a	long	time	to	come.	But	I	haven’t	finished	yet	and	the	blinds	are	about	to	be	
lowered.	
We	started	with	a	puzzle,	 the	puzzle	of	expression	 in	music,	 in	particular	
the	 expression	 of	 emotions	 in	 absolute	music,	 that	 is,	music	 devoid	 of	 lyrics,	
plots	 or	 program	of	 any	 sort.	 It	 is	 challenging	 to	 explain	 the	 role	 of	 emotion	
here.	That	seemed	quite	clear	from	the	beginning.			
I	have	explored	different	accounts	of	music	expressiveness.	Some	explained	
expression	 in	music	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	 imaginative	 capacity	 of	 listeners,	 to	
music’s	power	 to	 evoke	 and	arouse	 emotive	 states	 in	 them,	or	 the	passionate	
composer	 that	 created	 the	 composition.	 At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	
“hard-core”	 formalism	 denied	 any	 place	 for	 emotion	 in	 music,	 arguing	 that	
music	 is	 pure	 structure,	 formal	 patterns	 of	 sound	 where	 emotions	 cannot	
inhabit	any	of	its	guises.	After	reviewing	them,	I	arrived	to	the	conclusion	that	
none	of	them	offered	an	adequate	account	of	the	phenomena	that	I	was	really	
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looking	at:	to	explain	what	is	meant	when	we	say	that	this	song	 is	sad	or	that	
passage	is	anguished.				
So	the	first	conclusion	I	reached	is	that	the	answer	to	the	puzzle	needs	to	be	
found	 in	music,	 in	the	potential	of	music	to	house	emotions	as	something	we	
can	perceive.		
I	contend	that	we	“hear	emotions”	as	perceptual	properties	of	music,	 that	
those	properties	have	a	legitimate	place	in	it	and	are	part	of	its	nature.	We	don’t	
hear	 in	music	 anybody	 in	particular	 crying	with	 sadness,	 or	 screaming	 full	 of	
anger.	 What	 we	 perceive,	 hear,	 is	 the	 appearance	 of	 emotions	 as	 they	 are	
ordinarily	 expressed,	 as	 outer	 manifestations	 shaped	 in	 patterns	 of	 sound.	
Music	 does	 not	 “possess”	 emotions	 in	 a	 literal	 sense,	 but	 exhibits	 emotive	
properties.		
After	 analyzing	 the	 uses	 of	 the	 term	 “expression”	 I	 decide	 that	 Tormey’s	
label	 of	 “X	 expression”	 is	 that	 which	 fits	 best	 to	 the	 case	 of	 music.	 A	 sad	
expression	 does	 not	 entail	 somebody’s	 feeling	 sad,	 in	 the	 way	 that	 the	 Saint	
Bernard	dog's	sad	expression	does	not	entail	that	the	dog	is	sad.	In	a	similar	way	
a	prelude	of	Debussy	 is	 sad,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 is	 so	 in	 virtue	of	 some	outward	
musical	 features	 that	 are	 in	 its	musical	 structure.	 So	 I	 argue	 for	 a	 cognitivist	
point	 of	 view	 with	 regards	 to	 music’s	 expressive	 properties,	 and	 hold	 that	 a	
broader	notion	of	“expression”	accommodates	such	properties	perfectly.		
I	think	then,	that	music	is	not	expressive	in	a	metaphorical	sense	and	that	
the	terms	we	apply	to	expressive	properties	are	not	used	figuratively.	When	we	
attribute	 fury	 to	 a	 Beethoven	 symphony	 we	 are	 perceiving	 fury,	 which	 is	 no	
more	than	a	complex	combination	of	musical	elements.	And	this	combination	
can	be	analyzed.	But	it	is	not	a	simple	task.	The	expressive	properties	of	music	
are	not	to	music,	like	colors	are	to	material	things.	Music’s	expressive	features	
are	 there	 in	 virtue	 of	 other	 elements	 that	 can	 be	 identified,	 a	 complex	
agglomeration	of	musical	elements.	Of	course,	the	composer,	if	she	is	good	and	
successful	 to	 carry	 out	 what	 she	 intends,	 avail	 of	 the	 potential	 of	music	 and	
shape	the	sound	accordingly.	The	expressive	character	of	music	does	not	come	
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out	of	nothing,	but	is	created	thanks	to	all	those	little	elements	that	someone	
has	shaped	and	ordered.				
The	 account	 I	 adopt,	 grounds	 on	 a	 formalist	 view	 of	 music,	 “formalism	
revisited,”	 drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	 philosophers	 like	 Peter	 Kivy	 and	 Stephen	
Davies	to	whom	I	owe	so	much.	I	am	more	and	more	convinced	that	music	is	
essentially	formal,	abstract	and	structural,	and	that	its	virtues	have	to	be	found	
in	this	particular	nature	and	nowhere	else.	I	hold,	however,	that	the	expressive	
power	of	music	adds	aesthetic	value	to	it,	and	that	accepting	that	fact,	does	not	
entail	 underestimating	 musical	 form.	 In	 fact	 its	 expressive	 power,	 I	 argue,	
emanates	precisely	from	its	formal	structure.		
The	 biggest	 challenge	 is	 to	 find	 an	 account	 that	 answers	 how	 the	 formal	
features	of	music	and	its	expressive	properties	are	related.	Not	only	that,	but	it	
is	also	important	to	explain	how	it	is	that	we	perceive	some	expressive	features	
and	not	others	in	a	composition.	And	here,	I	admit,	there	is	much	work	to	do	
yet.	Mine	is	just	a	small	step.		
First,	 I	 argued	 that	 emotive,	 and	 expressive	 properties	 of	 artworks	 in	
general	 and	 in	 absolute	music	 in	 particular,	 are	 one	 among	 various	 types	 of	
second-level	 aesthetic	 properties.	 I	 describe	 them	 as	 “aesthetic”	 because	 they	
are	 qualities	 of	 the	 work	 that	 add	 value	 to	 it.	 They	 are	 structural	 and	
phenomenological	properties	of	the	work;	sensuous	features	for	which	taste	is	
required	 in	 order	 to	 recognise	 them.	Here	 I	 point	 to	 the	 difference	 between	
aesthetic	and	non-aesthetic	properties	of	artworks.	The	reason	is	that	whereas	
in	 other	 artistic	 genres	 the	 meaning,	 the	 message	 or	 the	 moral	 of	 the	 work	
counts	towards	its	artistic	evaluation,	this	is	not	the	case	for	absolute	music.	In	
absolute	music,	however,	that	which	is	artistically	relevant	is	the	music-work’s	
aesthetic	 properties	 plus	 its	 dispositional	 properties,	 which	 count	 as	
non-aesthetic	but	art-relevant	properties.	
The	discussion	of	Sibley	on	“aesthetic	concepts”	and	Kivy’s	sharp	reflections	
on	 the	 matter,	 lead	 me	 to	 consider	 what	 is	 the	 place	 of	 expressive	 and	
particularly	emotive	properties,	among	the	aesthetic	properties	of	artworks	 in	
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general.	 I	proposed	a	general	classification	first,	and	I	applied	 it	afterwards	to	
the	case	of	music.		
I	 contended	 that	 the	aesthetic	properties	we	attribute	 to	 artworks	 can	be	
classified	 according	 to	 two	 different	 levels.	 First-level	 properties	 are	 the	
perceptual	 elements	 that	 constitute	 a	 work,	 the	 base	 on	 which	 second-level	
properties	 depend.	 When	 we	 attribute	 delicacy,	 anguish,	 turbulence	 or	 any	
other	such	property,	the	ground	of	such	attributions	needs	to	be	found	in	those	
structural	elements.		
Second,	I	contended	that	the	relation	of	first	and	second-level	properties	is	
one	of	supervenience	of	the	latter	upon	the	former.	Thus,	second-level	aesthetic	
properties	 are	 phenomenological	 properties	 that	 are	 perceived	 as	 simple,	
though	 they	 are	 complex	 agglomerations	 of	 first-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 on	
which	 they	supervene	 (with	 the	possible	exception	of	relational	properties,	as	
we	saw	in	Chapter	3).	The	turbulence	perceived	in	a	Van	Gogh’s	painting	is	the	
result	of	a	combination	of	“physical”	features	and	techniques.	The	melancholy	
heard	 in	 Chopin’s	 compositions	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 complex	 and	 intricate	
combination	of	musical	 features.	Despite	the	dependence	of	emotive	qualities	
on	 other	more	 technical	musical	 features,	we	 hear	 them	 as	 distinct	 qualities,	
separated	from	those	features	on	which	they	supervene.		
Among	second-level	properties	I	propose	a	subdivision	also.	I	don’t	intend	
to	take	it	as	an	absolute	classification.	It	 is	one	amongst	others.	But	I	think	it	
sheds	 some	 light	 on	 our	 purpose,	 that	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 place	 of	 emotive	
properties	 in	music.	What	 I	call	 “feeling	properties”	 like	energetic,	 relaxing	or	
tender,	and	emotive	properties	like	melancholic,	 joyful	or	fearful	correspond	to	
the	 class	 of	 expressive	 properties.	 My	 point	 here	 is	 that	 understanding	 the	
nature	 of	 emotive	 properties	 in	music,	 is	 quite	 similar	 to	 understanding	 the	
nature	of	other	complex	properties.		
The	big	challenge	comes	when	we	have	to	explain	how	 it	is	that	music	has	
such	potentiality,	and	find	the	properties	 in	virtue	of	which	a	musical	work	is	
expressive	 of	 specific	 emotions.	 I	 claim	 that	 this	 power	 is	 to	 be	 found	 in	 its	
		 158	
genuine	musical	machinery,	the	dimensions	of	which	a	sound	event	is	shaped,	
and	 the	 features	 that	 “give	 life”	 to	 it.	 Harmony,	 rhythm	 and	melody	 are	 the	
fundamental	 aspects	 of	music,	 but	 timbre,	 dynamics,	 tempo,	 and	 texture	 are	
very	important	too.	
Included	in	what	I	called	the	emotional	machinery,	I	have	tried	to	identify	
the	 features	 that,	 in	 being	 combined	 in	 particular	ways,	 can	 exhibit	 traces	 of	
what	 humans	 take	 as	 emotional	 characteristics.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 I	 have	
adopted	a	resemblance	account	of	music	expressiveness,	the	idea	that	music	is	
perceived	 as	 expressive	 due	 to	 the	 resemblance	 of	 some	 musical	 features	 to	
human	outer	expressive	“contour”	or	behavior.	
The	first	difficulty	a	resemblance	account	must	face	is	that	those	similarities	
between	people’s	movements,	voice,	gestures,	facial	expression	or	gaits	are	not	
obviously	 identified	 in	music.	 I	have	attempted	 to	compare	 the	way	 in	which	
some	 musical	 aspects	 like	 rhythm,	 tempo,	 tone,	 dynamics,	 etc.	 shaped	 in	
structured	sound,	with	the	way	people	express	emotions.		
I	 have	 also	 pointed	 to	 the	most	 “obscure”	 element	 concerning	 this	 issue:	
harmony.	 I	have	not	yet	 found	a	satisfactory	explanation,	beside	conventional	
matters,	 of	 why	 we	 tend	 to	 hear	 some	 modes	 and	 harmonic	 structures	 as	
expressive	 of	 some	 emotion	 types,	 rather	 than	 others.	 I	 think	 there	 is	much	
research	to	be	done	in	this	regard.		
Just	a	final	consideration	in	regard	to	emotions	in	music.	Saying	that	music	
is	able	to	exhibit	emotions,	and	that	we	may	recognize	them	as	emerging	from	
its	purely	musical	properties,	does	not	 imply	 that	we	can	hear,	 recognize	any	
sort	of	emotion,	in	any	way.	I	think	that	the	criteria	must	be	found	in	what	is	
apparent	in	central	cases	of	genuine,	human	emotional	responses,	in	that	some	
emotions	have	outward	 identifiable	 characteristics,	 and	 some	of	 them	can	be	
exhibited	by	the	combination	of	different	musical	properties.		
Finally,	I	have	dedicated	a	chapter	to	something	I	would	like	to	research	in	
more	 depth:	 the	 responses	 to	music’s	 expressive	 properties.	 I	 introduced	 this	
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section	explaining	what	is	known	as	the	Fiction	Paradox	(or	Radford’s	Paradox).	
The	 puzzle	 of	 how	 audiences	 respond	 emotionally	 to	 fictional	 characters	 or	
situations,	 knowing	 that	 they	 don’t	 exist,	 i.e.	 that	 they	 don’t	 even	 fictionally	
exist,	 results	 in	 particular	 consequences	 in	 the	 case	 of	 absolute	 music.	 I	
conclude	 that	 what	 listeners	 normally	 feel	 when	 listening	 to	 music	 are	 not	
genuine	or	fully-fledged	emotions.	I	have	considered	different	theories	that	try	
to	 justify	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another	 that	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 say	 that	 we	 get	 sad	
listening	 to	 sad	music,	 or	 cheerful	 listening	 to	 cheerful	music.	 I	 have	 argued	
that	 they	 are	 wrong,	 and	 I	 have	 based	 the	 argument	 for	 that	 in	 a	 cognitive	
notion	of	emotions.	I	claim	that	behind	emotions,	there	is	thought,	appraisal	of	
the	situation,	motivation,	attention,	and	most	of	the	time	also	beliefs.	However,	
I	am	not	denying	that	music	moves.		
In	 fact,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 core	 idea	 of	 this	 issue,	 I	 think	 that	music	moves	
basically	in	two	distinct	ways.	
What	 I	 have	 called	 “aesthetic	 emotions”,	 are	 real,	 full-blooded	 emotions,	
and	fulfill	all	the	requirements	to	be	so.	Their	emotional	object	is	nothing	other	
than	the	music-work.	Beliefs,	 judgments,	attention,	cognition,	but	also	feeling	
and	 body	 components	 are	 involved	 and	 directed	 to	 what	 attentive	 listeners	
appreciate	as	valuable	and	beautiful.	 I	 remark	 that	 these	 “aesthetic	emotions”	
don’t	need	to	be	exclusive	to	an	ideal	listener,	an	expert	in	the	particular	genre,	
or	a	well-versed	individual.	The	fact	that	someone	may	not	be	able	to	describe	
the	object	 (perceptual)	 in	 technical	or	properly	musical	 terminology	does	not	
mean	that	proper	“aesthetic	emotions”	cannot	be	heard	by	them.		
With	regard	to	this	sense	of	understanding	how	music	moves	us,	 I	 totally	
agree	with	Kivy’s	account.	 In	 fact,	 I	guess,	 the	power	of	music	 to	 trigger	such	
full	and	deep	emotions,	as	Byron	says	in	his	poem,	is	what	makes	music	almost	
magical	and	terribly	attractive	and	pleasurable.	Our	interest	in	music	may	lie	in	
part	 in	 that	music	unleashes	 in	 the	 listener	 (and	also	 in	 the	performer)	many	
emotional	episodes	that	are	not	found	so	easily	in	everyday	life.	
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On	the	other	hand,	I	think	Kivy’s	enhanced	formalism	fails	to	explain	why	
listeners	tend	to	feel	appropriate	emotions	to	the	emotional	properties	heard	in	
music.	 I	do	not	 think	that	 the	garden	variety	of	emotions,	as	Kivy	calls	 them,	
may	 be	 aroused	 listening	 to	 expressive	 music.	 But	 I	 must	 admit	 that	 other	
parallel	 affective	 responses	 occur	 listening	 to	 music	 expressive	 of	 emotional	
properties.	 There	 exists	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 expressive	 properties	
perceived	in	music	and	some	of	the	listeners’s	responses.	The	difficult	question	
is	to	explain	how	it	is	that	music	has	such	force	and	scope;	how	music	gets	the	
listener	to	catch	its	affective	mode	and	be	affected	by	it	in	a	similar	direction.	
But	we	should	also	explain	why	 listeners	choose	to	be	affected	by	 it,	probably	
more	frequently	and	extensively	than	in	any	other	artistic	form.	
Bearing	 in	mind	 the	 differences	 between	moods	 and	 genuine	 emotions	 I	
have	argued	 that	 the	affective	 reactions	 to	music’s	 expressiveness	match	with	
moods.	In	a	sense,	moods	are	quasi-emotions,	if	we	take	the	idea	of	“quasi”	to	
refer	to	something	that	shares	some	but	not	all	the	features	of	a	type.	If	we	take	
quasi-emotions	as	affective	states	devoid	of	some	emotional	constituents	(like	
beliefs,	 or	 particular	 intentional	 objects,	 for	 example),	 I	 have	 no	 problem	 in	
defining	emotive	reactions	to	music	as	quasi-emotions.	
I	have	pointed	out	that	there	is	a	strong	relation	in	the	emotive	features	we	
perceive	in	music	and	our	affective	reaction.	The	perception	of	certain	musical	
features	combined	together,	the	tempo,	the	harmonic	structure,	the	melody	or	
rhythm,	 triggers	 certain	 feeling	 states	 in	 our	 system,	 affectively	 charged	 and	
bodily	 sensed.	 I	 have	 stressed	 too	 that	 the	 dynamic	 and	 temporal	 nature	 of	
music,	is	one	of	the	major	levers	with	regard	to	feeling	responses.	
I	think	the	explanation,	the	answer	to	the	“how”	question,	must	be	found	in	
the	perceiving	of	those	specific	features,	a	particular	rhythmical	pattern,	sudden	
tempo	 changes,	 or	 intense	 dynamics,	 we	 represent	 them	 in	 our	 mind,	 and	
somehow	relate	the	perceived	property	(or	combination	of	properties	unfolded	
in	 the	 music	 work)	 with	 physiological	 or	 somatic	 features	 characteristically	
associated	with	particular	affective	reactions,	moods	or	classes	of	mood	in	our	
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brains.	My	 intuition	about	how	to	explain	those	sorts	of	affective	reactions	to	
music	follows	this	line.	
Finally,	 I	 claim	 that	 listening	with	affection,	with	emotive	 involvement	of	
one	or	other	sort,	may	help	to	better	appreciate	and	understand	the	music-work,	
and	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 make	 the	 aesthetic	 experience	 of	 listening	 to	 music,	
pleasurable	and	incomparable.	
I	do	not	see	this	thesis	as	the	end	of	my	research	work.	Just	the	opposite:	I	
think	 of	 it	 as	 just	 the	 beginning.	 First,	 my	 most	 immediate	 tasks	 consist	 in	
filling	 in	the	 lacunas	of	 the	present	work.	 I	have	to	systematize	and	complete	
the	 taxonomy	 of	 second-level	 aesthetic	 properties	 of	 art,	 in	 general,	 and	 of	
absolute	music,	in	particular.		
Second,	 this	work	 has	 been	 almost	 exclusively	 devoted	 to	 the	analysis	 of	
artworks	and	music.	I	said	very	little	about	 interpretation	and	evaluation.	This	
has	 been	 a	 natural	 consequence	 of	 having	 limited	 my	 attention	 to	 pure	 or	
absolute	music,	which,	as	I	repeatedly	said,	lacks	any	representational	content,	
and,	 thus,	 has	 few	 non-aesthetic	 artistically	 relevant	 properties	 (I	 have	
tentatively	 included	 only	 dispositional	 properties	 in	 that	 category).	 The	 next	
step	appears	clear	then:	to	add	gradually	extra-musical	elements	like	title,	lyrics,	
acting	 and	 see	 how	 each	 of	 these	 elements	 affect	 the	 interpretation	 and	
evaluation	of	these	sorts	of	hybrid	or	impure	music-works.	
A	third	future	 line	of	research	that	I	hope	to	pursue	in	collaboration	with	
other	 researchers	 at	 the	 Institute	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 intimate	 connection	
between	 music	 and	 dance.	 The	 expressiveness	 of	 music	 gets	 altered	 when	
combined	with	dance’s	expressiveness,	and	perhaps,	vice	versa—or,	who	knows,	
there	might	be	an	asymmetrical	dependence	of	dance	on	music.	There	is	much	
to	discuss	with	dance	specialists.	
A	 fourth	 important	 connection	 I	would	 like	 to	dig	 into	 concerns	 the	 role	
that	 music	 plays	 in	 contemporary	 Western	 movies.	 Music’s	 expressiveness	
contributes	to	the	movies’	capacity	of	moving	the	audience,	that	seems	pretty	
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clear.	Again,	 the	 interesting	question	 is	how,	but	also	what	other	 roles	music	
plays	and	why.		
I	 intend	 to	pursue	all	 these	 lines	 in	 the	 future	or,	 at	 least,	 some	of	 them,	
while	 I	go	on	teaching	philosophy	to	young	women	and	men	and	playing	the	
piano	in	a	rock	band.	I	may	be	a	little	optimistic,	but	that’s	how	I	ended	up	here:	
pretty	much	ignoring	limitations	of	time	and	space.	
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